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ABSTRACT~ 
Contemporary feminism has witnessed the rejection of the sex/gender distinction. 
This thesis examines the effect of this rejection on conceptions of women's 
agency. It addresses this issue within the context of feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. The thesis outlines the critique of the sex/gender 
distinction provided by Judith Butler. I attribute to Butler a critique of the concept 
of pre-discursive subjectivi~y, the view that sexed bodies are natural and ther~fore 
fixed. Butler argues that the concept of pre-discursive subjectivity underlies the 
sex/gender distinction. She argues thi's concept is synonymous with the 
· foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency for women. Butler rejects the concept 
of pre-discursive subjectivity. This necessitates the radical reconfiguration of the 
concept of agency. 
Butler's thesis is then brought together wi(h another domain of philosophy ,. the 
· is_sue of. reproductive technology. I ask how Butler's rejection of the concept of 
pre-discursive subjectivity relates to the radical feminist's critique of reproductive . 
technologies? This question is answered by appealing to a concept of 
disembodied individualism which figures within Rosalyn Diprose's critique of 
bioethics. Di prose argues that the fundamental principles of bioethics are based on 
a co_ncept of disembodied · individualism. The concept of dis·embodied 
individualism amounts to a concept of pre-discursive subjectivity. Disembodied 
individualism, like pre-discursive subjectivity, implies the immutability of sexed 
bodies. I argue that a concept ·of prediscursive subjectivity is perpetuated within 
· t~e realm of radical feminist criticisms of reproductive technology. Returning to 
Butler's understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and agency it is 
argued that feminist criticism of reproductive technology foreclose adequate 
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concepts of agency for women. This is because such criticisms perpetuate the 
assumption of pre-discursive subjectivity. It is asked whether Butler's 
reconfiguration of agency can address this problematic feature of the radical 
feminist critique of reproductive technology. 
Part two of this thesis applies Butler's reconfiguration of agency to the issue of 
reproductive technology. It is argued that Butler's reformulation of the concept of 
agency cannot substitute for conventional conceptions of agency. This is argued 
on the basis that conventional conceptions of agency are an inevitable and 
necessary political fiction. Consequently the appeal to conventional conceptions 
of agency within the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology cannot 
·be a basis for a rejection of that critique. While Butler 's reformulation of agency 
. 
cannot substitute for conventional conceptions of agency, it nonetheless 
accommodates the possibility of change for women. 
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INTRODUCTION ~ 
Women's Bodies Are Not Biological Laboratories. 
Demand Reproductive Freedom. 
(S~icker for N .U .S Women's Department. 1996. Macquarie University.) 
For someone con'cerned with the issue of women 's reproductive rights , this 
slogan would probably carry many positive meanings. For instance , it may be 
regarded as: an example of women asserting the right to control their bodies; an · 
invitation to solidarity for the purpose of achieving a political objective ; a 
repection of the possibility of subverting patriarchal control of women 's bodies . 
Those acquainted with feminist campaigns for women's reproductive rights will 
probably be highly familiar with this type of slogan, as well as its implicit 
meanings. Indeed , this slogan constitutes a highly conventional political response 
to the issue of reproductive technologies. Such conventions are no less evident in 
feminist philosophical critiques of reproductive technologies. Traditionally , some 
femini~t' theorists have opposed the use .of reproductive technologies. These 
practices have been described as involving women 's objectification and 
patriarchal control over women's bodies. In the terms of conventional feminist 
philosophy therefore, the meanings contained within this slogan correspond to 
specific and important theoretical objectives. By the end of this thesis however, it 
will become apparent that from the p~rspective of contemporary feminist 
philosophy this slogan contains m~anings which seem to conflict with the 
objectives of feminist philosophers. How can such a seemingly positive message 
come to represent something negative for women? This question can be answered 
through recourse to contemporary feminism's rejection · of the sex-gender 
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distinction. Indeed, this theoretic~! development marks the point of departure in 
this thesis. More specifically, the general aim of ·this thesis is to explore the 
implications of this theoretical development for conceptions of women's agency 
within the context of radical feminist critiques of reproductive technology. 
In pursuing this aim, I will assume that the reader has some familiarity with the 
way in which contemporary feminism is characterised by a rejection of the sex-
gender distinction. For the sake of clarity however, let me outline this recent shift 
within feminist philosophy and at the same time inform the reader of debates 
surrounding this theoretical shift. · I shall begin by reminding the reader of the 
significance of the sex-gender distinction within conventional feminist 
philosophy. The history of philosophy contains numerous theories of subjectivity. 
Feminist philosophers acknowledge that these theories consistently incorporate a 
concept of the body. Feminists have observed however, that these theories 
consistently ignore the interaction between body and subje·ctivity. In particular, it 
is argued that these theories invariably conceive the body in isolation from the 
mind or consciousness. For instance, the philosopher Rene Descartes' writings 
are exemplary of this division between body and mind. For Descartes, the body is 
defined ' by its capacity to occupy space. The mind on the other hand, is 
considered as a domain of pure thought - based on Reason. Moreover, these 
elements are regarded as mutually exclusive. Thus, consciousness is considered 
non-spatial and the body is regarded as mere . matter. Significantly, this binary 
classification attributes subjectivity to the mind, characterising the body in 
isolation from consciousness and subsequently from subjectivity or personhood. 
(Descartes 1954 pp 66 -7.5) 
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More importantly for feminists, this formulation of the relation between mind and 
body can be related to women's social and political subjugation. Within the mind-
body paradigm, the body is relegated to the status of object. The mind-body 
paradigm involves the idea that the mind . is the domain of subjectivity and the 
capacity for Reason. Moreover, the minds capacity for Reason is that factor 
differentiating man from animals. Secondly, the mind-body paradigm involves 
the idea that the body remains distinctly within the realm of the physical, the 
organic or the natural. Thus, by virtue of its disconnectedness from reason, the 
body's activities are regarded as animalistic, un-tamely or natural. Descartes, for 
instance, only differentiates the body from other organic forms· by virtue of the 
complexity of its structure thereby assuming the body's place within the physical 
order. One consequence that arises through aligning the , body with the natural 
order is that it comes to be regarded in the same manner as other organic forms 
within the physical order. (Grosz 1987, p 5) Just as other organic forms become 
the object of scientific investigation, so too the human body is relegated to the 
status of object for the natural sciences. Accordingly, the social sciences takes 
the mind and its ideas as its primary focus. (Grosz 1987, p 5) In brief, -a dualist 
conception of subjectivity sharply divides the body from the mind. Jt also 
, assumes a specific conception of the body as an objective entity, a natural object 
independent from subjectivity. Moreover, Cartesian dualism is linked to "the 
foundations of knowledge itself, a link which places the mind in a position of 
hierarchal superiority over and abov·e nature, including ·the nature of the body." 
(Grosz 1994, p6) 
This conception of the body becomes significant when one .considers the 
historical conflation of women and their body. Some feminists have argued · that 
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·. Cartesiar.i dualism is linked to the institution of . a 'value laden identity for 
women'. Traditionally the value attributed to women has been, as Gatens reminds 
us, a negative value: 
Cultural attitudes to both women and corporeality . are 
often negative ... Women are most often understood to be 
less able to control the passions of the body and this 
failure is often located in the apriori disorder or anarchy of 
the body itself. (Gatens 1988, p60) 
The conflation of women's identity with a presumably inferior body is known as 
'biological essentialism' and refers specifically to the way "in which wo~en 's 
essence is defined in terms of their biological capacities." (Grosz 1990, p 334) 
Genevieve Lloyd explains this biological essentialism with direct reference to 
Descartes' method, which she argues, becomes inadvertently linked to the 
emergepce of a conception of · a specifically female consciousness characterised 
by an apparently inferior capacity for reason.1 Llyod argues that "in the context . 
of associations already existing between gender and Reason, [Descartes] version 
of the mind-body relatibnship produced stark polarizations of previously existing 
contrasts." (Lloyd, 1984, p45) Notably, this contrast emerged despite Descartes 
intentions; Descartes included women amongst those capable of Reason. 
' However, his characterisation of the mind as the place of Reason and the body as 
synonymous with the non-rational, inadvertently became associated with 
women's subjection. 
5 
This is ~evealed by tracing naturalistic perspectives on femininity, or notions of a 
corporeally determined female nature. Ludmilla Jordanova describes the way in 
which post Enlightenment (scientific and medical) definitions of femininity 
assumed a deterministic connection between women's biology and the idea of a 
so-called feminine character .2 Women were not only regarded as bound to the 
natural rhythms and laws of their bodies, they were regarded as biologically 
predisposed to uncontrolled passion, emotion and irrationality. The post-
enlightenment primarily scientific conception of womanhood thus involved the 
idea that women were subject to their bodies. Of course , we have seen that 
according to dualism, corporeality is conceptualised in opposition to Reason. So, 
the added proposition that women are tied to a fixed corporeality implies that 
women should not be regarded as fully rational subjects. Thus, the Cartesian 
concept of the subject does not sim.ply divide body and mind. It also provides the 
basis for a division of men and women into essentialist and fixed categories, 
rela_tive to their biological sex. In short, dualism has been linked to the idea that 
men are rational subjects housed within a body, while women, whnse bodies are 
at the mercy of natural laws, are assumed to have a supposedly lower capacity for 
Reason. 
Understandably, many feminists have contested this conception of a biologically 
. . 
determined female nature. It has been argued that this presumption assists in the 
rationalisation of the patriarchal .oppression of women. In particular, it helps to 
foster the perception that -women's prescribed social function is "natural" and 
therefore inevitable or unchangeable. If women are subject to their biology, and a 
woman's reproductive organs are part of that biology, then at least one of 
women's "natural" functions must be that of maternity. Feminists observe 
I ..
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however, that a woman's reproductive organs are not simply defined as part of 
her biology. Rather, they are seen as the singularly most crucial feature in the 
characterisation of women's identity. Moreover, with the added presumption that 
women's biology is· ",naturally" designed for a maternal role, the conflation of 
women with their bodies (reproductive organs) also provides a justification for 
the continued use of women - as objects - in the reproduction of patriarchal 
subjects. Thus as Grosz maintains, biological determinism "ties women closely 
to the functions of reproduction and nuturance ... [and is] an attempt to limit 
worn-en's social and psychological capacities." (Grosz 1990, p334). 
Thus, feminists h_ave consistently maintained that there are several negative bi-
products_ of dualism for women. It helps to reinforce a conflation of women with 
' 
their bodies and a reduction of women to the status of object. Secondly, it allows 
for the rationalisation that a maternal social function for women is natural. 
Feminist attempts to undermine biological essentialism are characterised by the 
promotion of women's rationality, a theoretical position most typical of 
egalitarian feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft .3 The attempt to undermine 
essentialism is also characterised by an attempt to differentiate ·women's identity 
from women's corporeality. One means of achieving this has been through the 
fotmulation of a ·sex-gender distinction. It is necessary to provide the reader with 
a brief account of this distinction. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a 
context in which to better understand recent concepts of subjectivity within 
contemporary feminist philosophy. I will not only provide an account of the sex-
gender distinction, I will also examine contemporary criticism of this formulation 
of subjectivity. In particular, I will elucidate feminist's justification for the 
.I 
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formation of an alternative to the sex-gender distinction., namely, a theory of 
constitutive embodied subjectivity . 
The Sex - Gender Distinction. 
The sex-gender distinction involves the idea of a sociologically constructed 
identity. Simultaneously, it involves the idea that subjectivity can be explained 
independent of any biological · characteristic. In other words, the sex~gender 
distinction involves defining sex as a biological category that bares no direct 
influence upon the purely social category of gender. We can recall that 
traditionally women have been conflated with their bodies. The sex-gender 
distinction stands in opposition to such biological reductionism. "Gender" as 
opposed to "sex", becomes the "central explanatory and organising category" 
capable of revealing the "social and familial and/or discursive construction of 
subjectivity." (Gatens 1983, p 144)"Significantly , the· sex-gen_der distinction has 
been used to address the issue of women's social oppression. We have seen how 
the presumption of women's relation to their bodies can function to restrict 
women's social freedom. Feminists have responded to this limitation by 
endeavouring to achieve sexual "equality" for women. Equality here is defined in 
terms of the right of women to have equivalent access to social and political life. 
The formation of the sex-gender distinction functions in favour of this objective. 
It denotes an· "arbitrary connection between femininity and the female body", 
such that the female body need no longer be thought of as a barrier to achieving· 
"equality" with men. (Gatens 1983, p 144) In particular, the sex-gender 
distinction is linked with the neutralisation of sexual difference so that women are 
seen as "free" from the constrairits of biological determinism. 
• 
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Sex-gender and the Perpetuation of Hierarchical Dualism. 
There is little doubt that the sex-gender distinction has been crucial in addressing 
the issue of women's limited and subordinate place in culture. However, some 
contemporary feminists argue that this model of subjectivity involves an 
inadvertent perpetuation of women's subjugation. This is because the sex-gender 
distinction, while combating biological determinism, inadvertently adheres to a 
dualist theory of subjectivity and the hierarchical division between mind and 
body. As Gatens argues , theorists who employ the sex-gender distinction 
understand this dichotomy as synonymous with a body-consciousness distinction. 
Subjectivity can be characterised as either "predominantly (or wholly) determined 
by biological forces .... or predominantly (or wholly) determined by the influence 
of social and familial relations ... " (Gatens 1983, p 147) The essentialist 
conception of women's identity I have outlined , is an example of the former 
characterisation of subjectivity, that is, women's identity is the product of their 
biology. The se;x-gender distinction is an example of the latter characterisation of 
subjectivity, that is, women's identity is the product of socialisation rather than 
their biological sex.
4 
Gatens observes however, that both these formulations of 
subjectivity propound hierarchical dualism. 
We have already seen the way in which essentialist conceptions of women's 
' 
identity propound hierarchical dualism. The · sex-gender distinction however, 
perpetuates hierarchical dualism on the basis that it presumes "the mind, of either 
sex, is a neutral, passive entity .... on which is inscribed various social lessons", 
and presumes the body as "the passive mediator of these inscriptions." (Gatens 
1983, p 144) In other words, the sex-gender distinction involves the assumption 
that the mind is a passive entity upon which the subject 's social character is 
----, 
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inscribed. It also implicitly assumes the neutrality and passivity of the body 
relative to the socialisation . process. Gender theorists maintain that the social 
determination of subjectivity operates solely in relation to consciousness; the 
body is regarded as having no effect upon the construction of a person's gender 
identity. Hence, hierarchical dualism is inherent in the sex-gender distinction in 
so far as the body is conceived as irrelevant to consciousness. This assumption of 
the neutrality of the body renders the sex-gender distinction problematic. It could 
be argued that despite the perpetuation of the body's marginalisation inherent in 
the sex-gender distinction, this formulation of subjectivity is nonetheless useful. 
As I have suggest~d, it helps to disentangle women from their traditional 
conflation with the body and subsequently proviqes a basis for the recognition of 
women as equal subjects. Yet, many contemporary feminist . philosophers , 
including Elizabeth Grosz, remain dissatisfied with the neutralisation of the body 
that the sex-gender distinction entails. This is, as we shall see, because the 
neutralisation of the body signifies a failure to adequately represent women's 
corporeal specificity. 
As suggested, the sex-gender distinction defines subjectivity solely in terms of 
the relation between consciousness and one's social environment. According to 
this formulation, the female body becomes peripheral to women's subjectivity. 
Thus, the sex-gender distinction allows women an identity independent of their 
body in order that they can be "e·qual" with men. However, this does not result in 
women being understood as embodied subjects. Rather, the attempt to neutralise 
the relevance of women's bodies results in a shift from women as de-subjectified 
bodies, to women as dis-embodied subjects. As suggested, the sex-gender 
distinction implies the possibility that women can be "free" from being conflated 
i . 
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with · their body. However, this possibility only exists through women's 
conformity with an implicitly male definition of human subjectivity. In other 
wo_rds, the sex-gender distinction does not really neutralise the diff~rence between 
women and men. It demands that women transcend their bodies in order to 
become subjects equal to men. So, not only does the sex-gender distinction leave 
the hierarchical division between mind and body intact, women's bodies remain 
the abject factor within this representation. Moreover, the sex-gender distinction, 
' ' 
as a theory that promotes a "male-defined notion of humanity" , is a theory of 
subjectivity incapable of properly addressing the particularity of women's 
corporeal existence. (Grosz 1987, p 2) 
Constitutive Embodied Subjectivity. 
From this recognition there has emerged a division within feminist theory 
between egalitarian feminisms and feminisms of sexual difference or corporeal 
feminisms. As suggested, theorists of sexual ·difference argue that traditional 
feminist responses to essentialist conceptions of women's identity inadvertently 
abstract women from the -particularities of their sex and demand their conformity 
with "an implicitly male-defined notion of humanity." (Grosz 1987, p 2) Whether 
women are defined as the opposite of men or, as egalitarian feminist argue, the 
same or similar to men, they are, as Grosz remarks, "seen as variations or 
versions of masculinity." (Grosz 1989 pxx) This recognition of the 'phallocentric' 
element of traditional feminist arguments has lead some feminists to question 
whether it is possible t'1 represent women independent of such relationality. 
Addressing this issue, the work of Elizabeth Grosz features as instrumental in the 
development of new modes of representing both sexual difference and the body. 
Drawing from the work of the French philosopher Luce Irigaray , Grosz derives a 
1 
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mode of embodiment that represents a radical break from conventional modes of 
theorising about the body. 
For Irigaray, not only is subjectivity structured with 
reference to the (symbolic) meaning of the body, but the 
body itself is product and effect of symbolic inscription 
which produces it as a particular, socially appropriate type 
of body. (Grosz 1989, pxix) 
This way of conceptualising the body represents a shift away from naturalistic , 
essentialist or fixed notions of the body towards a body re-theorised as an object 
of social production. Thus, within this re-theorisation, the body is recognised as 
' 
situated within and subsequently constituted in relation to ·specific social and 
historical contexts. This constitutive theory of embodied subjectivity ( or 
constructionism) recognises the body is a site of cultural signification.
5 
Part of its 
appeal for feminism is the potential for recognising the fluidity or pliability of the 
body. Because the body itself is viewed as a social object, the "rigid body" of 
. biological paradigms is replaced with a perception of ·the body as open to re-
organisation or transformation. Feminists also argue that this way of theorising 
about the body allows for the recognition of women's common experience, as 
well as their individual specificities. 
The specificity of the body must be understood in terms of 
its historical rather than simply biological concreteness. 
Indeed, there is no body. as such: there are only bodies -
111! 
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male or female, black; brown, white, large _ or small- and 
the graduations in between. (Grosz 1994, p19) 
1.2 
·A theory @f constitutive embodied subjectivity thus promotes an understanding of 
the body beyond the arguably reductionist categories of "male" and "female". In 
short, this way of conceptualising the body allows feminists to utilise the ·body as 
"a critical tool by which the' masculinity of prevailing knowledge's can be 
recognised and women's specific experience articulated". (Grosz 1987, p 3) 
A theory of constitutive e-mbodied subjectivity is the source for a wide array of 
' corporeal feminisms'. Cont~mporary feminists have utilised this concept of 
_embodiment in areas as diverse as political philosophy, bioeth_ics, biomedicine, 
anthropology and cognitive psychology .6 Central to the criticisms 'feminists of 
embodiment' make of these disciplines is that they maintain the traditional 
oppositions central to Western intellectual tradition, namely mind/body, 
nature/culture, reason/passion, sex/gender, and that these dualisms disavow the 
body in a way that is ultimately problematic for women. Attempting to counteract 
this tradition of a forgotten body, feminists of embodiment have utilised a theory 
of constitutive embodied subjectivity to develop new ways of conceptualising the 
relationship between such dualisms. ·A notable example of this is Moira Ga tens 
recent endeavours to reconceptualise the -relationship between mind/body and 
reason/passion dualisms. Using the metaphor of the body politic , Gaten's argues 
that 'newly imagined bodies' presents the possibility of alternate social, ethical, 
political and legal paradig~s .7 
l 
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In the area of bioethics, Rosalyn Diprose informs us of the way in which the 
assumption of "self present, autonomous, disembodied individuals" underlies 
biomedical ethics with serious consequences for women. (Diprose 1994b p 1)
8 
She argues that the concept of 'disembodied individualism' which underlies 
conventional ethics, particularly contractarian ethics, fails to accommodate 
women's corporeal specificities. In particular, the maternal body fails to be 
represented within the contractarian model of social exchange in so far as a 
pregnant woman's right to sovereignty over her body /property is forfeited in the 
name of justice and the 'common good'. While according to Diprose, regimes of 
social regulation constitute women's embodiment as 'other' to men and thereby 
perpetuate v.romen's exclusion from social exchange, alternatives to this 
understanding of sexual difference are possible. If regimes of social regulation 
constitute women's embodiment then alternative representations of embodiment 
and sexual difference might produce that difference. Accordingly, this project 
involves a redefinition of ethics as the interrogative practice of that which 
constitutes sexed embodiment. Notably, while this thesis will not be directly 
concerned with the issues and concerns raised within Diprose's project , it will 
refer to her observation that the ethics of reproductive practices appeal to a 
concept of 'disembodied individualism'. 
Of primary concern in this thesis is the criticism of traditional mind/body 
dualisms which feature within the works of Judith Butler. Butler's work features 
an analysis of the concepts of "sex", "gender" and "sexuality", as part of a 
regulated and regulating cultural system of meaning, that undermines the sex-
gender distinction, but which provides alternate points of theoretical and political 
departure for feminism. Her text Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion 
11~: 
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of Identity contests the idea that feminism requires the idea of a stable 'female' 
identity, usually at the centre of feminist theory and practice . She dissolves the 
sex-gender distinction on the basis that "sex" is an effect of discursive 
configurations of gender. Subsequently, Butler explores the possibility that a new 
type of feminist theorising and politics can emerge from a radical critique of 
categories of identity. The assumption of a continuous relation between the 
regulatory categories of "sex, "gender" and "sexuality" is linked by Butler, to the 
possibility of the subversion of identity. Butler's dissolution of the sex-distinction 
has been criticised as involving a negation or disavowal of the body. Butler 
remarks that she is often asked whether she has forgotten about the materiality of 
the body. 
Theorising from the ruins of the Logos invites the 
following question: "What about the materiality of the 
body?" Actually ... .the question was repeatedly formulated 
to me in this way: "What about the materiality of the 
body. Judy ?" I took it that the addition of "Judy" was an 
effort to dislodge me from the more formal "Judith" and 
to recall me t9 a bodily life that could not be theorised 
away. (Butler 1993, pix) 
In response to such criticism, Butler's second most influential text, Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex deals directly with the issue of the 
materiality of the body. She embarks upon a genealogy of the concept of ' sex ' 
and reveals the way in which it 'organises'· material bodies. 
•l ,1 
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~t the onset, I stated that the general aim of this thesis is to explore the 
implications of feminism's rejection of the sex-gender distinction. The history of 
feminist ideas which I have outlined is importantly, at stake in this thesis. In 
response to the recent theoretical shift perhaps it is right to ask: t~ what extent is a 
rejection of the sex-gender distinction truly justified? Moreover, to what extent 
does a theory of constitutive embodied subjectivity succeed where the sex-gender 
distinction does not? I also stated that the general aim of this thesis is to explore 
the implication·s of feminism's rejection of the sex-gender distinction for 
conceptions . of women ' s agency ; within the context of feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. For Judith Butler, the possibility of subverting identity 
constitutes a form of agency; a reconfiguration of the concept of agency which 
contests a conventional, voluntarist concept of agency. Significantly, Butler links 
the primacy of a conventional concept of agency and the subsequent disavowal of 
alternate modes of agency , to those dualisms which are the focus of corporeal 
feminist critiques. She argues that the sex-gender distinction , and in particular, 
the assumption of mind-body dualism which underlies this distinction, is a 
discursive mechanism that regulates and fixes the assumption of voluntarist 
agency and thereby forecloses _adequate concepts of agency for women. 
Butler's thesis is addressed in both chapter one and chapter two of this thesis. In 
chapter one I begin with Butler's dissolution of the sex-gender distinction and its 
effects on concepts of women's agency. As we shall see, Butler's critique of the 
sex-gender distinction involves a rejection of the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity. Prediscursive subjectivity is the idea of a pre-gendered agent capable 
of existential choice. Butler argues that the concept of prediscursive subjectivity 
forecloses adequate concepts of agency for women. This is because the subject is 
'. 
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confined within a regulated conception of subjectivity which is assumed to be 
natural and therefore fixed. It is assumed to be fixed because the conditions which 
regulate subjectivity conceal its discursive origins. By contrast, Butler 
investigates those rules and practices which regulate the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity. Through this investigation, Butler dissolves the assumption of 
prediscursive subjectivity by arguing that subjects are in fact produced by 
discursive configurations of gender. Also in chapter one, I argue that Butler's 
rejection of the concept of prediscursive subjectivity necessitates a 
reconfiguration of the concept of agency. This is argued on the basis that 
conventional conceptions of agency rely upon the concept of a prediscursive 
subject which Butler dissolves. 
The value of Butler's thesis, I suggest, becomes evident when considered in the 
context of another domain within philosophy, that is, radical feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. This discussion started with an example of a recent 
feminist response to the issue of reproductive technology. The sentiments 
expressed in this slogan reflect a radical feminist response to the issue of 
reproductive technology. It should be acknowledged that contemporary feminism 
' 
remains divided in its response to the issue of reproductive technologies. While 
the justification for the radical feminist position varies, generally, it involves 
assessing reproductive technologies as inherently patriarchal.9 Such technologies 
are seen as instruments of control and domination over women's bodies, in 
particular, an attempt to control and dominate the reproductive function. Thus 
radical feminists maintain that reproductive technologies constitute a form of 
violence against women and that their us~ leads to a perpetuation of patriarchal 
power. In opposition to this generalised radical feminist position, liberal feminists 
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take issue with the belief that reproductive technologies are inherently 
patriarchal.10 This position is not to be confused with an unquestioned 
acceptance of reproductive technologies as liberal feminists raise notable 
objections to the institutional settings in which these technologies are used. 
Liberal feminists seek to separate reproductive technologies from the power 
relations that surround them. This separation is based on the premise that 
reproductive technologies are not patriarchal but neutral a.nd only become 
problematic in relation to the attitudes and practic~s of the medical profession. 
Liberal feminists thus seek to constrain the abusive use of reproductive 
technologies vis · interventions into the institutional settings in which these 
technologies are used. Such a restructuring they argue, would ensure that 
reproductive technologies would be an empowe.ring resource for women allowing 
them the right of reproductive choice. 
The line dividing these two perspectives is not a_lways clear; just as liberal 
· feminists demand intervention into the institutional settings in which reproductive 
technologies are used, radical feminists also regard the instit_utional settings; and 
in particular the attitudes and · practices of · the medical profession as 
questionable.11 For the most part however, we can discern the radical fetninist 
position by its unquestionable ?enial that reproductive technologies are, under 
any circumstances liberating for women, and by their call for women's 
withdrawal from such practices. A more accurate account of the radical feminist 
position will be given ir this thesis in relation to the issue of the foreclosing of 
concepts of agency. My consideration of this issue is assisted by the recognition, 
inherent in Rosalyn Diprose's critique of bioethics, that . the fundamental 
principles of bioethics are based on a concept of 'disembodied individualism ' . I 
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argue that a concept of disembodied individualism legitimates a concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity. One consequence of this connection is that a concept 
of prediscursive subjectivity is perpetuated within the realm of bioethics, and in 
particular, the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology. Consequently, 
I argue that according to Butler's thesis, feminist criticisms of reproductive 
technology are associated with the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency for 
women. Finally, I conclude chapter one by asking whether a Butlerian conception 
of agency can address this problematic feature of the radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technology. 
Chapter two of this thesis begins by outlining Butler's reconfiguration of the 
concept of agency. I then apply this re-configuration to the radical feminist 
critique of reproductive technology. First, while I endorse Butler's conception of 
subjectivity, I argue that Butler's reconfiguration of agency cannot substitute for 
conventional conceptions of agency. This is argued on the basis that conventional 
conceptions of agency are, as Butler acknowledges, a necessary political fiction. 
One consequence emerges from this conclusion; the appeal to conventional 
conceptions of agency by the radical feminist critique cannot be a basis for a 
rejection of that critique. I argue · that this conclusion produces an apparent 
conflict. While .it appears as if a conventional concept of agency needs to be 
retained in relation . to radical 'feminist, ·critiques of reproductive technology, this 
does not resolve the problem of the perpetuation of a concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity within those critiques. I attempt to resolve this conflict by arguing 
that it is possible to retain a conventional conception of agency as well as Butler's 
reconfiguration of agency. This argument is elucidated by showing the way in 
r 
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which Butler's reconfiguration of agency accommodates the possibility of change 
for women within the context of the issue of reproductive techno~ogy. 
1 
20 
PART ONE-
For those philosophers concerned with women's social position , the sex-gender 
distinction has proved to be a valuable theoretical tool. It has allowed theorists to 
address the issue of women's traditional ·conflation with their bodies and 
subsequently provide the basis for a recognition of women as equal subjects . In 
light of contemporary feminism's rejection of the sex-gender distinction an 
important question arises. What is the effect of this rejection upon feminist theory 
and politics? In the following discussion I will indirectly address this question by 
asking what is the effect of Judith Butler' s rejection of the sex-gender distinction 
for concepts of women's agency. In order to evaluate Butler's thesis, it 1s 
nec.essary to situate this issue within a specific context, preferably one that 1s 
especially pertinent to the issue of women's agency. Accordingly, this discussion 
will consider the issue of women's agency within the context of radical feminist 
critiques of reproductive technology. Given that this domain has traditionally 
relied upon the sex-gender distinction, it provides an excellent context in which to 
compare and contrast conventional and contemporary approaches to this issue. 
Leading up to a discussion of radical feminist critiques of reproductive 
technology, I will appeal to a critique of the concept of embodiment that underlies 
feminist bioethics offered by Rosalyn Diprose. Finally , the contents of this 
chapter forms the basis for a subsequent discussion of the .effect of feminism 's 
. . 
. rejection .of the sex-gender distinction upon concepts of women ' s agency and the 
significance and value of Butler's thesis to feminism. 
-- 1 
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The following outline guides the reader through the contents of chapter one. I will 
outline the way in which the issue of agency arises within Judith Butler's critique 
of the sex-gender distinction. I will show that Butler criticises the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity which underlies the sex-gender distinction on the basis 
that it is forecloses adequate concepts of agency for women. The conclusion that 
. will be drawn from this discussion is .that Butler's dissolution of the concept of 
prediscursiv·e subjectivity necessitates a radical re-configuration of the concept of 
agency. Secondly,- I will borrow from Rosalyn Diprose's critique of bioethics the 
concept of disembodied embodiment, elucidating the way in which this concept 
underlies the radical feminist critique of reproductive technologies. Further, I will · 
argue that a concept of disembodied individualism amounts to a concept of 
prediscursive embodiment. Consequently, I shall maintain that the radical feminist 
critique of reproductive technology is implicated in the problem of the foreclosing 
of adequate concepts of women's agency. Finally, I wiJl conclude this chapter by 
asking whether one way to address this problematic feature of the radical feminist 
critique of reproductive technology is to institute a Butlerian re-configuration of 
agency. 
Judith Butler's Critique of the Sex-gender Distinction and "Agency". 
In the introduction I outlined four important points relating to feminism and 
concepts of subjectivity. First, a dualist conception of subjectivity is linked with 
· women's subordination. Second, feminists have responded to the biologically 
essentialist based arguments for the subjugation of women by formulating the sex-
gender distinction. Third, contemporary feminists have criticised a _sex-gender . 
distinction because it inadvertently perpetuates dualism. Fourth, feminists have 
formulated an alternate conception of subjectivity, namely, a theory of 
l 
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constitutive embodied subjectivity. In a theory of constitutive embodied 
subjectivity, the body is figured as an effect of social production. In other words, 
the body is assumed to be constituted in relation to a specific social and historical 
context. Thus, bodies are social or historical rather than biologically specific and 
fixed. Feminists regard this as positive because it allows for the recognition of 
women's collective and individual differences. I~ other words , a theory of 
constitutive embodied subjectivity accommodates the idea that bodies are not 
simply "male" and "female". It allows for the recognition of the innumerable 
"systems of meaning, signification and representation" which are at play in the 
constitution of women 's embodied subjectivity. (Grosz 1994; p 18) · 
Indeed , there is no body as such: rather there a-re only _ 
bodies - male or female, black, brown , white , large or 
small - and the graduations in between. Bodies can be 
understood ... as a field, a two-dimensional continuum in 
which race (and possibly even class , caste , or religion) 
form body specifications. (Grosz 1994; p 19) 
I will now relate Judith Butler's critique of the sex-gender distinction to this 
contemporary account of embodied subjectivity. In her text Gender Trouble : 
Feminism and · the Subversion of Identity, Judith Butler discusses the way in 
which egalitarian feminists and social constructionists employ the · sex-gender 
distinction. Butler draws attention to the way· in which these appropriations of the 
sex-gender distinction perpetuate a conception of the body that is ahistorical or 
_ fixed. First, consider Butler's critique of the social constructionist ' s appropriation 
' . 
of the sex-gender distinction . . According to social constructionists , gender is 
l 
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constructed upon "anatomically differentiated bodies, where those bodies are 
understood as passive recipients of an inexorable cultural law." (Butler 1990, p 8) 
It has been argued however that this specific formulation of the relation between 
sex and gender involves an internal contradiction. Gatens argues for instance that 
social constructionists understand the sex-gender distinction as a body-
consciousness distinction. According to this "uncritical use of the mind-body 
distinction", social constructionists perpetuate a conception of the subject as 
wholly determined by social relations (Gatens 1983 , p147). Gatens reminds us 
that this position involves the assumption of a naive causal relation between the 
environment and the mind and that this viewpoint is committed to a neutral and 
passive concept of the body. (Gatens 1983, p147) So , social constructionists have 
appropriated the sex-gender distinction in order to confront biologically 
determinist conceptions of woman. However, the· presumption of a passive body 
contained within this account of the sex-gender distinction is equally as 
deterministic. Within the social constructionist conception of subjectivity - where 
the body figures as passive - culture, as opposed to biology , is the determining 
feature in the construction of subjectivity. (Butler 1990, p 8) 
Similarly, Butler maintains that egalitarian feminists evoke a conception of the 
body that is biologically determined or fixed. Significantly , Butler maintains that 
this concept of a biologically determined body simultaneously evokes the concept 
of a pre-social subject, that is, a subject .that exists prior to the acquisition of 
culturally determined identity. Butler illustrates this point with reference to 
Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir addresses the issue of the construction of gender in. 
The Second Sex and suggests that "one is not born a woman but , rather, one 
becomes a woman". (Beauvoir 1988, p 295) According to Butler, this suggestion 
1 
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evokes the notion of an agent (a cogito) who appropriates their gender. . In 
particular, the body is presented as a vehicle through which an "appropriative and 
interpretive will determines a cultural meaning for itself." (Butler 1990, p 8) Thus 
for Butler, . the sex-gender distinction that underlies egalitarian feminism figures 
the body as "a mere instrument or medium for which a set of cultural meanings 
are only externally related.''. (Butler 1990, p 8) In other words, it is not simply that 
Butler maintains that both social constructionists and egalitarian feminists evoke a 
conception of the body that is biologically determined, fixed and ahistorical. This 
concept of the body is linked with the idea of a pre-social subject who is assumed 
to have "some stable existence prior to the cultural field that it negotiates." (Butler 
.1990, p 142) Hence, Butler argues that the sex-gender distinction perpetuates not 
simply the concept of an ahisto·rical body, but simultaneously implies the 
existence of a pre-gendered subject who is "vested with an agency"_. (Butler 1990, 
p 142) 
Subjectivity and Agency 
Butler regards this concept of prediscursive subjectivity as problematic in so far as 
it is linked to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. In order to realise 
this argument it is necessary to outline the conventional understanding of the 
relationship between concepts of "subjectivity" and "agency". Accordingly, let 
me offer a brief account of Butler's interpretation of this relationship. Within 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Judith Butler 
elucidates a particular urderstanding of the relationship betw·een subjectivity and 
agency. Conventionally, the question of subjective agency has been dependent 
upon the concept of a prediscursive subject. 
•i 
The question of locating "agency" is usually associated 
with the viability of the "subject", where the "subject" is 
understood to have some stable existence prior to the 
cultural field that it negotiates. (Butler 1990, p 142) 
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As this quote suggests, prediscursi~e subjectivity is defined as that aspect of 
subjectivity which precedes and is independent of socially acquired identity, and, 
which is also · the point of agency for the subject. In other words, Butler is 
suggesting that conventionally, the concept of prediscursive subjectivity figures as 
• 
the metaphysical locus of agency. As I have shown, Butler illustrates this point by 
.examining the egalitarian feminist's account of -gendered subjectivity. In 
particular, we saw how Beauvo_ir's account of subjectivity evokes the notion of a 
pre-social agent who in some sense appropriates and interprets their gender. Butler 
is trying to emphasise that the concept of a prediscursive subject is consistently 
presumed to be linked to a subject's capacity for agency. In particular, she is 
suggesting that by maintaining the concept of a prediscursive subject, theorists are 
also sustaining the idea of a subject capable of existential choice. 
In other words, theorists believe that in maintaining the concept of a prediscursive 
subject they are sustaining the possibility of agency for the subject. Butler 
describes the reasoning that underlies this traditional understanding of agency. 
Butler observes that a conventional understanding of the relation between 
subjectivity and agency assumes that: 
(a) agency can only be established through recourse to an 
"I", even if that "I" is to be found in the midst of a 
, 
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discursive convergence, and (b) that to be constituted by 
discourse, is to be determined by discourse, where 
determination forecloses the possibility of agency. 
(Butler: 1990, p143) 
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In other words, the concept of voluntarist agency appears to require the . ' 
assumption of subjectivity which is .prediscursive. This is because abandoning the 
idea of a prediscursive subject - a subject exterior to discourse - suggests that the 
subje.ct is completely determined by culture or discourse. In other words, if t~ere 
can be no recours~ to a prediscursive subject, then the subject appears to be 
constrained within the terms of discourse itself. 
Butler describes this point as a conflict between constructionism and 
·determinism. Constructionism we shall say, is the · idea that subjects are 
. constituted through language. It has been argued that this idea implies a type of 
determinism because, as we saw, in the absence of a prediscursive subject, 
subjects appear to be fully determined by discourse. Seyla Benhabib for instance, 
criticises Butler's thesis of subject constitution on the basis that it appears to be 
deterministic. In particular, she questions whether Butler's account of subject 
formation can in fact "account for the capacities of agency and -resignification it 
. . 
wants to attribute to individuals, thus explaining not .only the constitution of the 
self but also the resistance that this very self is capable of in the face of · 
power/discourse regimes?" (Benhabib 1995b, plll) Butler herself acknowledges 
the apparent problem of determinism by asking how, without . recourse to the 
concept of a prediscursive subject, constructionism could accommodate the 
possibility of agency : 
If there is no recourse to a "person", a "sex", or a 
"sexuality" that escapes the matrix of power and 
discursive relations that effectively produce and regulate 
the intelligibility of those concepts for us, what 
constitutes the possibility of effective 
. . 
1nvers1on, 
subversion, or displacement within the terms of a 
constructed identity? (Butler 1990, p 32) 
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It is important to understand what Butler means .by agency here. Agency refers to 
a subject's capacity to invert, subvert or displace the social systems of meaning 
that constitute the subject. Butler recognises that constructionism does not seem 
. to allow for the idea of a "before"' "outside"' or "beyond" one's discursively 
constituted subjectivity. Accordingly she asks where is the ground - once 
provided by a concept of a prediscursive subject - from which to effectively 
transform one's discursively ' constituted subjectivity? This issue shall be 
addre·ssed later. Presently however, it is important to recognise that Butler 
recognises · the tension between cons.tructionism and determinism. She 
acknowledges that it seems necessary to maintain a concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity. This is in order to ensure that the subject is not constrained wholly 
within the terms of discourse. Significantly however, this is where Butler's 
alliance with critics of constructionism ends. Alternatively, Butl~r offers us a. 
fascinating response to the apparent problem of determinism. 
We have seen that critics of constructionism such as Benhabib, advocate the need 
· to retain a concept of 'prediscursive subjectivity so the subject will not be seen as 
fully determined by discourse. However, Butler argues that this position contains 
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a significant contradiction. Constructionism is the idea that subjects are 
constituted through language. According to Butler, the suggestion that one should 
maintain a concept of prediscursive subjectivity thus ignores what 
constructionism is suggesting to us. In particular, it fails to recognise that the 
"subject" is itself a product of signification. As Butler outlines, it is the structure 
of signification that is the enabling condition for the formation of the subject: 
... the enabling conditions for the assertion of an "I" are 
provided by the structure of signification, ..... Language is 
not an exterior medium or instrument into which I pour a 
self and from which I glean a reflection of that self. 
(Butler 1990, p 144) 
Thus, while critics of constructionism maintain that the concept of a prediscursive 
subject is a necessary pre-requisite to agency, Butler reminds us that it is only 
through discursive traditions that a specific configuration of subjectivity emerges. 
In other words, the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity conflicts with the 
basic premise of constructionism, namely, that the subject is a product of 
signification. 
Butler has several purposes in providing us with ·this reminder. One of these , I 
have suggested, is to highlight the contradiction evident in critiques of 
constructionism. Secondly however, Butler wishes to make a point about the 
discursive origins of concepts of agency. Butler maintains . that the constitutive 
effect of language extend to concepts beyond subjectivity. In particular, some 
feminist theorists have constructed a specific relation between the concepts . of 
"/ 
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subjectivity and agency. Notably, this relationship figures a highly specific 
conception of agency, that is, one which requires the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity; a concept of prediscursive agency. So, not only does discourse 
determine the subject, it also regulates our understanding of agency. According to 
this idea, Butler argues that adherence to a concept of prediscursive of agency is_ 
inadequate in so far as it forecloses the possibility of other concepts of agency. 
What discursive tradition establishes the "I" and its 
"Other" in an epistemological confrontation that 
subsequent! y decides · where and how questions of 
knowability and agency are to be determined? What kinds 
I 
of agency are foreclosed through . the positing of an 
epistemological subject precisely because the rules and 
practices that govern the invocation of that subject and 
regulate its agency in advance are ruled out as sites of 
analysis and critical intervention. (Butler 1990, p144) 
· The preceding discussion was intended to reveal two important points. First, that 
the sex-g~nder distinctio~ perpetuates the concept of prediscursive subjectivity. 
Second, that this is problematic because the concept of prediscursive subjectivity 
is linked to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. The concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity is discurc:ively figured as · external to discourse. 
Consequently, it is exempt from critical investigation. It is therefore a conception 
of subjectivity which is assumed to be natural and therefore fixed. Since it is also 
the metaphysical locus of agency, strict adherence to the concept of prediscursive 
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subjectivity forecloses the possibility of alternate concepts of agency. In short, 
Butler argues that the failure to recognise the discursive origins of the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity forecloses the possibility of alternate concepts of both 
subjectivity and agency. 
In response to this, Butler attempts to expose the discursive ong1ns of 
subjectivity. In particular, she endeavours to analyse "the rules and practices that 
govern the invocation of [the] subject and regulate its agency". (Butler 1990, p 
144) I began this chapter with the question of why Butler advocates the 
dissolution of the sex-gender distinction. It should now be evident that it is 
because it perpetuates a concept of prediscursive subjectivity which for Butler, 
leads to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. Hence, for Butler, the 
sex-gender distinction constitutes an example of the way in which the subject 
comes to be regulated and confined within a specific configuration of subjectivity. 
By making the sex-gender distinction a site of critical intervention however, 
· Butler attempts to dissolve the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity. In short, 
Butler's critique of the sex-gender distinction is intended to show the way in 
which the assumption of a prediscursive subject is discursively instituted. Let us 
then tum to Butler's analysis of the sex-gender distinction, keeping fn mind that 
she is attempting to expose the discursive origins of subjectivity. Butler begins 
her critique of the sex-gender distinction by dissolving the assumption of 
prediscursive embodiment. 
I 
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The Discursive Construction of "Sex" 
As outlined, the sex-gender distinction presumes the "biological intractability. of 
sex". (Butler 1990, p 6) Butler however wishes to contest the discontinuity 
between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. She does this by 
questioning the very idea of the biological intractability of sex. According to 
Butler, the sex-gender distinction is problematic because it is based on a failure to 
acknowledge the discursive means through which "sex" figures as both immutable 
and radically discontinuous from gender. Just . as "gender" is assumed within the 
sex-gender distinction to have a constructed status, Butler asks whether "sex" 
itself does not have a history of signific~tion, within which the ostensibly natural 
fact of "sex" is in fact discursive! y produced? 
.... what is sex anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, 
chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to 
assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish 
such "facts" for us? Does sex have a history? Does each 
sex have a different history, or histories? Is there a history 
of how the duality of sex was established, a genealogy 
that might expose . the binary options as a variable 
construction? (Butler 1990, p 7) 
For Butler, when feminism inquires as to how "gender" is culturally formulated, 
-this focus misses the more fundamental question of whether the sex-gender 
distinction warrants its ')Wn genealogical investigation. This question is more 
fundamental according to Butler, because it recognises the sex-gender distinction 
as a discursive formation through which the assumption of a "natural sex" is 
derived. In ' acknowledging both "gender" and "sex" as sites of contestable 
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meaning, Butler maintains that sex is revealed as "always already gendered" such 
that "the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all." 
(Butler 1990, p 7) In order to highlight the way in which "sex"· is a site of 
contestable meaning, Butler embarks upon her own genealogical investigation of 
the concept of "sex". 
Butler argues . that biologi~al sex is disc~rsively produced. She does this by 
contesting the assumption that sexual difference is a prediscursive phenomenon 
by virtue of the indissociable relation of "sex" to the materiality of the body. In 
questioning the allocation of sex to a prediscursive domain, Butler is questioning 
that the .materiality of the body should .be presumed to exist within the domain of 
the prediscursive. She is also questioning whether the sexual categories that 
emerge from ~aterial differences should be presumed to exist within this domain. 
Butler maintains however, that such categories are not an effect of material 
differences so much as they are the product of the discursive category "sex". The 
discursive category "sex" ."is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies 
it governs." _(Butler 1993, p 1) In other words, the idea that the materiality of the 
body is experienced · only through the discursive production of sex -suggests that 
the materiality of the body is itself a product of signification. The concept of 
materiality is supposed to secure the idea of an "outside" to discourse. Yet, as a 
concept, it has no such exteriority. Hence Butler questions whether language can 
refer to materiality without "creating 'the very condition under which materiality 
may be said to appear". (Butler 1993, p 31) 
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or 
signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect 
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of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless 
and simultaneously claims to discover as that which 
precedes its own actions. (Butler 1993, p 30) 
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Moreover, though materiality is conventionally defined as natural , "nature" too 
may be regarded as having a history of signification. Butler addresses the issue of 
the relation between culture and nature often presumed within e·galitarian accounts 
of gender. Within these accounts it is implied that culture acts upon nature, where 
nature is conceived as "a passive surface, outside the social and yet its necessary 
counterpart." (Butler 1993, p 4) According to Butler however, the conception that 
the natural exists prior to signification misses two important points. First, that 
nature is a concept which, like all concepts, has a history of signification. Second, 
that "sex is positioned ambiguous! y in relation to that concept and its history." 
(Butler 1993, p 5) As outlined, the egalitarian feminist thesis involves the idea 
that the natural body has no social value and is that which passively awaits social 
inscription. In contrast, Butler argues that the concept of "natural" (bodies) is· 
discursively figured as that which has no social value and which passively awaits 
social inscription. In other words, "nature" is discursively figured as that which is 
prediscursive. In this sense there is nothing, including the material body, that is 
natural or prediscursive. There is only a discursive configuration of the natural as 
something which is prediscursive. As Butler suggests, '_'the social construction of 
the natural presupposes the cancellation of the natural by the social." (Butler 
1993, p 5) 
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Butler applies the recognition of the social or discursive construction of the 
natural to the issue of sex as a discursive product. The recognition of "the natural" 
as discursively constructed dissolves the domain in which "natural sex" is said to 
reside. Moreover, there is a·n historically ambiguous relation of sex to discursive 
configurations of the "natural". 
[if the natural] assumes its value at the same time that it 
assumes its social character, that is, at the same time that 
nature relinquishes itself as the natural .. [ then] .. the sex-
gender division founders on parallel lines; if gender is the 
social significance · that sex assumes within a given 
culture .... then what, if anything is left of "sex" once it has 
assumed it's social character .as gender? (Butl~r 1993, p·S) 
For Butler it is not the case, as presumed within the sex-gender distinction, that 
biological sex is a "natural" foundation from which gender is socially acq.uired. 
Rather, "sex", like "nature", comes into being at the moment it figures 
discursively. This also suggests that, like "nature", "sex" relinquishes itself at the 
moment "gender " comes into being. 
If gender consists in the social meanings that - sex 
assumes, then sex does not acc·rue social meanings as 
additiv~ properties but, rather, is replaced by the social 
meanings it takes on; sex is relinquished in the course of · 
that assumption, and gender emerges, not as a term in a 
continued relationship of opposition to sex, but of its full 
substantiation into gender or what, from a materialist 
I 
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point of view, night constitut.e a full de substantiation. 
(Butler 1993, p 5) 
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Apparently then, Butler attempts to dissolve the sex-gender distinction by 
' 
analysing the discursive origins of sexual difference. She argues that biological 
sex is a product of discursive configurations of gender. Thus "sex" has a .history of 
·signification that undermines the possibility of "sex" as a prediscursive category. 
Specifically, Butler maintains the idea of the discursive origins of sex through an 
examination of the relation between the concept of "sex" and the concept of 
"material" or "natural" bodies. Concepts of "materiality" and "the natural" imply 
the idea of a realm outside of language in which "material" or "natural" bodies 
may be said to exist. Butler reminds us however, that such discursive concepts are 
the very condition under which "the natural" and "materiality" come to exist. 
Broadly therefore, Butler reveals the discursive origins of sexual difference by 
undermining the possibility of a natural or prediscursive realm in which sexual 
difference is said to exist. The sex-gender distinction implicitly assumes 
biological sexual difference as natural. According to Butler 's thesis however , 
sexual difference should be regarded as having a discursive rather than a natural 
significance. 
"Sex" and Compulsory Heterosexuality 
Another way in which Butler attempts to demonstrate the discursive origins of 
subjectivity is by showing the way in which . it ,relates to culturally compulsory 
heterosexuality. As I will outline, Butler argues that culturally normative sexuality 
depends upon the production and maintenance of a binary frame for sex. A binary 
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frame for sex refers to the complementary concepts of "male" and "female" which 
are assumed to be biologically determined and therefore fixed. Culturally 
normative sexuality is dependent upon a binary frame for sex because this frame 
helps to foster the assumption that sex is a cause of sexual desire. Butler regards 
compulsory heterosexuality as figuring in the production and stabilisation of a . 
binary gender configuration. In relation to the production of a binary frame for 
sex, Butler argues that compulsory heterosexuality requires and regulates both 
"gender" and "sex" as a binary relation. 
The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes 
the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions 
between "feminine" and "masculine", where these are 
understood as expressive attributes of "male" and 
"female". (Butler 1990, p 17) 
She argue·s that compulsory heterosexuality emerges as a product of a matrix of 
cultural intelligibility. According to a triadic figuration of sex, gender and desire, 
the cultural "heterosexualisation of desire" includes a specific relation between 
sex, gender, and sexual practice and/or desire. In Butler's words; "the act of 
differentiating the two oppositional moments of the binary results in a 
consolidation of each term, the respective internal coherence of sex, gender, and 
desire." (Butler 1990, p 23) · 
Accordingly, the stability of this normative conception of sexuality ·demands the 
assumption of the inevitability and fixed nature of a binary configuration of sex. 
Again, this assumption emerges as a product of the compulsory order of sex, 
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gender and desire. The matrix of cultural intelligibility carries the assumption of 
compulsory and naturalised heterosexuality. Simultaneously, it institutes 
biological sex as the "natural" and therefore unchanging ground from which 
gender and desire naturally emerge. Thus, the notion that "sex" is a cause of 
sexual experience is an effect of: 
.. the production of a given regime of sexuality that seeks 
to regulate sexual experience by instating the discrete 
categories of sex as foundational and causal functions 
within any discursive account of sexuality. (Butler 1990, 
p 23) 
The heterosexualisation of desire requires and institutes a binary configuration of 
sex and gender. The stability of this configuration depends upon the institution of 
biological sex as the natural foundation from ·which compulsory heterosexuality is 
assumed to emerge. 
Specifically then, how does Butler's observance of a compulsory order of sex , 
· gender and desire, relate to the idea of the discursive origins of sex? As I have 
shown, compulsory heterosexuality relies no.t . ~nly upon a specific binary 
configuration of sex, but also the stabilisation of this frame. Not only is the binary 
relation of sex accomplished through the practice of heterosexual desire , the 
stability of the binary relation also relies upon the production of the categories of . . 
"female" and "male". Thus, the substantiation of heterosexual desire depends 
upon the proliferation and maintenance of sexed categories within a binary frame. 
Butler cites Foucault's recognition of the relation between historically specific ~ 
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modes of sexuality and the coristruction of the binary categorisation of sex .
12 
The 
production of the binary categorisation of sex she argues, involves concealing "the 
strategic aims of that very apparatus of production by postulating sex as a cause of 
sexual experience, behaviour, and desire." (Butler 1990, p 23) Hence, in terms of 
the relation between sex and desire, the binary categorisation of sex is an effect 
rather than a cause of the regulation of sexual experience: According to Butler 
therefore, the concept of a binary sex is an effect of "the production of a given 
regime of sexuality", that regime being compulsory heterosexuality. (Butler 1990, 
p 23) Moreover, the regulation of sexuality as normatively heterosexual, involves 
the initiation of "discrete categories of sex -as foundational and causal functions 
within any discursive account of sexuality." (Butler 1990, p 23) Again therefore, 
Butler emphasises the discursive origins of a binary frame for sex. In this instance 
a binary frame for sex, is not natural, but an effect of the heterosexualisation of 
desire. The practice of heterosexual desire is not only premis·ed on the assumption 
of the causal relation between sex, gender and desire. This triadic configuration is 
stabilised through its implicit assumption of the natural or prediscursive origins of 
sex. Biological sex is seen as the causal factor through which the cultural matrix is 
established and maintained. 
Butler emphasises a third aspect of the relation between compulsory 
heterosexuality and the stabilisation ·of a binary gender configuration, that is, a 
system of -compulsory heterosexuality which underlies the establishment and 
maintenance of normati,;e identity concepts. Butler argues that this cultural 
matrix generates what she calls 'coherent' or 'intelligible' gender identities, that 
. 
is, identities which reflect a continuous relation between sex, gender and desire. 
J 
"Intelligible" genders are those . which 1n some sense 
institute and maintain relations of coherence and 
continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice , and desire. 
(Butler 1990, p 17) 
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In other words, coherent gender identities are those in which gender follows sex , 
and desire follows gender, according to the binary nature of the matrix of 'cultural 
intelligibility. In short, th~ heterosexualisation of desire leads to the substantiation 
of culturally intelligible or normative. gender identities. Such normative identities 
are those which accord with a specific and continuous relation between sex , 
gender and desi~e. 
Important for Butler is the method through which normative gender identities are 
maintained. Once again we must turn to the erroneous assumption of 
I 
prediscursive embodiment that underlies the matrix of cultural intelligibility. As 
outlined, the heterosexualisation of desire is maintained on the assumption that 
biological sex is the "natural" foundation from which heterosexuality emerges . 
Acc<;>rdingly, the assumption of biological · sex as "natural" also· figures · as the 
unchangeable foundation of the cultural matrix that generates coherent gender 
' 
identities. So, just as the heterosexualisation of desire is maintained tl)rough the 
assumption of "sex" as the prediscursive origin of desire , the cultural matrix is 
maintained according to -the same assumption. Consequently , as coherent or 
normative gender identities are produced by the cultural matrix , the assumption of 
the prediscursive nature of biological sex assists in the maintenance of normative 
gender identities. Thus for Butler, the regulatory practices that generate coherent 
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identities through the matrix of intelligibility, both produce and are maintained by 
the assumption of the prediscursive nature of the binary frame for sex. 
Significantly, Butler argues that the generation of coherent gender norms· involves 
the simultaneous production of a realm of 'abject' gender configurations. As 
outlined, the cultural matrix that posits as normative a continuous relation 
between sex, gender and desire, generates so-called coherent gender identities. 
However, Butler maintains that the production of normative gender configurations 
involves the simultaneous production of identity configurations that exceed or 
contradic.t the terms of cultural intelligibility . . 
The cultural matrix through which gender identity has 
become intelligible 
. 
requues that certain kinds of 
"identities" cannot ''exist" - that is, those in which gender 
does not follow from sex and tho_se in w-hich the practices 
of desire do not follow from either sex or gender. (Butler 
1990, p 17) 
We have seen that the cultural matrix of coherent gender norms is 
' 
characteristically binary in its formation, and sex is regarded as the unchange,able 
or natural ground upon which this matrix is founded. Consequently where ever a 
relation between sex, gender and desire manifests itself that does not conform to 
the characteristically binary matrix, it is regarded as an unnatural or abnormal 
' 
phenomenon. Abject or unlawful configurations, argues Butler, are those that 
illustrate ·a discontinuous relation between sex, gender and desire. The generation 
of coherent identities is in part achieved through the prohibition of those gender 
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configurations in which 'gender does not follow from sex, or the practice of desire 
does not follow from either sex or gender' according to the binary matrix of 
cultural intelligibility. The "effeminate male" would be one such unlawful 
configuration. The effeminate male contradicts the terms of intelligibility in so far 
' 
as it reflects a discontinuous relation between sex and gender. According to the 
terms of intelligibility, only females are supposed to be 'womanly' or 'feminine'. 
The effeminate male clearly exists within culture, but as an identity which · 
contradicts the terms of intelligibility, it figures within culture as an identity 
which is abject or abnoqnal.
13 
So for Butler, the cultural matrix of intelligibility forbids the manifestation of 
identities that reflect alternate matrices of gender configurations. Significantly , the 
fact such identities are culturally forbidden does not mean that they do not occur. 
To the contrary, we ·will later seen the way in which Butler regards abject 
identities as an inevitable manifestation of the matrix of cultural intelligibility. 
What it does ~ean however, is that discontinuous gender configurations occupy a 
culturally marginalised or abject position within the realm of cultural 
intelligibility. As Butler explains, the manifestation of gender configurations that 
contradict the characteristically binary nature of that matrix are automatically 
regarded as "developmental failures or logical impossibilities from within that 
· domain." (Butler 1990, p 17) In chapter two I will focus on the way in which 
Butler regards the existence of "unlawful" gender configurations . as the means 
' . 
through which to contest (and perhaps extend) the domain of cultural 
intelligibility. 
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Critique of the Subject 
I have so far demonstrated the way in which Butler attempts to destabilise the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity by exposing the subject as a product of 
discursive configurations of gender. So far, this has involved dissolving the 
assumption of prediscursive embodiment. Sexed bodies should be seen as the 
material effect of discursively . produced gende~ configurations. Furthermore , 
Butler's attempt to destabilise the assumption of a prediscursive subject extends 
beyond a critique of prediscursive embodiment. Butler wants to emphasis that not 
only is the body constituted in relation to discursive configurations -of gender, but 
. the subject per se becomes a subject , precisely through becoming gendered. This 
point becomes clearer when we consider Butler's critique of a· unified conception 
of the subject. 
As outlined, the matrix of intelligibility that generates coherent gender id.entities 
supposes a causally continuous relation among sex , gender, and desire. It has also 
been shown that this matrix involves the idea that biological sex is natural and 
therefore unchanging. According to Butler, it also assumes a conception of 
identity' as one which is "self identical, persisting through time as the same , 
unified and internally coherent." (Butler 1990, p 16) Thus, consistent with her 
attempts to reveal biological sex as having a history of signification, Butler asks 
whether unified subjectivity is the product of discursive configurations: 
To what extent do regulatory practices of gender 
formation and division · constitute identity, the internal 
coherence of the subject, indeed, the self identical status 
of the person? (Butler 1990, p 16) 
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More closely, this critique of the subject involves questioning traditional 
philosophical conceptions of personhood as ontologically prior to the acquisition 
of gender identity. Conventional philosophical and sociological conceptions of 
personhood, according to Butler, are characterised by the assumption of the 
irrelevance of social context to the constitution of the subject. In particular, at 
least in so far as a "person" is conceived in terms of "consciousness , the capacity 
for language, or moral deliberation", conventional conceptions of personhood are 
characterised independently of social context. (Butler 1990, p 16) For Butler 
however, subjectivity does not exist prior to the acquisition of one's gendered 
identity. Rather, subjects become subjects precisely through becoming gendered. 
So, not only does Butler relegate "sex" to the realm of the discursive , she 
eliminates any conception of a prediscursive subject- by arguing that subjectivity is 
itself derivative of the cultural matrix of gender. 
Butler's critique of unified subjectivity specifically relates to a perspective on the 
relation between language and reality contained within contemporary 
philosophical debate. Butler maintains that within contemporary philosophical 
criticism, it has been argued that: 
[certain] philosophical ontologies have been trapped 
within a certain illusion of "Being'' and "Substance" that 
are fostered by the belief that the grammatical 
formulation of subject alld predicate reflects the prior 
ontological reality of substance and attribute. (Butler 
1990, p 20) 
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This perspective involves questioning the presumption of the truth of grammatic_al 
formulations of subject and predicate. Moreover, it questions the 'truth of the 
configuration of "Being" as ontologically prior to discourse that emerges from the 
presumption of the truth of grammatical formulations of subject and predicate. 
For instance, it might be suggested that the "I" in Descartes' proposition "I think 
therefore I am" is assumed to be a unified being, characterised by its capacity for 
rational thought. Descartes' ontology seems to assume a unified subject whose 
unified status and capacity for rational thought are assumed. to exist prior to social 
context or identity. Butler emphasises the essentially discursive status of the 
grammatical formulations · of subject and predicate. Understood as essentially 
. discursive formations, these grammatical categories thus reveal the illusion of the 
"truth" of a prediscursive subjectivity. Subjects are not subjects prior to an 
acquisition of social identity, rather subjects become subjects through the 
constitutive effects of discourse. Moreover it may be said that these essentially 
grammatical constructs are the artificial means through which the concept of 
prediscursive identity is effectively instituted and maintained. Butler maintains 
that this ostensibly Nietzschean critique of the metaphysics of substance 
"becomes . instructive . when it is applied to the psychological categories that 
govern much popular and theoretical thinking about gender identity .... the critique 
of the metaphysics of substance implies a critique of the very notion of the 
psychological person as a substantive thing." (Butler 1990, p 20) Thus, for Butler, 
behind the dissolution of the sex-distinction is a broader claim regarding the 
construction of subjectivity. The idea of unified subjectivity is a cultur~lly 
produced rather than a natural or predi~cursive phenomenon.14 
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I began by st~ting that for Butler the sex-gender distinction perpetuates a concept 
of prediscursive subjectivity which forecloses adequate concepts "Of agency for 
women. This is because the concept of prediscursive subjectivity regulates a 
specific configuration of both subjectivity and agency, which are thereby assumed 
to be fixed. For Butler, there are specific rules and practices which help to 
perpetuate the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity. Within her critique of the 
sex-gender distinction, we have seen how Butler attempts to reveal those rules and 
practices, and hence to dissolve the concept of prediscursive subj~ctivity. 
Simultaneously, Butler contests the assumption of prediscursive embodiment. She 
questions the assumptio'n, that sexual difference is a prediscursive phenomenon by 
virtue of an indissociable relation of "sex" to the materiality of the body. She does 
this by arguing that sex is a product of cultural meanings rather than biology. 
Butler also maintains that the concept of an intractable material reality is 
instituted via a necessary relation to compulsory heterosexuality. In other words , 
compulsory heterosexuality is instituted. through a matrix of intelligibility that is 
founded on a binary frame for sex. Moreover, this matrix is maintained on the 
presumption that sexed bodies are a prediscursive phenomenon and are therefore 
natural and fixed. The concept of prediscursive embodiment also functions to 
conceal the discursive origins of the concept of prediscursive. subjectivity. As we 
have seen, the concept of prediscursive embodiment _evokes the idea of a 
pregendered or prediscursive subject. Presumed to be fixed, the concept of 
prediscursive embodim~nt regulates and fixes the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity. Significantly~ however, we have also seen that Butler attempts to 
dissolve the distinction between prediscursive embodiment and gendered 
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subjectivity. For Butler, subjectivity is an effect of discursive configurations of 
gender; the subject becomes a subject precisely through being gendered. 
Butler's thesis renders the traditional understanding of the relationship between 
subjectivity and agency problematic. I have outlined the way in which 
conventionally, the concept of agency is assumed to be dependent upon the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity. As we have seen however, for Butler the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity functions to foreclose adequate concepts of 
agency. We have also seen that Butler attempts to dissolve the . concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity on the basis that subjects are in fact an _effect of 
discursive configurations of gender. However, if the concept of agency has 
tradition.ally relied upon the concept of prediscursive subjectivity then it seems 
that Butler's thesis undermines a traditional conception .of agency. How · does 
Butler's thesis accommodate the possibility of agency for the subject? Or as 
Benhabib asks, "How can one be constituted by discourse without being 
determined by it?" (Benhabib 1995b, p 110) Having undermined the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity, and seemingly therefore, a conventional conception of 
agency, what alternative can Butler offer us in order that subjects still have 
agency? Apparently, Butler's thesis seems to require a radical reconfiguration of 
the concept of agency. 
Butler's Critique of the Sex-gender Distinction and Radical Feminist 
Critiques of Reproductive Technology. 
The r_oute we have just taken is leading us to some interesting revelations about 
Butler's thesis. Let's tum then to the second task of this thesis, namely, a 
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contextualisation of Butler's thesis in the domain of feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. In order to address· this issue I will turn directly to the 
radical feminist critique of reproductive technology. Moreover, I will appeal to 
Rosalyn Diprose's discussion · of the concept of disembodied individualism that 
underlies conventional feminist bioethics in order to demonstrate the relevance of 
Butler's thesis to the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology. I will 
show that a concept of . disembodied individualism underlies conventional 
feminist -bioethics and that the concept of disembodied individualism amounts to a 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity. Thus I will maintain that the radical 
feminist critique perpetuates a concept of prediscursive embodiment and is 
therefore implicated in the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. Before 
examining the way in which a concept of prediscursive embodiment underlies the 
radical feminist critique of reproductive technology, let me outline the impetus for 
applying Butler's thesis to this specific context. The impetus for connecting these 
two theoretical perspectives, we shall see, stems from a common criticism that is 
often made of Butler's· thesis. 
As I have outlined, Butler's text Gender Trouble calls into question the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity. In the preceding account of Butler, the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity referred to the idea of a subject that exists prior to the 
acquisition of culturally determined identity and who is vested with agency. We 
have seen how, for instance , Beauvoir's account of gender formation evokes the 
notion of a pre-social agent who in some sense appropriates their gender. More 
gene~ally, the concept of prediscursive subject is assumed to be a necessary 
feature of agency in order to ensure that the subject is not regarded as fully 
determined by culture or discourse. Significantly, I also referred to the concept of 
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prediscursive embodiment as the assumption of the intractability of sexed 
embodiment. I showed that for Butler, the concept of prediscursive embodiment 
helps to regulate and fix the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity. As we have 
seen, there is an assumption of prediscursive embodiment which underlies 
egalitarian feminist accounts of gender. In these accounts the (prediscursive) body 
figures as "the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will . 
determines cultural meaning for itself." (Butler 1990, p8) Thus, at least within this 
account of gender formation, the concept of prediscursive embodiment is one 
means through which the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity is maintained. 
My point in reiterating this aspect of Butler's thesis is to emphasise that it is the 
concept of prediscursive e1nbodin1ent which Butler links to the foreclosing of 
adequate concepts of agency. 
Remember that Butler dissolves the sex-gender distinction on the basis that it 
perpetuates the concept of prediscursive embodiment. The concept of 
prediscursive embodiment, we have seen, implies the existence of a pre-cultural 
agent or prediscursive subject who 'determines cultural meaning for itself'. 
Even within theories that maintain a highly qualified or 
situated subject, the subject still encounters its 
discursively constituted environment in an oppositional 
epistemological frame. The culturally enmired subject 
negotiates its constructions ...... .In Beauvoir, for 
example, there is an "I" that does its gender, that · 
becomes its gender. ... (Butler 1990, p143) 
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Butler reminds us that within the terms of this understanding of gender formation, 
the body figures as the instrument through which an evidently prediscursive agent 
appropriates its gender. Accordingly, Butler attempts to undermine the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity by questioning the assumption of a prediscursive or 
intractable bjological sex. For Butler, "sex" has a history of signification that 
vndermines the possibility that sex could be a prediscursive category. In other . 
words, Butler maintains the discursive origins of sexual difference · by 
undermining the idea of a realm outside of discourse in which an intractable 
biological - material reality might exist. 
Many of Butler's contemporaries however, have questioned this aspect of Butler ' s 
thesis. In particular, they have questioned whether Butler's dissolution of the 
concept of prediscur_sive embodiment involves ignoring or negating the 
materiality of the body. Remember tha.t prediscursive subjectivity refers to the 
idea of an intractable biological reality. Thus when Butler rejects the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment she seems to be saying that there is no material or 
bodily reahty that precedes the . discursive constitution of the subject. Indeed 
biological sex, as we have seen, is regarded by Butler as the product of discursive 
configurations of gender. Accordingly, theorists have responded to Butler's thesis 
by asking about the relevance of biological specificity. In particuiar, the apparent 
_ specificity of the female body and its capacity for impregnation are cited by 
theorists as an example· of a material constraint upon discourse, which Butler' s 
thesis seems to ignore: 
And what about the body? You see bodies as forcibly 
produced through particular disco-qrses. Some might say 
"i 
'I 
that you haven't adequately addressed the biological 
constraints on bodied here. Take the female bodies 
capacity for impregnation, for example. Why is it that 
male bodies don't get produced as child bearing? There 
are certain constraints coming from the body itself which 
you don't seem to register. Shouldn't you be talking 
about the constraints on discourse as well as 'the 
discursive limits of "sex". (Osborne & Segal 1994, p 33) 
50 
This specific criticism aroused in me a curiosity about the applicability of Butler's 
thesis in relation to feminist issues related to reproductive technology. For 
instance, it seems reasonable to suggest that the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment is justified in relation to discussing issues such as reproductive 
technology. Isn't the issue of reproductive technology pertinent to women 
precisely because of the specificity of the female body? Isn 't it the material re~lity 
of bodies that determines who is the subject of issues related to reproductive 
technology? Hence, doesn't this ~ imply the legitimacy of the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment that Butler attempts to dissolve? The recognition of a 
legitimate female body seems to imply the relevance of the assumption of 
prediscursive embodiment - that is an intractable material reality - at least within 
tpe context of issues related to reproduction. The impetus for bringing together 
Butler and the issue of reproductive technology stems from my desire to resolve 
the apparent anomaly between Butler's dissolution of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment and the recognition that issues pertaining to a specifically female 
body, like· issues related to reproductive technologies, seems to justify the use of 
this concept. 
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· Radical Feminist Critiques of Reproductive Technology and ''Agency" 
I have just suggested that the impetus for bridging these theoretical domains is to 
reconcile the relationship between Butler's dissolution of the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment, and the apparent relevance of this concept to the issue 
of reproductive technology. In particular, I want to reconcile Butler's d~ssolution 
of the concept of prediscursive embodiment with radical feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology, which I will show, perpetuate the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment. In order to achieve this reconciliation it is necessary 
for me to reveal to the reader the relevance of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment to radical feminist critiques of ·reproductive technology. In order to 
illustrate this relevance I will appeal to Rosalyn Diprose 's observation that the 
concept of 'disembodied · individualism ' is central to conventional feminist 
bioethics. Together with an. examination of radical feminist's fundamental 
objections to reproductive technologies, I will show the way in which the radical . 
feminist thesis is implicated . in the perpetuation of a concept disembodied 
individualism. I will argue that the concept of disembodied individualism, if 
conceived in Butlerian terms, amounts to a perpetuation of a concept of 
prediscursive embodiment. Consequently, I will argue that the perpetuation of the 
concept of disembodied individualism within the radical feminist critique of · 
reproductive technology fixes a concept of prediscursive subjectivity and thereby 
forecloses adequate concept? of agency for women. 
''Disembodied Individualism" and Conventional Bioethics 
Rosalyn Diprose maintains that conventional ethics, bioethicists and feminist 
bioethicists, can be linked to the perpetuation of a concept of disembodied 
individualism. Conventional ethics, according to Diprose, is generally understood 
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in terms of "a universal set of principles, which ought to gove~n behaviour, 
principles which are formulated and grasped with · the rational mind." (Di prose 
1991, p 65) This conventional understanding of ethics suggests the legitimacy of 
applying general moral principles to any situation. For Diprose however, the idea 
that w~ can apply general moraf principles· to any ~itu~tion is problematic for 
several reasons. First, she suggests that the proliferation of often conflicting moral 
principles makes problematic the task of determining which moral principle to 
apply~ Specifically, following Max Charlesworth, she suggests th~t it · is naive to 
think that ethicists could ever "reach absolute agreement on any particular issue 
given the diversity of the principles at hand, and the divergence of the premises 
upon which they are based." (Diprose 1994a) 15 Second, Diprose suggests that 
given the diversity of issues that arise for ethical debate, there is a difficulty in 
sufficient! y grounding such abstract moral principles. In other words, the 
application of _universal principles is problematic in so far as such principles are 
"abstracted from the particularity of a situation" and are therefore not sufficiently 
contextualised such that the complexities of any given issue are often overlooked. 
(Diprose 1994a) Accordingly, Diprose notes that there · is a growing awareness 
amongst ethicists as "to the inadequacy of abstract principles to attend to the 
complexities of any given situation." (Diprose 1991, p 66) · Di prose cites in 
particular recent discussion in the field of biomedical ethics, which she suggests, 
~ I 
reflects a shift away from formal principles to an acknowledgment of "individual 
rights, particular contexts and specific needs._" (Diprose 1991, p 66) We shall see 
later for instance, the way in which feminist ethicists · demand the recognition of 
the patriarchal context i -i which women in relation to the ethics of reproductive 
practices. 
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While regarded as positive in some respects, for Diprose , the shift towards an 
emphasis on "individual rights" is not without its problems. As I will later show, 
Diprose argues · that ap emphasis on individual rights still ignores the relevant 
issue of bodily specificity. This is to suggest that problems such as conflicting 
premises and abstraction from context usually attributed to the use of general 
principles , are preceded by a more fundamental and perhaps more serious 
pro~lem, namely , the interpretation of the body upon which these moral principles 
are based. (Diprose 1994a) Diprose argues that underlying the assumption of the 
applicability of universal principles are certain assumptions regarding the 
relationship between self and world , mind and body. She suggests that "an ethics 
based on universal rational principles assumes that our being is a discrete entity 
separate from the world such that we are 'in' the world after the advent of both." 
(Diprose 1991 , p 66) In other words, the theory of embodiment that underlies an 
ethics based on universal principles assumes that one's subjective being' - one's 
subjectivity - exists 'in' the world, though independently of any feature of the 
world. (Diprose 1991, p 66) Hence, according to Diprose , an ethics based on 
universal principles characterises subjectivity in terms of self presence , and 
autonomy. Further, the assumption of the applicability of an ethics based on 
universal principles also contains certain assumptions regarding the relationship 
between mind and body. In part·icular she suggests that general principles ent.ail 
"an interpretation of the body which severs it from the person and from others". 
(Diprose 1994a) This is to say that general ethical principles are assumed to 
regulate relations between "self-present, autonomous, disembodied individuals. " 
(my emphasis: Diprose 1994b, p 1) 
"[as general] principles claim universality, they evoke 
an ethics which assumes that behaviour originates in a 
•11 
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potentially unified mind housed in a broad, 
homogeneous h~bitat." (Diprose 1991, p 65) 
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In other wo~ds, the legitimacy of general ethical principles rests on the assumption 
that the mind is distinct from the body. 
The assumption of disembodied subjectivity Diprose argues, is no where more 
evident than in the field of biomedical ethics. While not immediately apparent, 
Diprose maintains that this account of subjectivity that underlies modern ethics 
also informs the basic principles of bio-medical ethics. Diprose notes the ironic 
point that despite the fact the body is the very object of bio-medical practice, there 
is "a curious silence which resounds throughout discussions of the ethics of 
biomedicine." (Diprose 1995, p 202) Despite the apparent absence of the body in 
bio-medical ethics however, Di prose does manage to detail a conception of 
embodiment that she thinks underlies C<?ntemporary biomedical ethics. The model 
she details is extracted from the paradigm of . social relations used in the 
deliberation of the ethics of reproductive practices .16 As Di prose notes, the 
principles informing The Australian National Bioethics Consultative Committee 
(NBCC) 1990 report on surrogacy are as follows: 
"l. 'The principle of personal autonomy . or self-
determination, namely that people should have the right 
to make their own decisions for themselves so long as 
those decisions do not involve harm to others'; 
· 2. ' The principle of justice,' namely that arrangements 
between individuals should not involve exploitation and 
should best serve the interests of those involved ...... 
3. 'The principle of the common good, namely that the 
good of the whole community must be considered' in 
arrangements made between individuals." (in Diprose 
1994b, p 2) 
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Consistent with a conventional approach to ethics, Diprose maintains that these 
fundamental principles of bioethics reveal a model of embodiment that dislocates 
subjectivity from both the world and the body. According to Diprose, these 
principles reveal that the bodies which are the object of bio-medical practice and 
regulated by biomedical ethics are assumed to be that of self present , autonomous, 
disembodied individuals. Di prose maintains that there are two characteristics of 
subjectivity assumed within the principle5 informing the ethics of bio-medical 
practice: "first, that the indiyidual is disembodied, and second that the individual's 
identity is given prior to its relations with other." (Diprose 1994b, p 3) 
That bioethical deliberations centre around a concept of disembodied 
individualism is evident , Diprose suggests, in the concept of the individual 
assumed in the principle of personal autonomy. The version of personal autonomy 
appropriated within the sphere of bioethics, according to Diprose, stems from the 
liberal empiricist tradition. She observes that the only direct reference to the body 
in the NBCC1s report involves a direct quote from John Stuart Mill 1s essay 'On 
Liberty' in which the individual is defined in terms that imply its disembodied 
status. Mill employs a conception of freedom as "autonomous self government" 
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where the individual is sovereign "over himself, over his own body and mind". 
(Diprose 1994a) Hence, according to Diprose, the principle of personal autonomy 
assumes a conception of the individual i"n which the body " . .is given the status of a 
passive object governed by an individual agent who somehow stands above it." 
(Diprose 1994b, p 3) Further, Diprose maintains that the principle of personal 
autonomy is also influenced by John Locke's idea that the individual is said to 
have property rights over their own person. According to Diprose, this conception 
. . 
of the individual 'severs' "the rational agent from his or her body giving the agent 
property rights over the body and the products of its labour." (Diprose 1994b, p 3) 
These two ideas combined, Diprose concludes that the principle· of personal 
autonomy , central to bio-ethics, involves a conception of the subjectivity in which . . 
the body is both separate from, and subordinate to mind. As Diprose 9escribes , the 
principle of personal autonomy implies that: 
The person as an agent, a decision maker, ·stands above 
the body and objectifies it, owns it and pushes it around. 
Decisions, and the actions which flow from them, are 
autonomous if the product of one's will, that is, if they are 
free of physical and intellectual coercion. From this 
model of autonomy flows the idea that we are free to do 
with our bodies what we will providing others are not 
harmed by that action, either directly or via harm to 
oneself. And social relations are said to be equitable, and 
individual freedom and autonomy preserved, if exchange 
of body-property or forfeit of the sovereignty you have 
111 
over your body is based on fair contract or informed 
consent. (Diprose 1994a) 
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In · other words, Diprose maintains that the principle of personal autonomy 
employed in bio-medical ethics assumes not only that the subject is disembodied ,. 
but also that the subject is sovereign over that body. Diprose -also implies that the 
· concept of the individual upon which the principle of autonomy is based, is that 
of an agent who is both "unified and present to herself." (Diprose 1994b, p 3) The 
principle of personal autonomy · assumes that the. individual has direct access to 
his or her motives and desires, and is therefore capable of making decisions 
regarding what to do with his or her body .
17 
Thus, the principle of personal 
autonomy assumes that individuals (or ethicists) are capable of making decisions 
regarding their bodies, independent from and irrespective of their specific 
embodiment. Generally therefore, Diprose maintains that the concept of the 
subject th:at underlies the principle of autonomy is one which, in relegating the 
body to the status of object, 'severs' the individual from his or her body, and 
hence, contains a concept of 'disembodied individualism'. 
According to Diprose, the concept of disembodied individualism which underlies 
the principle of personal autonomy also informs relation between individuals. The 
principle of personal autonomy, when considered in · relation to interactions 
between individuals, is subject to the competing principles of 'justice' and 'the 
common good'. Because disembodi~d individualism underlies the principle of 
personal autonomy, it is assumed within bioethics that the principles of justice 
and the common good regulate relations between self present individuals whose 
body is an appendage to the self. In attempting to reconcile the principle of · 
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personal · autonomy with the principles of justice and the common good," the 
implicit focus of regulation" Diprose maintains, "are relations of contract and 
exchange between self present individuals where the object of exchange is . the 
individual's body (Diprose 1994b, p3) So, according to the fundamental 
principles of bioethics, relations of social contract are between self present, 
disembodied individuals, where the body is the property-object of exchange. 
As suggested , this paradigm of social relations implies that an individual's 
identity is given prior to its relations to others, and as Diprose suggests, "prior to 
the rules which govern those relations." (Diprose 1994b, p 3) The concept of self 
present, disembodied individualism implies not simply that an individual's 
identity is clearly delineated from his or her body, but also that an individual's 
identity exists independently of social context. Hence, the assumption within 
bioethics that the individual agent is unified and self present implies that 
individuals enter into relations of contract as equals. It also implies that the nature 
of relations between individuals is determined by the specific terms of contract. 
Second, Diprose maintains that a paradigm of social . relations that assumes a 
concept of the individual as self present and disembodied , also assumes that 
identity is unchanging for the duration of the social exchange. (Diprose 1994b, p 
4) Disembodied individualism implies that while in terms of contracting out body · 
property various subtractions · or additions to a body may be made, it is assumed 
that the individual does not substantially alter in subjectivity for the duration of 
the contract. In summary, the concept of 'disembodied individualism' not only 
underlies the principle of personal autonomy, it also informs our understanding of 
relations between individuals. A principle of autonomy assume~ disembodied 
individuals whose self-present identity exists prior to his or her relations to others 
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and independently of social context, and whose identity is assumed to remain the 
same irrespective of changes to the body. 
Many - feminists· have criticised and subsequently challenged the atomised 
disembodied concept of the individual and the contract. model of social relations 
on the basis that it is problematic for women .
18 
Di prose for instance uses the 
issue of surrogacy _to demonstrate the inadequacy of the contract model of social 
relations. She argues that the assumption of atomised disembodied individualism, 
inherent in the -fundamental principles of bioethics , ensures that these principles 
are incapable of representing every-body equally. In particular, the application of 
the principle of autonomy. results in the exclusion of the maternal body from 
social exchange. While according to the principle of personal autonomy 
individuals should be free' to contract out parts of their body , the 11principles of 
justice and the common good place ethical limits upon the ways in which a body 
can become a legitimate object of exchange." (Diprose 1994b, p 4) Hence, while 
an bodies are potential objects of exchange, the significance of some bodies, and 
the individual's right to sovereignty over his or her body, are sometimes 
determined in relation to the _ rights of the whole community according to the 
-
principles of justice and the ·common good. In more general terms, " .. .in 
determining the ethics of a contract between individuals ... :the value and integrity 
of the individual's body, assumed by the individual her- or himself, is weighed 
against the value and integrity o'f others. and the b_ody of the community." 
(Diprose 1994b , p 4) D~prose emphasises that the maternal body is consistently 
considered in relation to the 1rights' of those other than the pregnant woman. Thus 
the pregnant woman's right to sovereignty over her body , implicit within the 
principle of personal autonomy, is weighed against the rights of oth_e_rs according 
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to the same principle. In the case of surrogacy for instance, the woman's body is 
' 
the object of exchange. But there are many aside from the pregnant woman, who 
in fact compete for the rights over this pregnant body (namely, the unborn child, 
the commissioning couple, the bioethicist, and the biomedical · practitioner). 
Hence, there are many whose interests are weighed against the pregnant woman's 
right to sovereignty over her body, and many possible outcomes wherein the 
woman's right to sovereignty may be forfeited. 
Apparently then, the principle of personal autonomy does not automatically apply 
to the pregnant woman. In adhering to the fundamental principles of bioethics, 
"the pregnant body is not a body which can be ·easily exchanged in the market 
place" and this difficulty indicates a significant inadequacy . in the under! ying 
assumptions of the contract model of social exchange and their capacity to ensure 
women's right to inclusion in social exchange. (Diprose 1994b, p 4) As Diprose 
argues, "if women are to be admitted into social exchange on the same basis as 
men, then [they] should have the right to participate in contracts to do with 
property in [their] person". (Dip rose 1994b, p 4) As evident in the . case of 
surrogacy however, the specificity of women's embodiment ensures that women 
are excluded from having equal right to participate in contracts relating to 
property in their person, as well as equal representation wi_thin the field of 
bioethics as it is currently conceived. Thus Diprose maintains that in adhering to 
the fundamental principles of bioethics, and in particular, the concept of the 
individual upon which t_hese principles are based, the ethicist can not help but be 
part of an inadvertent discrimination against women. 
61 
In the present context our concern is with the way in which the principles of 
bioethics inform radical feminist critiqu~s of reproductive technology and 1n 
particular, with the fact a concept of disembodied individualism is central to these 
critiques. In the following discussion I will elucidate the way in which the radical 
feminist critique of reproductive technology· constitutes a ·challenge to the contract 
,· model of social relations. This challenge takes the form of a demand for the 
recognition that the patriarchal context i~ which women live influences their 
capacity for autonom9us decision. Remember that the concept of disembodied 
individualism which underlies the principles of bioethics implies that the 
individual is not only sovereign over their body but also free to make decisions 
about what to do with their body. However, we shall see how radical feminists 
challenge the assumption of such sovereignty by maintaining that a woman 's 
autonomy is compromised by the patriarchal context in which women act ; various 
economic, social and familial factors are said · to impede a woman ' s ability to 
choose freely to use reproductive technologies. The radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technologies thus implies that women are never ' free ' to make 
decisions about what to do with their_ body. On the basis of a principle of personal 
autonomy therefore , radical feminists maintain that a woman ' s autonomy is 
automatically compromised the· instant that she uses reproductive technologies. I 
will now ex.amine more close I y, this aspect of the radical feminist ' s challenge to 
the idea of autonomous choice. In particular, I will consider the way in which this 
challenge to a contract . model of social relations leads radical feminists to 
advocate women ' s withdrawal from practices involving the use of reproductive 
technologies and secondly, that this involves legitimating the assumption of 
disembodied individualism . 
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Radical femiHist oppositi?n to reproductive technologies is justified on numerous 
social, economic and ethical grounds. The contributions of the feminist activist 
organisation FINNRAGE (The Feminist International Network against 
Reproductive Technology) are typically regarded as . indicative of a radical 
feminist response to this issue.1-9 Strongly echoing Mary O'Briens theoretical 
framework, Gena Corea, a well known founding member of Finnrage , authored 
the influential text The Mother Machine (1985).20 This text characterises new 
reproductive technologies as an expression of patriarchal control over women ' s 
bodies. In particular she argues that reproductive technologies are the means 
whereby men will take control of the reproductive function: 
Reproductive technologists now aim to bring forth life 
through "art", rather than nature and enable man to be 
not only the father, but also the motner of his child. 
(Corea 1985, p 291) 
While Corea' s text has been criticised for being "essentialist and ahistorical " it 
has proven to be an influential text within feminist theory; its ideas remain central 
to more contemporary radical feminist critiques of . reproductive technology . 
(Franklin & McNeil 1988, p 550)21 According to the ·contemporary radical 
feminist critique, reproductive technologies are inherently patriarchal. 'Patriarchy ' 
as it is most readily characterised by feminists, maintains women's social 
subordination via the legitimation of male control.over women's bodies. Thus for 
radical feminists, reproductive technologies are assumed to endorse male control 
over women's bodies. In entering into contract agreements where reproductive 
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technologies are used, radical feminists maintain that women are relinquishing 
control over their bodies. In other words , radical feminists assume that when a 
woman utilises reproductive technologies her autonomy is compromised . For 
instance, Deborah Lynn Steinberg writes that "implicit is IVF treatments is what 
may we.11 be an unpre.cedented erosion of women's personal autonomy and 
reproductive agency." (Lynn Steinberg 1990, p88) T~is erosion of women 's 
autonomy, Steinberg argues, exists at two level. First , within the representations 
of women that surround reproductive technologies ; women are consistentl y 
" 
denied autonomous personhood in so far as they are consistently· referred to as 
"infertile", "childless", or as part of a "couple" . Secondly , the necessarily 
hierarchical relationship between women and the IVF practitioners also 
constitutes a threat to women's autonomy. Again , central to Steinberg ' s argument 
is the assumption \\:hich underlies the radical feminists critique of reproductive 
technologies , namely , that such technologies are inherently patriarchal. 
However, the essentially ideological charge that reproductive technologies are a 
form of patriarchal contro~ over women's bodies (an attempt by men to claim 
reproduction) is informed by more pragmatic objections. Again , it is possible to 
show that many of these objections directly relate to the. issue of women 's 
compromised autonomy. Radical feminists wish to draw attention to the fact that 
reproductive technologies such as invitro fertilisation , have a significantly low 
success rate .22 Contrary to public perception, statistics related to the use of 
reproductive technologies reveal very limited success. Moreover, radical feminist s 
claim that even these statistics are dubiously calculated. Klein suggests for 
instance, that five to ten per cent of live births for , every IVF attempt a woman 
undergoes is the currently acknowledged success rate for this procedure. 
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However, they maintain that this figure excludes the fifty per cent of women for 
whom fertilisation never takes place. (Klein 1994, p134) Thus, radical feminists 
m3:intain that while conceptive technologies are continually being promoted or 
advertised by the medical profession as a miraculous and highly successful, the 
actual figures reveal a decidedly different reality. Not only is a mere five to ten 
per cent rate of "successful" births significantly low (birth rates are calculated 
independently of how long the foetus actually survives), the number of women 
who actually conceive is signif~cantly lower. So, not only are reproductive 
technologies significantly unsuccessful, the real success or failure of reproductive 
technologies ren1ains undisclosed to the women who use them. In broad terms, 
these specific criticisms amount to the recognition that women are not fully 
informed in relation to the dangers and success rates of reproductive technologies. 
Radical feminists maintain that if a woman is to consent to the use of reproductive 
technologies, then this consent should be informed. Yet, as radical feminists 
argue, given the deceptive way in which information about reproductive 
technologies is filtered, women are never fully informed about the relevant issues. 
I ha.ve shown that it is a condition of t~e principle of personal autonomy people 
should have the right to make their own decisions regarding themselves. Yet, 
radical feminists maintain _that, the failure to fully inform women about the risks 
related to using reproductive technology hinders a women's ability to choose 
freely. Thus, on the basis that a woman's consent is not fully informed, radical 
feminists argue that a woman's decision to use reproductive technologies will 
never be autonomous. 
Radical femini'st critiques of reproductive technology maintain that women's 
ability to freely choose whether to. use reproductive technology is also mediated 
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by a series of coercive factors. First, radical feminists also maintain that limited 
economic opportunities for women, are also assumed to persuade women towards 
the use of reproductive technologies, particularly where surrogacy is concerned. 
Moreover they suggest that women are coerced into using reproductive 
technologies by male partners and unscrupulous doctors who misinform women 
about the risks associated with the procedures. Judith Lorber for instance , offers 
an account of the influence that males have over reproductive decisions. While 
she does not go so far as to suggest that, in using reproductive technologies 
women become "victims", she does argue that women should not be regarded as 
acting autonomously in this context. 
The dynamics of participation in such treatments 
illuminates issues of men's domination in reproduction 
and the extent to which women can truly control their 
bodies when faced with personal, psychological, 
familial, and community pressures to produce a 
biological child. (Lorber 1988 , p 126) 
Third, radical feminists argue that women's ability to freely chose whether to use 
reproductive technologies is mediated by a social imperative to procreate. Women 
are constantly confronted by societies pronatalist which imply that women who 
does not have a child has fallen short of societies ideal. This position is outlined 
by Andrea Dworkin .who questions the idea that women are free to choose 
reproductive technologies. She argues that " .. the state has constructed the social , 
economic, and political situation iri which the sale of some sexual or reproductive 
capacity is necessary to the survival of women .. " (Dworkin 1983, p 182)
23 
Closely linked to this objection is the claim that infertility is a social rather than a 
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medical condition. Mary_ Sue Henifen for instance, draws our attention to the 
anthropological evidence that suggests that "the desire to have children is not 
biologically determined but rather culturally constructed. (Hen if en 1988 , p5)
24 
This dominant pronatalist value does not only · produce negative images of 
involuntary childlessness. The subsequent emphasis on reproductive technologies , 
rather than adoption, is said to turn us away from "the plight of children in need of 
parents, languishing in institutions. (Henifen 1988 , p5) 
Further, central to Janice Raymond's critique of reproductive technologies , is the 
idea that the expansion of reproductive technologies can be attributed to the 
constru·ction of a definition of "infertility". (Raymond 1994, pl) In accordance 
with the argument that women's "choice" to use reproductive technologies is 
mediated by a series of social and familial factors , Raymond observes that women 
are influenced by a definition of "infertility" that is not only misleading, but also 
continually adjusted. 
Doctors _increasing! y expand · the definition of 
infertility. The current accepted medical definition is 
inability to conceive after one year of intercourse .... .In 
the last decade, the · number of years has dwindled 
from two to one ..... The definition conflates inability to 
conceive with difficulty conceiving." (Raymond 1994, 
p3) 
Related to this point, Raymond even suggests that the perception that infertility is 
a disease that requires treatment is a fairly recent social perception largely 
.... 
''"I 
'I . 
67 
attributable to the medicalisation of infertility. (Raymond 1994, p2) By 
continually giving new meaning to the term, physicians are actively producing the 
concept of infertility and that this production p~ovides the means to implement 
and .expand conceptive technologies. Again, these preceding objections can be 
described in terms of women'·s autonomy being compromised. In other words, a 
woman's capacity to make independent decisions about whether to use 
reproductive technologies is mediated ·by the patriarchal context in which she 
lives. Radical feminists maintain that limited economic opportunities, male 
~ 
partners and unscrupulous doctors, the patriarchal imperative to procreate, and 
numerous other familial and social factors influence and therefore impede a 
\ 
woman's capacity for autonomous choice.
25 
I have so far shown that the principle of personal autonomy utilised within the 
. sphere of bioethics contains a concept of disembodied individualism. I now wish 
to argue that the radical feminist critique of reproductive technologies, · in 
appealing to the principle of personal autonomy, perpetuates the assumption of 
disembodied individualism. The radical feminist thesis, as we have seen~ centres 
around the idea that a woman's autonomy is compromised if she uses 
reproductive technologies. This constitutes a challenge 'to the contract model of 
social relations in so far as the division between the idea of personal autonomy 
~nd the , common good is rendered proble~atic; the poss.ibility of a woman 
·making an autonomous decision is influenced by the values of the patriarchal 
society in which she lives. It is important to recognise that ·this constitutes a 
chall~nge to the legitimacy of a contract model of social relations functions to 
legitimate the· principle of personal autonomy, and thereby . the assumption of 
disembodied individualism inherent in this principle. 
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Radical feminists attempt to secure a space for women's autonomy by demanding 
the recognition of the patriarchal context in which women live by appealing to a 
principle of personal autonomy. Moreover, the radical feminist critique involves 
the suggestion that in order to uphold the principle of personal autonomy women 
. should reject reproductive technologies. As Di prose reminds us however , 
this conclusion implies that there is a space for women 
uncontaminated by patriarchal values. And this can 
only be assumed by allowing back into the analysis of 
individual autonomy ·as the exercise of sovereignty 
over one's body and the distinction between the 
individual agent and the social context. (Di prose , 
1994b, p8) 
In other words, when radical feminists argue that women should reject 
reproductive technologies on the basis that they compromise women ' s autonomy, 
they perpetuate the assumption that there is a space for women in which the 
possibility of autonomy is located. Further, the radical feminist thesis implies that 
the agent who seeks autonomy is separate from her social context and hence , 
capable of 'exercising sovereignty over her body.' Thus , the radical feminist 
critique of reproductive technology represents a challenge to the conflict between 
· the principle of personal autonomy and the common (patriarchal) good ; in 
acknowledging the latter it appears that the contract model of social relations is 
problematic for women in so far as it influences and limits women's ability to 
chose reproductive technologies freely. Yet, their conclusion that women should 
reject these technologies does nothing to disrupt the division between agent and 
body, and agent . and social context, inherent in this contract model ·of social 
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relations. Significantly therefore, while contesting the viability of contract social 
relations for women, radical feminists perpetuate the assumption of 'disembodied 
individaulsim' fundamental to this model. In other words, in attempting to secure 
a space for women's autonomy, -radical feminists perpetuate the legitimacy of 
both the principle of personal autonomy and the concept of embodiment that 
underlies this principle. 
Disembodied Individualism and Agency 
The recognition that radical feminists perpetuate a concept of autonomous or 
disembodied individualism can be allied with Butler's critique of the concept of 
,prediscursive subjectivity. As we have seen, the concept of subjectivity that 
underlie·s the principle of autonomy is that of a (self present, autonomous) , 
disembodied individual, whose identity is thus dislocated from the body (and the 
world). In other words, disemb.odied individualism _implies a dualist conception of 
the subject in which there is a radical distinction between · subjectivity and the 
body. A dualist conception of subjectivity, we have seen, involves the assumption 
of the intractability of sexed embodiment. This has been referred to in this thesis 
as the assumption of prediscursive embodiment. From this it can be argued that 
the principle of personal autonomy and in particular, the concept of disembodied 
individualism inherent in this principle, parallel the conceptual presuppositions of 
the sex-gender distinction. Both the sex-gender distinction and the concept of 
disembodied individualism contain the assumption of prediscursive embodiment. 
More specifically, the assumption of disembodied individualism includes the 
concept of a biologically determined body, and hence, functions to legitimate the 
traditional feminist distinction between biological sex and socially acquired 
gender. 
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In terms of Butler's thesis, the reader may recall that the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment evokes and maintains the concept of prediscursive subjectivity . This 
is because the concept of prediscursive embodiment functions to conceal the 
discursive origins of subjectivity. Prediscursive subjectivity is thus assumed to be 
natural and therefore fixed. More specifically , Butler maintains that the 
-
assumption of prediscursive embodiment is instituted via a necessary relation to 
compulsory heterosexual_ity. Compulsory heterosexuality is instituted through a 
matrix of intelligibility that is founded on a binary frame for sex. This matrix is 
maintained on the presumption that sexed bodies are a prediscursive phenomenon 
and are therefore natural and fi_xed. Thus the assumption of prediscursive . 
embodiment helps to 'fix the concept of prediscursive subjectivity. I have 
suggested that the concept of ·prediscursive embodiment is therefore linked to the 
foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. The assumption of the intractability 
of sexed embodiment simultaneously implies that the prediscursive subject who is 
the metaphysical locus of agency is also intractable. · Hence , the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment regulates and fixes a specific conception of both 
subjectivity and agency. In particular, the concept of prediscursive embodiment 
functions to conceal the discursive origins of subjectivity and agency , and hence, 
forecloses the possibility of alternate concepts of agency. 
By association then, the assumption of disembodied individualism also functions 
to foreclose adequate concepts of agency for women. As I have just reminded the 
reader, adequate concepts of agency are foreclosed on the basis of the assumption 
of the intractability of sexed embodiment. I have argued that the concept of 
disembodied individualism amounts to a . concept of prediscursive embodiment. 
This is because it contains the assumption of the intractability of sexed 
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embodiment. Again, it is the .assumption of the intractability of sexed embodiment 
that forecloses adequate concepts of agency. The assumption of the intractability 
of sexed embodiment simultaneously implies that the prediscursive subject, who 
is the locus of agency, is also intractable. Thus, the concept of disembodied 
individualism regulates and fixes a specific concept of agency thereby foreclosing 
the possibility of other concepts of agency. The radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technology, we have seen, centres .aroupd the concept of 
disembodied individualism which implies the intractability of sexed embodime_nt. 
Evident_ly therefore, the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology, in 
.. 
perpetuating the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity, inadvertently 
perpetuat~s a regulative and fixed conception of agency. 
In this chapter . I have outlined the way in which a concept · of disembodied 
individualism, also understood as a concept of prediscursive subjectivity , is 
perpetuated within the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology. I have 
mentioned that, including the broader sphere of feminists bioethics , · this 
perpetuation is problematic for women. As Diprose indicates , it result in the 
perpetuation of the exclusion of the maternal body from social exchange. 
Moreover, it has also been suggested · that the assumption of disembodied 
individualism leads feminists to respond to bioethical issues, such as the use of 
reproductive technologies, by advocating women's withdrawal from such 
. practices. I have been concerned -with the way in which this conclusion aligns 
with Butler's thesis. I have sugg~sted that th€ recognition that feminists 
perpetuate a concept of disembodied individualism is highly significant in terms 
of Butler's thesis. The concept of disembodied individualism we have seen, 
amounts to a concept of prediscursive embodiment. In Butlerian terms, the 
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assumption of prediscursive embodiment helps to sustain and indeed fix the 
concept of prediscursive ·subjectivity, that is, a subject who precedes gendered 
"identity and who is vested with agency. This is because the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment helps to conceal the discursive origins of subjectivity. 
The assumption of prediscursive subjectivity is thus seen to be immutable and is 
thereby excluded as a site for critical analysis. On the basis of this assumption, the 
possibility• of alternate concepts of subjectivity and agency are therefore forfeited. 
Thus, the concept of disembodied individualism forecloses adequate concepts of 
agency for women. I have also argued that he radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technology functions to restrict concepts of agency. Again this can 
be attributed · to the fact these critiques include a concept of disembodied 
individualism. While Butler does not link the concept of disembodied 
individualism concept to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency I have 
. attempted to show that this concept aligns with the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity and is thereby linked to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of 
agency. 
We have seen that Butler attempts to dissolve the sex-gender distinction by 
emphasising the discursive origins of sex. Assumed to be prediscursive, Butler 
argues that sexed bodies are an effect of discursive configurations of gender. 
Given that, as we h~ve seen, the radical feminist critique of reproductive · 
technology perpetuates a concept of prediscursive subjectivity , one question 
which emerges from this discussion is whether the radical fe·minist critique should 
move away. from such conventional conceptions of subjectivity? Moreover, the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity is perpetuated within the radical feminist 
critigue through the appropriation of the principle of personal autonomy. Does 
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· this mean that radical feminists should abandon the principle of personal 
autonomy? These are not the only questions to emerge from this discussion. I 
have also shown that conventionally, the issue of agency is thought to be · 
dependent upon the concept of prediscursive subjectivity. For instance, Benhabib 
claims that without the assumption of a concept of prediscursive subjectivity there 
appears to be no "conceptual space for thinking of the possibility of agency .. " 
(Benhabib 1995b, p 111) If radical feminists abandon a principle of personal 
autonomy and ther~by the concept of prediscursive subjectivity , can they be sure 
that they are securing women's agency in relation to the issue of reproductive 
technology? As Nicholson remarks , Benhabib's critique of Butler also involves 
the claim that the way to address the tension between constructionsim and 
determinism is to "provide a theoretical explanation of how agency becomes 
possible." (Nicholson , 1995 , p9) Similarly, the issue I have raised in part one of 
this thesis is whether, in light of Butler's dissolution of the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity, it is possible to secure women ' s agency within the 
context of reproductive technologies. Accordingly, chapter two of this thesis will 
address the issue, not only of Butler's reconfiguration of agency , but also of 
whether this reconfiguration can be applied within the context of feminist debates 
on reproductive technology, with positive effects for women. 
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PART TWO~ 
The purpose of part one was to establish a context for ·discussing the implications 
of feminism's rejection of the sex-gender distinction for conceptions of women's .· 
agency. This context was primarily established in relation to two specific domains 
within philosophy, namely, Butler's critique of the sex-gender distinction and 
radical feminist critiques of reproductive technology. A . third aspect of 
philosophy, Rosalyn Diprose's critique of bioethics, provided the means to create 
a link between these two domains. The following chapter will carry on the task of 
resolving many of the questions which evolve_d from the application of Butler's 
critique of the sex-gender distinction to the issue of feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. In order to be clear about what those questions are , let 
us briefly review the journey we took through chapter one. 
. The concept of ·prediscursive subjectivity refers to the idea of a pre-gendered 
subject who is vested · with agency. According to Butler, the concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity leads to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. 
This is because the concept of prediscursive subjectivity is discursively figured as 
external to culture or discourse. It is thus a conception of subjectivity which is 
assumed to be natural and therefore fixed. Butler argues that the failure to 
I 
recognise the discursive ong1ns of the concept of · prediscursive subjectivity 
forecloses the possibility of alternate conceptions of both subjectivity and agency. 
Butler then attempts to . reveal those discursive practices that conceal the 
discursive origins of ·subjectivity. The reader may recall that one such discursive 
pr~ctice that conceals the discursive ong1ns of subjectivity is the sex.-gender 
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-distinction. This is because it contains the assumption of prediscursive 
embodiment. Within the sex-gepder distinction , biological sex figures as an 
intractable material reality. The idea of the intractability of sex is based on a 
differentiation of gender from sex through which "sex" is relegated to the realm of 
the prediscursive or natural. Thus, the sex-gender distinction implies the existence · 
of a natural female subject. Bt.Jtler argues that this assumption of a prediscursive 
embodiment helps to regulate a concept of prediscursive subjectivity. This is 
because the concept of prediscursive embodiment or "sex" evokes the notion of a 
prediscursive subject or agent who in some sense appropriates their gender. 
Again , this forecloses adequate concepts of agency for women because the 
prediscursive subject is presumed to be natural and fixed. 
In revealing those discursive practices that maintain the assumption of 
prediscursive subjectivity, Butler simultaneously dissolves the assumption of 
piediscursive subjectivity. Butler ' s critique of the sex-gender distinction involves 
the argument that the idea of an intractable sexed body is a product of language 
rather than biology. According to Butler, the sex-gender distinction implicitly 
assumes the concept of prediscursive embodiment, that is , the idea of an 
intractable material or reality which we call biological sex. For Butler however, 
"sex" is discursively produced as prediscursive. Indeed for Butler, "biological 
·sex" is the product of discursive configurations of gender. Significantly , Butler 
also argues that subjectivity is a product of discursive configurations of gender; 
the subject becomes a subject precisPly through ·being gendered. Thus , there does 
not exist , according · to Butler, a prediscursive subject, rather it is the "forcible 
citation" of "legitimating gender norms" that come to substantiate (sexed) 
subjects: 
.... 
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Femininity is ... not the product of a choice, but the 
forcible citation . of a norm, one whose complex 
historicity is indisociable from relations of dis~ipline, 
regulation, punishment. Indeed, there is no "one" who 
takes on a gender norm. On the contrary, this citation of 
the gender norm is necessary in order to qualify as · a . 
"one", to become a viable as a "one", where subject 
formation is dependent on the prior operation · of 
legitimating gender norms. (Butler 1993, p232) 
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Evidently, Butler's critique of the sex-gender distinction is based on the argument 
that the idea of a prediscursive subject is quite literally a fiction. 
Butler's Reconfiguration "Agency". 
We have seen . that Butler's dissolution of the concept of prediscursive agency 
raises an important question in ~elation to the issue of agency. I have outlined the 
way in which the possibility of agency is often assumed to be dependent upon the 
assumption of prediscursive subjectivity. We saw for instance, that Benhabib 
argues ·that Butler' s position on subjectivity is deterministic and disallows agency 
for women.26 In other words, if concepts of agency have traditionally relied upon 
the concept of prediscursive subjectivity, and Butler dissolves this concept on the 
basis that it forecloses adequate concepts of agency, what sort of agency can 
Butler's thesis accommodate? The following discussion seeks to resolve this 
apparent anomaly between Butler's dissolution of the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity and the apparent necessity of this concept as a pre-requisite for 
agency. In particular, I will elucidate Butler 's claim that a constructionist account 
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of subje9tivity opens up the possibility of concepts of ·agency for women. This 
claim we shall see, is . dependent upon Butler's radical reconfiguration of the 
concept of agency. Consistent with my focus in chapter one, this reconfiguration 
of agency will be applied within the . context · of radical feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology. 
First, I will provide the reader with an account of Butler's reconfiguration of 
agency. In relation to the issue of reproductive technology, I will argue that 
) 
Butler's reformulation· of the concept of agency can not substitute for 
conventional conceptions of agency. This is argued on the basis that conventional 
conceptions of agency are · an inevitable · and necessary political fiction. 
Consequently, I will argue that the seemingly problematic effect of conventional 
conceptions of agency within the radical feminist critique of reproductive 
technology can not be a basis for a rejection of that critique. In conclusion I will 
·mainta.in that while Butler's reformulation of agency can not be a substitution for 
conventional conceptions of agency' it importantly accommodates the possibility 
of ~hange for women within the context of reproductive technology. 
I have shown the way in which Butler regards the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity as linked to the foreclosing · of adequate concepts of agency for 
women. Intrinsic to this conclusion is Butler's alternative thesis, namely, that 
agency is possible precif ~ly because identity is a discursive effect. The reader will 
observe that I have referred to the concept of identity rather than prediscursive 
subjectivity. In Butler's text Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity, the concepts of subjectivity and identity appear to be inextricably related, 
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if not interchangeable. For instance, we have seen that Butler maintains the 
) 
subject as an effect of discourse. Similarly, she refers to "the reconceptualisation 
of identity as an effect .... ". (Butler 1990, p14 7) Both subjectivity and identity are 
therefore produced or generated by specific discursive configurations. Indeed for 
Butler the subject becomes a subject precisely through becoming gendered. My_ . . 
understanding of this aspect of Butler's thesis is that subjectivity denotes a 
multiplicity-of identities. This is indicated in the fact Butler maintains that " .. there 
is no recourse to a "person", a "sex", or a "sexuality" that escapes the matrix of 
power and discursive relations that effectively produce and reg·ulate [intelligible 
concepts]." (Butler 1990, p 32) Subjectivity thus appears to consist of multiple 
identities including those related to sex and sexuality. Following Butler then , I 
shall utilise the concept of identity with the understanding that this concept cannot 
be separated from the understanding that both subjectivity and identity are 
instituted through discursive means. 
When in relation to a conventional conception of agency Butler acknowledges the 
issue of what constitutes effective subversion within the terms of the constructed 
identity, she then responds to this issue by asking the alternate question , "what 
possibilities exist by virtue of the constructed character of sex and gender? " 
(Butler . 1990, p32). In this question, Butler indicates the possibility of a 
conception of .agency that exists by virtue' of the recognition that identity is 
constructed by discourse. As I have outlined;constructionism implies the radical 
contingency of those discursive practices that result in the constitution of the 
subject. Specifically, because, "abstractly considered, language refers to an open 
system of signs", signification is a practice that allows for the contestation, and re-
creation of conventional intelligibility. (Butler 1990, pl45) Since identity is 
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interpreted by Butler as ·a ·signifying practice, and signification is open - to 
intervention and re-signification, then the subject is also open to re-signification 
and re-constitution. In other words, the contingent nature of language ensures that 
. the practice of signifying identity is itself a mode of agency. Thus , when Butler 
asks 'what possibilities of effective inversion exists by virtue of the constructed 
character of identity~ she is in fact re-formulating the question of agency "as a 
question of how signification and re-signification works." (Butler 1990, p 144) 
Accordingly Butler maintains that by examining the terms through which 
traditional discursive conceptions of the subject are formulated, one actually 
opens up the possibility of their re-formulation, and t~ereby opens up the 
possibility_ of transforming the subject. So, for Butler, signification does not 
restrict gender within a specific discursive framework, it harbours the possibility 
of alternate gender configurations: 
If the regulatory fictions of sex and gender are 
themselves multiple contested sites of meaning, then 
the very multiplicity of their construction holds out 
the possibility of a disruption of their . univocal 
posturing. (Butler 1990, p32) 
For Butler, the possibility for agency is to be_ found in the very constructionism 
that is traditionally assumed to foreclose agency. Discursive constructions are "the 
necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and 
becomes culturally intelligible." (Butler 1990, p147) In short, the tension between 
constructionism and determinism is dissolved for Butler because, "as a process, 
signification harbours within itself what the epistemological discourse refers to as 
agency." (Butler 1990, p145) Significantly for critics of constructionism, I will 
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later show that Butler maintains that this agency exists, irrespective of the absence 
of a prediscursive subject. 
Let's look more closely at this conception of agency by first examining what 
Butler has to say about gender ontology. We have seen that the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment forms the basis for a matrix of intelligibility that 
produces coherent gender identities. These are identities that, according to a 
binary frame for sex, follow a continuous order of sex, gender and desire. Gender 
ontology refers to such coherent gender identities. The reader should also observe 
that Butler sometimes refers to gender ontology as substantive identity. Returning 
to the issue of agency however, Butler recognises that gender ontology depends 
upon the consistent repetition of those signifying practices that condition the 
subject: 
.. .to qualify as a substantive identity is an arduous 
task, for such appearances are rule generated 
identities, ones which rely on the consistent and 
repeated . invocation of rules that condition and 
restrict culturally intelligible practices of identity. 
(Butler 1990, p144) 
Butler argues that the possibility of substantive gender identities can only be 
maintained through a repetition • of the rules governing signification that restrict 
cultural intelligibility within a binary frame. Significantly for Butler however, one 
crucial consequence of this point is that because of the need for such repetition, 
there emerges the possibility for re-signification and hence, for agency. According 
~ 
i, 
'I 
( 
l 
I 
I 
I 
lll 
I 
1  
'"I 
81 
,to Butler, since "all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to 
repeat, agency, then, is to be _located within the possibility of a variation on that 
repetition." (Butler 1990, p145) If however, as Butler argues, agency is found in 
the instance of 'a variation on the repetition of the ·rules of signification', precisely 
where is that variation to be found? 
As I have demonstrated., because, abstractly speaking, language is an open system 
of signs, signification can be regarded as a process whereby intelligibility can be 
contested and re-created. As constructionism is the idea that gender ontology is an 
effect of signifying practices, then it follows that gender is itself · a process 
through which the subject comes to be constituted, but can never be fully 
determined. Put another way, because "signification is not a founding act, but 
rather a regulated process of repetition", identity can never be fully determined by 
the terms of discourse responsible for its generation. (Butler 1990, 145) As Butler 
explains, as an effect of discourse, the category ""woman" .. .is a term in process, a 
• 
' . 
becoming, a construction that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end." 
(Butler 1990, p33) Specifically, as the effect of the repetition of enactments that 
are essentially discontinuous, gender "is a norm that can never be fully 
internalised" and is therefore "impossible to embody". (Butler 1990, p141) Thus, 
while Butler recognises that gender ontology depends upon the consistent 
repetition of those signifying. practices that condition the subject, these stylised 
repetition of 9-cts can only ever approximate gender norms. Furthermore, 
discursive injunctions of gender simultaneously produce a realm of abject gender 
configurations that in some sense "exceed or defy the injunction by which they 
are generated." (Butler 1990, p145) The emerg~nce of an identity that blatantly 
,,, 
contests the compulsory order of sex, gender · and desire, such as "the 
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homosexual n is one obvious variation on intelligibility. However, Butler argues 
that the "failure to become "real" and to embody "the natural" is ... a constitutive 
failure of all gender enactments for the very reason that these ontological locales 
are fundamentally uninhabitable." (Butler 1990, p146) So, while the possibility of 
subversion can.be found in those marginalised gender identities that are ostensibly 
excl_uded from the domain of cultural intelligibility, . for Butler, subversive 
variation exists as a product of all identity injunctions. In short, 
the injunction to be a given gender produces 
' 
necessary failures, a variety of incoherent . 
configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and 
defy the injunction by which they are generated. 
(Butler 1990, 145) 
. Notably th~refore, Butler maintains it is not only that .agency can be located in 
those gender enactments that challenge or ultimately parody the gender 
injunctions by which they are generated. Rather, such variations are an inevitable 
product of the gender injunctions by which they are generated .. 
To recapitulate, Butler maintains that signification is the necessary scene of 
agency on the basis that gender norms are impossible to fully embody. Although 
identity is constituted _in and through language · through a process of a stylised 
repetition of acts, the discontinuou~ nature ·of those gender enactments that 
actually produce identity means that identity is never really fully determined. 
Thus, gender enactment alwa·ys expresses a variation on gendered identity norms. 
For Butler, this inevitable variation is the very scene of agency or possible 
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subversion. Nevertheless, it is still unclear how the incapacity to fully embody 
gender norms constitutes a form of agency. To qualify Butler's position I must 
turn to a third point, namely, that the failure. to fully embody gender norms 
exposes gender as a phantasmatic and therefore, a politically tenuous 
construction. 
As I have shown, for Butler, the "failure" to properly embody culturally 
intelligible gender configurations illustrates a variation on gende_r intelligibility, 
potentially capable of subverting conventional gender norms. More accurate! y, 
Butler argues that the potentially subversive element is to be found in the fact that 
gender enactment constitutes a variation on gender intelligibility that 
consequently, contests the hegemony of that intelligibility. As I have shown 
Butler argues that the incapacity to fully embody gender norms exists by virtue of 
the discontinuity of those performative acts that constitute identity. For Butler, 
such moments of variation reveal the discursive origins of culturally intelligible 
gender configurations and thereby destabilise the notion of gender ontology: 
The possibilities of gender transformation are to be 
found precisely in the arbitrary relation between such 
acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-
formity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the 
phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically 
tenuous construction. (Butler 1990, p141) 
More explicitly, I have shown how the subject appears through a signifying 
practice that functions to conceal its own construction and, as Butler writes, 
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"naturalise its effects". (Butler 1990, p144) As we have seen, one of the functions 
of such signifying practices is to produce · and regulate the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment which functions to fix the . matrix of gendered 
intelligibility. According to Butler however, gender enactments ·that fail to 
properly embody the gender norm, and thereby fail to reflect the . compulsory 
order of sex , gender and desire, actually reveal the phantasmatic nature of that 
"compulsory" order. In other words, "the "real" and the "sexually factic" are 
p~antasmatic constructions or illusi?ns of substance that bodies are compelled to 
approximate, but never can." (Butler 1990, p146) Therefore , unintelligible gender 
configurations . actually· expose' that illusion of substance upon which the 
· framework of intelligibility is built. Thus, defiant or parodic repetitions of gender, 
suggests Butler, "expose .. the illusion of gend~r as an intractable depth and inner 
substance." (Butler 1990, p146) In short, Butler maintains that the failure to 
properly embody culturally intelligible genders, that is, the failure to become 
."real", reveals the concept of prediscursive embodiment as an illusion , and 
thereby destabilises gender ontology. 
Previously I asked, since concepts of agency have traditionally relied . upon the 
notion of a prediscursive subject, and Butler's task is to dispense with this notion , 
then what sort of agency could ·Butler's thesis accommodate? Broadly speaking, it 
appears th.at the .issue of agency is re-formulated in Butler's thesis , as an issue of 
how signification and re-signification works. Butler argues that signification 
harbours agency becau~e, as the effect of discursive configurations that are 
impossible to embody, gender enactment inevitably parodies gender ontology. 
Such parody, suggests Butler, reveals the notion of gender ontology as an 
illusion, and thereby provides the opportunity for the legitimation of those gender 
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configurations that defy cultural intelligibility. ·Significantly, Butler does 
supplement her conception of agency with the suggestion that parodic repetition 
by itself does not constitute an effective subversion of identity: 
Parody by itself is not subversive, and there must be a 
way to understand what makes certain kinds of parodic 
repetitions become effectively disruptive, truly 
troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated 
and re-articulated as instruments of cultural hegemony . 
A typology of actions would not suffice, for parodic 
displacement, indeed, parodic laughter, depends· upon 
a context and reception in which subversive confusions 
can be fostered. (Butler 1990, p139) 
Thus, the question of what constitutes effective agency without recourse to a 
concept of a prediscursive subject is not simply answered in relation to the way in 
which signification and re-signification work. Evidently Butler does maintain that 
it is the recognition of the need for consistent repetition of those signifying 
practices that produce and naturalise the subject, and the subsequent recognition 
of the inevitability of a variation on that repetition, that reveals the possibility of 
agency as an inevitable feature of signification. However, she then adds the 
crucial qualification that, while subversive or abject gender configurations have 
' 
the effect of revealing the illusion of gender substance, the extent to which they 
are genuinely subversive is contextually dependent. 
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Finally then, in precise terms, how does. Butler re-conceptualise agency? The 
essence of Butler's position can be illustrated by a brief examination of some 
general criticisms of constructionism. To reiterate a previous point, . Butler 
observes _that critics of constructionism consistently ask questions such as.: "If 
gender is constructed, then who is doing the constructing?", and similarly, "If the 
subject is constructed, then who is constructing the subject?" (Butler 1993, p6) In 
other'words, critics of constructionism appear to be confused about how, without 
recourse to a human agent - a prediscursive subject, constructionists can account 
for the construction of subjectivity. While on the surface, such questions appear to 
. 
accept the general point of constructionism, namely, that the "subject" is 
• 
discursively constituted, Butler argues that they implicitly assume and perpetuate 
the very · concepts that constructionism attempts to dissolve. Specifically, Butler 
argues that this type of question implicitly assumes the necessity of a conception 
of agency that presupposes the concept of a prediscursive subject . . By assuming 
the idea of an agent responsible for the construction of the subject, such questions 
evoke a voluntarist conception of agency, and thereby inadvertently maintain the 
idea of an "outside" to discourse wherein the acting subject dwells. Butler stresses 
that this failure to dispense with the idea of an "outside" to discourse wherein the 
subject-agent can contest the terms of discourse, reflects a failure to grasp the 
extent to which constructionism radicalises our general acceptance of grammar, as 
well as our general understandin~ of both subjectivity and agency. Hence, as a 
rejoinder to criticisms of constructionism, Butler emphasises the · necessity to 
develop a greater "suspicion toward grammar" in order to re-conceive the issue of 
subjectivity, and the question of agency, more appropriately. (Butler 1993, p7) As 
I will show, Butler's request for a more critical approach to grammar provides the 
basis for a more refined understanding of her .re-conceptualisation of the concept 
of agency. 
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As I have suggested, Butler maintains that questions such as " ... who is 
constructing the subject", reflect a failure to come to terms with both the essence, 
and the implications of the constructionist's thesis that the subject is a_ discursive 
effect. First , in contradiction to the idea that the subject emerges from within 
discourse , Butler reveals that such questions are grounded on the assumption ·that 
there is an outside to discourse in which the subject exists. Butler maintains that , 
by adhering to a voluntarist conception of agency, such questions entail th·e notion 
of a prediscursive subject. In other words , the question of "who" constructs the 
subject implicitly assumes that there must be "a human agent , a subject, ... who 
guides the course of construction .. " (Butler 1993, p6) So , by seeking a subject - an 
agent -responsible for the construction of the subject, critics of constructionism 
seem to assume that agency is established with recourse to a subject who .is not 
constnicted by discourse , that is , who exists outside of discourse. In terms of 
Butler's thesis however, the question of "who" constructs the subject appears to be 
a non-question. Since. constructionism involves the idea that the subject is itself 
discursively constructed, then this question, rather than being critical, presupposes 
the truth of the grammatical formulations of the subject that constructionists 
oblige us to dissolve. In other words, such questions appeal to the very ontology 
that constructionism renders highly problematic. Consequently , it can be argued 
that because c?nstructionism dissolves the concept of prediscursive subjectivity , 
then the question of "who" constructs the subject which assumes a concept of 
prediscursive subjectivity, is essentially question begging. 
But how does the · recognition that the questions offered by critics of 
constructionism are question begging help to clarify Butler's understanding of 
agency? As I have discussed, critics of constructionism implicitly presume the 
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necessity for a concept of agency based on the idea of subject existing outside of 
discourse. For Butler however, to locate both the subject and agency in a realm 
outside of discourse is to miss the point of constructionism all together. 
According to Butler, the desire to maintain · the idea of a realm outside of 
discourse, reflects the extent to which critics of constructionism continue to 
maintain their faith in the legitimacy of grammatical formulations of the subject. 
Moreover, such desire stems from a failure ·to account for the fact that the 
necessary "outside" to which critics of constructionism intuitively refer, is 
actually found within discourse, through the failure of bodies to properly 
materialise identity norms. While the practice of re-signification is the location of 
"agency", it is not the case that potentially subversive gender performatives are an 
intentional product of a subject-author whose action provides a "pure" 
opposition to discursive modalities of power. (Butler 1993, p241) Rather, agency, 
is to be located in that space or excess produced by the incapacity to fully 
embody gender norms, and which necessarily accompanies any enactment of 
gender ontology. Butler does emphasise that the re-conceptualisation of the 
subject as one who is discursively constituted necessitates a re-conceptualisation 
of agency that is "directly counter to any notion of a voluntarist subject who 
exists quite apart from the regulatory norms which he or she opposes." (Butler 
(my emphasis) · 1993, p15 ) Correspondingly, as the subject is produced by the 
very norms it resists, Butler re-defines agency as a "reiterative or re-articulatory 
practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power." 
(Butler 1993, p15) In other words, it is wrong to think of agency in terms of an 
intending subject capable of contesting the terms of discourse; a subject's inability 
to fully embody the discursive injunctions through which they themselves are 
I 
generated, ensures that they inevitably do. 
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This discussion assists in refining our understanding of Butler's conception of 
agency. Primarily, it implies that constructionism necessitates a radical re-
conceptualisation of agency , that cannot be premised on the notion of a "subject" 
which exists outside of discourse. Butler dissolves the concept . of agency as 
subjective voluntarism , ·and reconceptualises it as a practice of reiteration and re-
articulation , that , unlike voluntarism , is immanent to power, but "not .a relation of 
external opposition to power." (Butler 1993, p15) 
... agency denoted by the performativity of "sex" will 
be direct I y counter to any notion of · a vol untarist 
subject who exists quite apart from the regulatory 
norms which she/he opposes. The paradox of 
subjectification ... is precisely that the subject who 
would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not 
produced , by such norms. Although this constitutive 
constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency , 
it does locate agency as a reiterative or re-arti~ulatory 
practice , immanent to power, and not a relation of 
external opposition to power. (Butler 1993, p 15). 
In other words, we have seen that a concept of voluntarist agency presupposes a 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity that by the terms of constructionism, does 
not exist. Agency then must be · reformulated as an immanent feature of the 
discourse that constitutes the subject In other words, Butler' s reconfiguration of 
agency denotes an interesting paradox. Not only is the subject produced by 
discursive gender norms, these norms also provide the conditions for the re-
--
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workings of that subject. This is because, as we have seen, gender enactment is 
always an approximation of gender norms. 
Finally, the adaptation of this re-conceptualisation of agency to the issue of the 
subversion of identity warrants some further qualification. According to Butler's . 
re-conceptualisation of agency, the issue of what constitutes a . genuinely 
subversive act, seems to be an incalculable or never ending question. As (non-
voluntarist) agency is located in the failure of bodies to properly materialise 
identity norms ; and this failure is an inevitable feature of all gender enactment, · 
then the matter of re-signifying identity is, as Butler describes, both continuous 
and unrelenting: 
Performativity describes [the] relation of being 
implicated in that which one opposes, this turning of 
power against itself to produce alternative modalities 
of power, to establish a kind of political contes~ation 
that is not a "pure" opposition, a "transcendence" of 
contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labour 
of forging a future from resources inevitably impure. 
(Butler 1993, p241) 
The implications he~e are twofold. First, while gender enactment will parody 
gender ontology and provide testimony to the idea that the idea of "true" or 
"natural" identity is a regulatory fiction, such parody will never amount to a 
genuine subversion of cultural intelligibility. Second, this inability to achieve a 
genuine subversion of intelligibility also relates to the fact that gender parody 
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emerges from the very gender norms that it subverts. As I have outlined , Butler 
maintains that "it is only within the practice of repetitive signifying that a 
subversion of identity becomes possible." (Butler 1990, p145) Hence, while the 
injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures that, according to 
Butler, "allow the assertion of alternate domains of intelligibility-", the emergence 
of these "subversive" domains also depends upon , the continuing presence of 
those terms from which they emerged. (Butler 1990, p145) In short , the enactment 
of a parodic gesture that defies the terms of cultural intelligibility is only parodic 
by virtue of the terms of intelligibility. Hence, while the parodic enactment of 
gender norms reveal the unstable and continuing condition of the subject , which 
for Butler, is the requisite condition for agency , this agency does not suggest the 
possibility of subverting or · transcending the terms of intelligibility. Rather, 
Butler's re-conceptualisation of agency implies "subversion" as an immanent 
feature of gender parody; a displacement of the very gender norms from which 
such parodies inevitably emerge. 
In summary, constructionism entails a re-formulation of the concept of agency as 
a reiterative or re-articulatory practice made possible by the contingent nature of 
those discursive practices that inform the constitution of the subject. While critics 
of constructionism argue that constructionism implies a constraint that forecloses 
the possibility of agency for the subject, Butler maintains that this criticism is 
based on the false perception that agency depends upon the idea of a prediscursive 
subject. According to .Futler ' s thesis however, the concept of a predis.cursive 
subject is itself a product of signification. Hence, adherence to this specific 
discursive construction results in a type of determinism in so far as the subject is 
constrained within the .terms of a regulated conception of both subjectivity and 
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agency. Once the idea of an "outside" to discourse is abandoned however, a 
· radical re-conception of the subject as a constitutive effect emerges. Moreover, 
I 
the acceptance of a constructivist account of gender formation allows for a re-
formulation of the concept of agency as an immanent feature of signification and 
as an effect of the inability of bodies to exactly reproduce gender norms. Butler 
argues that gender ontology depends . upon the consistent repetition of those 
signifying practices that condition the subject. Given the contingent nature of 
language however, the practice of signifying .identity is (inevitably) accompanied 
by a variation_ on the repetition of the rules of signification . Specifically, as 
' 
signification is a regulated process of repetition , gender identities can never be 
fully determined · by the terms of discourse from which they emerge. Rather , 
discursively constituted genders are themselves constructions in process, tbat 
through their essentially discontinuous nature, are impossible to embody. 
Significantly , instances of parodic repetition ~lso provide the basis to contest the 
terms of cultural intelligibility. Such variations implicitly contest the hegemony 
. . 
of culturally intelligible gender configurations . in so far as they reveal the 
discursive origins of the gender injunctions from which they are generated. 
"Agency" and Reproductive Technology. 
So far , I have outlined Butler's reconfiguration of agency. We have seen that for 
Butler ''agency" is refigured as an issue of how signification and resignification 
works. In particular, Butler maintains that "signification takes place within the 
orbit of the compulsion to repeat"; "agency", then, is to be located within the . 
possibility · of a variation on that repetition." (Butler 1990, p 145) This thesis is 
primarily concerned with whether Butler's reconfiguration .of agency can be 
applied to the context reproductive technology? In chapt~r one I raised this issue 
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1n response to a critical . examina~ion of the radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technology. First , following Butler, I argued that the assumption of 
prediscursive subjectivity can function to restrict adequate concepts of agency for 
women. In particular I showed that one way in which the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity is perpetuated is through the sex/gender distinction. This is because 
the sex-gender distinction perpetuates a concept of prediscursive embodiment 
which , as we have seen, helps to perpetuate the assumption of a prediscursive 
subject who is vested with agency. 
Following this , I argued that the radical feminist critique of reproductive 
technology is implicated in the foreclosing of adequate concepts of . agency for 
women. I argued this on the basis that these critiques maintain the sex/gender 
distinction. Specifically , the principle of personal autonomy that underlies this 
critique contains a concept of prediscursive embodiment. This leads to the 
foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency because the ·concept of prediscursive 
embodiment naturalises and therefore fixes the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity , that is , the assumption of a presocial subject who is vested with 
agency. Thus , the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology perpetuates 
one conception of agency thereby foreclosing the possibility of alternate 
conceptions of agency. However, I have also shown that by dissolving the 
presumption of prediscursive subjectivity Butler advances a theory of constitutive 
embodied subjectivi.ty in which the subject is presumed to be an effect of 
discursive configurations of identity. We have just seen the way in which this 
theory of subjectivity underlies Butler's reconfiguration of the concept of agency 
as an issue of how signification and resignification works. Again, I am trying to 
determine whether this reconfiguration of agency can be applied to the context of 
...... 
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reproductive technology. Given that this issue has advanced from an analysis of 
the radical feminist critique of reproductive technologies, I am also trying to draw 
some conclusions regarding the implications of Butler thesis for this particular 
feminist critique. Before applying Butler's reconfiguration of agency to the issue 
of reproductive technology, let me address what I believe to be the broad 
implications of Butler's thesis for radical feminist critiques of reproductive 
technology. 
This thesis has indicated that the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity is 
inextricably related to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. We have 
seen that within the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology, the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity helps to regulate and fix a voluntarist 
. ' 
conception of agency thereby foreclosing other concepts of agency. Moreover, we 
have seen that in dissolving the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity, Butler 
advances an alternate conception of agency. The possibility of a concept of 
agency beyond a voluntarist concept of agency, is thus linked to the dissolution of 
the concept of prediscursive subjectivity. Thus, Butler's reconfiguration of agency 
implies the need to engage in critical practices aimed at challenging the 
legitimacy of the concept of prediscursive subjectivity. In the present context, this 
I 
challenge has been directed towards radical feminist critiques of reproductive 
technology. In particular, I have argued that the principle of personal autonomy 
upon which these critiques are generally founded, is one discursive means through 
which the concept of prediscursive subjectivity is perpetuated and adequate 
concepts of agency foreclosed. One implication which may be gathered from this 
discussion is that if radical feminists are concerned with the issue of women's 
agency, they should be concerned with those discursive traditions that perpetuate 
~ 
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the assumption of prediscursive subjectivity. In particular, feminists should 
critique those discursive mechanisms through which a binary frame for sex is 
· produced and established as prediscursive. By critiquing discourses that 
perpetuate the assumption of the intractability_ of a binary frame for sex, feminists 
are displacing the concept of prediscursive subjectivity that, as we have seen, 
forecloses adequate concepts.of agency for women. 
. 
Significantly however, I have also indicated that the possibility of cha11enging the 
legitimacy of the concept of prediscursive subjectivity is an inevitable feature of 
gender enactment. We have seen that for Butler, gender ontology depends upon 
the consistent repetition of those signifying practices . that condition the subject 
and that agency is to be located within a variation on that repetition. Gender 
enactment inevitably constitutes a variation o_n repetition in so far as it is 
impossible to fully embody gender ontology. Hence, for Butler, the possibility of 
parodic repetition presents itself as an inevitable feature of gender enactment. 
Such enactment, suggests Butler, inevitably produces a repetition of parodic 
gender enactments, "a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender 
· norms that enabled the repetition itself." . (Butler 1990, p 148) According to this 
thesis, Butler n1aintains that the question of agency is to be answered by acting 
within the terms of intelligibility. 
The critical task for feminism is to locate strategies of 
subversive repetition· enabled by those const_ructions, 
to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through 
participating in precisely those practices of repetition 
that constitute identity _and, therefore, present the 
~ 
immanent possibility of contesting the.m. The critical 
task of feminism is not to establish a point .of view 
outside of constructed identities: that conceit is the 
construction of an epistemological model that would 
disavow its own cultural location and, hence, promote 
itself as a global subject, a position that deploys 
precise I y the imperialist strategies that feminism ought 
to criticise. (Butler, 1990, p 147) 
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I have shown that th~ radical feminist critique of reproductive technology is based 
upon the assumption of a fixed conception of voluntarist agency and that this 
forecloses other concepts of agency. One consequence of this assumption I have 
said, is that radical feminists advocate women's withdr<:1wal from such social 
practices such as reproductive technology. This consequence of the radical 
feminist critique of reproductive technology conflicts with Butler's thesis that 
subversive repetition is enabled by acting within the realm of cultural 
intelligibility, that is, within the matrix of normative gender relations. As Butler 
reminds us, 
"to operate within the matrix of power is not the same 
as to replicate uncritically relations of domination. It 
offers the possibility of a repetition of the law which is 
not its consolidation, but its displacement." (Butler 
1990, p, 30) 
Radical feminists, in adhering to a fixed voluntarist concept of agency, perpetuate 
the false assumption that agency is secured for women by withdrawing from 
~ 
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patriarchal practices such as reproductive technology. According to Butler' s 
reconfiguration of agency however, the task of feminism is to affirm the 
possibility that women 's participation in the terms of intelligibility allows for the 
possibility of contesting those terms. To what extent do reproductive technologies 
promote a matrix of normative gender relations and therefore the 'immanent 
possibility of contesting' such norms? This question returns us to the issue of 
whether Butler' s reconfiguration of agency can be applied to the context of 
reproductive technofogy. 
Are There Material Constraints Upon Discourse? 
Before addressing this question however, it is necessary to respond to a common 
criticism that is often made of Butler' s thesis. In chapter one I ·indicated that my 
impetus for bringing these two domains together was the issue of whether 
Butler' s thesis ignored the problem of biological constraints upon discourse. To 
reiterate , I outlined the way in which many of Butler ' s contemporaries have 
questioned whether Butler' s dissolution of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment involves ignoring or negating the materiality of the body. This 
cri_ticism is based on the observation that when Butler rejects the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment she seems to be saying that there is no material or 
bodily reality that precedes the discursive constitution of t4e subject. In other. 
words , because Butler regards. biological sex as the . product of discursive 
configurations of gender, theorists have questioned whether this involves a denial 
of the relevance of sexual specificity. In particular, the apparent specificity of the 
female body arid its capacity for impregnation is cited by theorists as an example 
of material constraints upon discourse which Butler's thesis seems to ignore. The 
issue of reproductiv~ technology seemed to be a context_ in which the presumption 
-
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of prediscursive embodiment seemed justified. This is to say that the issue of 
reproductive technology seems pertinent to women precisely because of the 
specificity of the female body. 
I have shown how Osborne and Segal question Butler ' s thesis in terms of her 
apparent failure to address the issue of the materiality of the body by asking why 
is it that male bodies don ' t get produced as child bearing. The issue of the specific 
relevance of reproductive technologies to women - based on the specificity of the 
female body - raises the question of the validity of dissolving the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment in relation to discussions about reproductive 
technology. Indeed , just as Osborne and Segal asked Butler: "Why is it that male 
bodies don ' t get produced as child rearing? " , we might ask: why is it that male 
bodies don ' t get produced such that they are eligible to use reproductive 
technologies? In other words , given that only female bodies are exposed to 
reproductive technologies , doesn't this legitimate the assumption of prediscursive 
embodiment , that is , an intractable biological reality , which Butler ' s thesis 
attempts to dissolve? Does the specificity of the female body constitute a 
legitimate constraint on discourse such that the assumption of prediscursive 
material reality is justified? In response to this issue , I would like to suggest that 
while the issue of reproductive technology appears to be a context in which the 
assumption of an intractable biological reality is justified , it is. in fact Butler ' s 
dissolution of the concept of prediscursive embodiment which is justified. In 
particular, I would like t1 suggest that the question of whether there are biological 
constraints upon discourse indicates a misunderstanding of Butler ' s thesis. 
Moreover, it can_ be argued . that the question itself perpetuates the very 
assumption of prediscursive subjectivity that Butler attempts to dissolve. 
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Recaping again · the implication I drew from Osborne and Segal' s question, one 
might think that the concept of prediscursive embodiment is warranted in so far as 
the "female" body has the capacity for impregnation. In other words, one might 
think that the fact that "male" bodies do not have the capacity for impregnation 
justifies the differentiation between "males" and "females", and hence affirms the 
legitimacy of not only the concept of prediscursive embodiment, but also a binary 
frame for sex. Likewise Butler acknowledges that someone might well ask why it 
is that only "female" bodies go to the gynaecologist: 
Somebody might, well say: isn't it the case that certain 
bodies go · to the gynaecologist for certain kinds of 
examinations and certain bodies do not. .... One might 
say it's because somebody is of a given sex that they 
go to the gynaecologist to get an examination to 
establish the possibility of pregnancy. (Butler cited in 
Osborne & Segal 1994, p 33) 
In terms of Butler's thesis however, this perspective misses the point that the 
discursive concept "female" imposes ·an artificial unity upon (the body) which 
would otherwise be a discontinuous set of attributes. In other words, "females" 
exist only by virtue of the assumption that certain biological differences become 
the salient characteristic of an identity category which we call "sex". In relation to 
the question: what about the "female" body's capacity for impregnation therefore, 
the question itself presupposes that the· biological diffe.rences of the female body 
are naturally the most salient characteristic of "sex". As outlined however, these 
features are discursively constructed as the salient feature of "sex" in relation to 
an otherwise discontinuous set of attributes. Thus, in relation to the question: 
•l i 
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what about the female body's capacity for impregnation, Butler maintains that the 
"real question" is: "to what extent does the body get defined by its capacity for 
pregnancy?" Or, "why is it pregnancy by which the body gets defined?" (Butler: 
cited in Osborne & Segal 1994, p33) 
Put another way, Butler emphasises that there are many "females" who are not 
capable of impregnation. Moreover, with regard to those women who are capable 
of impregnation, it should be acknowledged _ that this capacity need not be 
· regarded as the most salient feature of their identity: 
.... the fact of the matter is that there are female infants 
and children who cannot be impregnated, there are 
women of all ages who cannot be impregnated, and 
even if they could ideally, that is not necessarily the 
salient feature · of their bodies or even of their being 
women. (Butler cited in Osborne & Segal 1994, p 33) 
Thus for Butler, the question: but doesn't the female body's capacity for 
impregnation indicate the validity of the concept of prediscursive embodiment, 
inadvertently demonstrates one way in which the female body is forcibly 
produced through discourse. This is to say that the question assumes that the issue . 
of reproduction is an issue central to women's · lives, and subsequently, is 
implicated in making the issue of reproduction central to the sexing of the 
(femal_e) body. Thus for Butler, the assumption that reproduction is salient in the 
sexing of the body amounts to an "imposition of a norm, not a neutral description 
of biological constraints." (Butler cited in ·Osborne & Segal 1994, p 33) 
'i 
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According to this conclusion, the apparent relevance of reproductive technologies 
to the female body does not legitimate the assumption of prediscursive 
embodiment or natural sex. As I have outlined, while it is the specificity of the 
female body that renders women eligible for exposure to reproductive 
technologies, this should not be regarded as evidence of a natural differentiation 
between "males" and "females" or the legitimacy of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment. ·As with the example of impregnation, the question: why is it that 
only the ~emale body is exposed to reproductive technologies, falsely presumes 
that the biological differences of the female body are naturally the most salient 
characteristic of "sex". In other words, the question ignores Butler's fundamental 
point that the female body is forcibly produced or unified through discourse. 
Moreover, the question assumes that the issue of the female body's capacity for 
impregnation is an issue central to women's lives, and, is subsequently implicated 
in making the issue of reproduction central to the_ sexing of the (female) body. In_ 
emphasising the relevance of reproductive technologies to the "female body", one · 
perpetuates the legitimacy of the concept of a prediscursive "female" identity. 
Thus, while we might ask: but isn't it only female bodies that are exposed to 
' . 
reproductive technologies (and doesn't this legitimate the concept of 
prediscursive embodiment), Butler might argue that the real question is: why is it 
that reproductive technologies are discussed in relation to their effects upon 
"female" bodies? Such a focus, she would argue, amounts to "a discursive 
enforcement of a norm", that in fact contributes to the constitution of specifically 
female bodies. (Butler cited in Osborne & Segal 1994, p 33) 
. Indeed this is an important question to ask in relation to understanding the 
apparent inadequacy of the radical feminist agenda of denying all women access 
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to reproductive procedures. As outlined, Butler emphasises that in relation to the 
issue of the female body's capacity for impregnation it is important to 
acknowledge that this capacity need not be regarded as the most salient feature of 
sex. Similarly, when radical feminists present the proble-matic of reproduction 
(within the context of the issue of reproductive technologies) as an issue 
specifically for women, they fail to acknowledge that there are· women for whom 
the issue of reproductive technologies is not relevant. Akin to the issue of 
impregnation , when radical feminists define the issue of reproductive technology 
as "a woman 's issue", they reconsolidate the supposition that reproduction is 
central to the sexing of the body. Consequently , they are implicated in the 
constitution of sexed embodiment in accordance with a specifically binary frame. 
To repeat my previous argument, the radical feminisrmight retort: but aren't there 
biological differences that justify making any issue related to reproduction a 
"woman's" issue? As outlined however, for Butler: 
When people ask the question 'Aren ' t these 
biological differences?, they're not really asking 
about the materiality of the body. They're actually 
asking whether or not the social institution of 
reproduction is the most salient one for thinking 
about gender. (Butler cited in Osborne and Segal 
1994, p 34) 
In conclusion·, Butler's point is that the assumption. that the issue of impregnation , 
or the problematic . of reproduction is· relevant to women by virtue of the 
specificity of the female body, is an · assumption that contributes to the 
constitution of sexed embodiment in accordance with a binary frame. 
I• 
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Accordingly, the assumption within the radical feminist critique of reproductive 
technology, that the problematic of reproduction is relevant to women by virtue of 
the specificity of the female body, implicates that critique in the constitution and 
perpetuation of the concept of prediscursive embodiment. 
Maintaining the Principle of Personal Autonomy. 
Apparently then, Butler's response to the problematic of reproduction suggests 
that her primary concern is with the (discursive) conditions under which 
biological differences become the most salient features of "sex". In relation to the 
issu~ of reproductive technologies, I have shown how Butler's concern translates 
into a conc~rn with the (discursive) conditions inherent in the radical feminist 
critique within which the concept of a prediscursive female identity is · 
perpetuated. While the application of Butler's thesis to the radical feminist 
critique so far seems to justify her dissolution of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment, it is not without its problems. The thesis that: the radical feminist 
critique of reproductive technology perpetuates the concept of a prediscursive 
embodiment does not, for me at least, resolve the issue of those bodies that suffer 
from using reproductive technologies. In other words, while Butler's primary 
concern is with the (discursive) conditions under which biological differences 
become the most salient features of "sex", this focus contributes little to the 
problem outlined for us within the radical feminist critique, namely, that there are 
. bodies that do suffer through the use of reproductive technologies - ~rrespective of 
the way in which these bodies are coPstituted. 
\ 
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In chapter one I outlined the primary objections which radical feminists have to 
reproductive technologies. Among those objections that I did not outline was that 
radical feminists recognise that reproductive technologies have considerable 
negative physical and -psychological effects. Let me now then consider that tenet 
of the radical feminist critique of reproductive technologies that suggests the use 
of reproductive technologies results in a significant level of adverse physical 
reactions for the women who use them .27 Radical feminists indicate that despite a 
very high failure rate for procedures· related to reproductive technologies, it 
remains standard or 'routine' procedure for women to undergo "at least four to six 
treatment cycles." (Klein: 1994, p134) This point becomes significant when we 
consider that women are being subject to the routine use of an essentially 
dangerous procedure. One effect that is consistently cited is that of women's 
adverse reactions to the use of hormonal drugs. These drugs are used to stimulate 
ovulation but have proven to be consistently problematic producing such side 
effects as "vision problems, nausea, dizziness, weight gain to hyper-stimulation: a 
dangerous swelling of the ovaries and/or the production of cysts ... " (Klein 1994, 
p132) Robyn Rowland and Renate Klein, feminists who have consistently argued 
against the use of reproductive technologies, suggest that the intense level of 
· danger associated with the drugs used to artificially stimulate ovulation, includes 
the danger of premature menopause and cancer. (Klein 1994, p133) Moreover, 
many women who are on the IVF programs because of their partners infertility, 
when subject to these risks, become themselves infertile. 
Radical feminists also maintain that the uses of reproductive technologies affect 
women in psychologically adverse ways. Each attempt according to the radical 
feminist critique, is fraught with emotional upheaval and a disruption ·to one's 
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daily life, the stress of which is compounded by the effects of hormonal drug use 
and the consistent 'failure' to produce a child. Not only does an infertile women 
have to contend with the stress of involuntary childlessness, her pain is intensified 
by the perception that even with the help of technology she has 'failed' to produce 
a baby. Moreover, the_y argue that this perception is certainly not alleviated by 
such "reprospeak" as "diseased tubes, .... hostile womb, .. .incompetent 
cervix, ... aggressive placenta, ... and fertilisation failure." (Klein 1994, p132) The 
emotional cruelty that stems from the use of reproductive technology has also 
been explained in terms of their existence making it difficult for women to reject 
these technologies and reconcile themselves to childlessness; in light of the 
relative failure of these procedures, the public perception that reproductive 
technologies are a miraculous 'cure' for the infertile has been described as 
offering cruel and false hope to women who want to have a biological child but 
who cannot. 
We have seen that these sorts of objections to reproductive technologies compel 
radical ~eminists to appeal to a principle of personal autonomy and subs~quently 
to advocate that women should withdraw from this type of social exchange in 
order to maintain their autonomy .
28 
For instance, I have mentioned that Steinberg 
rejects new reproductive technologies on the basis that they "constitute an 
unprecedented ·assault on the privacy, integrity and autonomy of women." 
(Steinberg 1990, p 85) 
The extent to which 'IVF' treatment fragments 
women's_ reproduction and transfers their bodies 
whole and in parts to medical scientific jurisdiction 
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and control is the extent to which: (1) women are 
alienated from their own bodies, reproductive 
processes and general health and well-being: · (2) 
women are subordinate to practitioners' control and 
dependent upon practitioners' priorities and 
schedules; and (3) womert'.s reproductive agency is 
-
constrained, compromised or precluded altogether. 
(Steinberg 1990, p 89) 
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Here Steinberg implicitly appeals to a principle of personal autonomy and claims 
that women's use of reproductive. technologies amounts to an assault on that 
autonomy, as well as women's agency. Again, the loss of autonomy is linked to 
the degree medical practitioners control women's bodies. Secondly, the 
reclaiming of that autonomy is linked to women's ability for voluntary agency; 
women's autonomy is intact if she maintains the right" to make· decisions about 
what to do with her body. However, I have also outlined the way in which the 
principle of personal autonomy perpetuates a concept of prediscursive 
embodiment and thereby fixes a voluntarist conception of agency. Does this mean 
that radical feminists should abandon the_ principle of personal autonomy? 
I want to argue that the observations regarding the adverse physical and 
psychological effects of reproductive technology contained within the radical 
feminist critique of reproductive technology in fact justify the radical feminist's 
appeal to a principle of personal autonomy. When we acknowledge that 
reproductive technologies cause bodies to suffer, it seell).S justified to recall the 
principle of personal autonomy as a necessary political fiction, fundamental to the 
~ 
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protection of women's bodies involved in the use of reproductive technologies. 
The issue of reproductive technologies aside, it is relatively easy to conceive of 
ways in which the abolition of a principle of personal autonomy would elicit all 
manner of exploitation and abuse of women. There are many contexts in which 
women's withdrawal from a particular social exchange is legitimate and for .which 
the principle of personal autonomy functions to ensure women's safety or legal 
redress.29 I am thinking here of issues such as rape, incest, or indeed any form of 
assault . involving the body. In the case of rape for instance, the premise that 
• 
women have the right · to make decisions regarding their body property is 
measured against the actions of the rapist and, abstractly at least, provides women 
with legal indemnity. Accordingly, when radical feminists claim that . women's 
bodies are negatively affected by the use of reproductive technologies, then an 
appeal to the principle of personal autonomy is at least one conceptual framework 
from which_ the idea that wo_men have the right to make decisions regarding their 
bodies is maintained. This is not to say that theorists .such as Steinberg are correct 
in assuming that the very use of reproductive technologies constitutes an assault 
on women's autonomy; I am not assessing the legitimacy of the radical feminist 
position. Rather, I am suggesting that the concept of autonomy assumed within 
the radical feminists critique of repro_ductive technologies is a necessary political 
fiction. While perpetuating the concept of prediscursive subjectivity, the principle 
of personal autonomy nonetheless functions as a political tool through which 
women's bodies can sometimes be protected. 
When I defend the principle of personal autonomy I am also defending a 
voiuntarist conception of agency, that is, one which assumes the concept of a 
disembodied individual capable of existential choice.30 As I have discussed, 
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while radical feminists regard reproductive technologies to be linked to an assault 
on women's autonomy, the reclaiming of that ·autonomy is linked to the 
possibility that women can voluntarily withdraw from or control such procedures. 
In other words, the protection of women's autonomy is linked to women's 
capacity for voluntarist agency. Thus, when I refer to the apparent need to retain 
the principle of personal autonomy, I am also advocating that a concept of 
voluntarist agency is necessary for the protection of women's bodies; it too 
functions as a necessary political fiction. The apparent need to retain a voluntarist 
conception of agency, suggests that Butler's recorrception of agency should not be 
a substitution for a conventional voluntarist conception of agency. As I have 
suggested, the abolition of a conventional approach to the issue of women's 
agency amounts to the abolition of a useful political fiction against which all 
manner of exploitation and abuse of women can be measured. Thus, the concept 
" 
of voluntarist agency should stand therefore, as a useful and necessary political 
tool that remains fundamental to feminism and the issue of women's protection.31 
Given this understanding of the . importance of this·· conventional concept of 
agency for feminism, there ·does seem to be something problematic about 
rejecting the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology simply on the 
grounds that this concept remains central to that critique. Thus, while there may 
be other ground on which to reject the radical feminist critique of reproductive 
technologies, the fact that it retains a conventional approach to the issue of agency 
is not one such ground. 
So where does this leave Butler's thesis? So far I have argued that, at least within 
the context of reproductive technology, Butler's re-conception of agency should 
• 
not substitute for a conventional conception of agency. I argue this on the basis 
.... 
109 -
that the principle of personal autonomy functions as an effective political fiction 
that services the protection of bodies. Nonetheless, this does not resolve the issue 
of radical feminists perpetuating a concept of prediscursive embodiment by 
appealing to the principle of personal autonomy. In chapter one I outlined the way 
in which a concept of prediscursive embodiment legitimates the idea of a 
prediscursive subject and that this leads to the foreclosing of adequate concepts of 
agency. The pertinent question now is how to reconcile the apparent need to retain 
a principle of al!ltonomy with the recognition that this principle perpetuates · the 
concept of prediscursive embodiment. In particular, I am endeavouring to 
ascertain whether Butler's reconfiguration of agency provides a way through this 
problem? I vvould like to suggest that while Butler's conception of agency should 
not be a substitution for a voluntarist conception of agency it nonetheless remains 
compatible with a voluntarist conception of agency. This is a radical suggestion 
which implies that it is possible to retain both a conventional conception of 
agency and Butler's reconfiguration oft.he concept of agency. In order to justify 
this claim, I would like to consider the way in which Butler's conception of 
agency allows us to conceptualise change for women within the context of 
reproductive technology. 
According to Butler, constructivism harbours agency. This is because, as an effect 
of discursive configurations that are impossible to fully embody, gender 
enactment inevitably parodies gender ontology. How does this conception of 
agency translate within the context of reproductive technology? In the temis of 
Butler's thesis, the manifestation of identity norms within discourses that 
surround reproductive technologies should allow for the simultaneous enactment 
and subversion of those norms. In other words, such identity norms are discursive 
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configurations which will inevitably produce instances of parodic repetition. In 
order to assess this supposition , I will consider some of the identity norms which , 
according to the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology , influence or 
encourage women ' s use of reproductive technology: I will suggest that these 
identity norms can be regarded as discursive configurations of identity which in 
accordance with Butler ' s thesis, proyide the possibility of change for women. 
Radical feminists argue that the following identity norms are restrictive in so far 
as they exclude the possibility that women can freely choose to reject 
reproductive technologies. I will attempt to show however , that for Butler, these 
identity norms are "the necessary scene of agency, the very terms through which 
agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible." (Butler 1990, p 14 7) . 
Gendered Identity Norms and Reproductive Technologies 
As outlined , radical feminists maintain that women are coerced into using 
reproductive techn?logies by n1;1merous social factors. Subtle forms of influence 
such as the dominance of pronatalist values, the conflation of woman with 
motherhood , limited economic opportunity, and socially bearing the responsibility 
of male infertility - are said to exclude the possibility that women can freel y 
choose to use these high risk procedures. This is not , radical feminists argue , to 
present women as passive victims who are invariably tricked into undergoing 
these procedures. Rather, radical feminists maintain that a woman's ability to 
choose to risk subjecting themselves to these procedures is mediated by these 
social factors , the existence of which asserts a genuine and unavoidable influence 
upon women's lives. Significantly, I outlined the radical fe.minist suggestion that 
this coercion can largely be attributed to the social expectation that it is a 
woman's role in society to have children. There is, they argue, an exaggerated 
... 
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perception of the need for reproductive technologies that is dependent upon 
. society's tendency to -conflate women · and -motherhood. In other words, radical 
feminists argue that the expansion of ·reproductive technologies is often justified 
through the perpetuation of stereotypical images of women as desperately in need 
of having a child. 
Further, I. indicated · that some feminists argue that the social imperative to 
procreate pressures women into pursuing motherhood because women fear their 
behaviour will be judged in relation to this dominant ideal. For instance, 
Raymond relays the experi_ence of an infertile women who is agonised, not by her 
infertility, but by the perception of family and friends that she is abnormal for 
not pursuing every avenue possible to obtain a child, either through the use of 
reproductive technology or via adoption. (Raymond 1994, p5) Thus, ·radical . 
feminists argue that the social imperative to procreate, inextricably connected 
with the social imperative that all women should be mothers, leads infertile 
women to perceive reproductive technologies as the only way of becoming a 
successful member of society. Women who expose themselves to reproductive 
technologies only do so .because of the pressure of a socially constructed gender 
identity norm, that is, one which conflates women w_ith their capacity for 
reproduction. Reinforcing the concept of a socially constructed gender identity 
norm, radical feminists maintain that the social perception of an infertile woman 
is of someone who is desperate to have a child. Some feminists maintain that this 
type of pressure clearly relates to a public conception not only that childlessness 
is abnormal, but that women are incomplete without a child. Radical feminists 
argue-that this is evident when we observe that despite the fact male infertility is 
as common as female infertility, the public conception of the infertile is uniformly 
!. 
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female. According to radical feminists therefore, the expansion of reproductive 
technologies flourishes due to the pressure exerted by social attitudes towards 
infertility, but in particular women's infertility. The issue of coercion _aside, it can 
· be argued tha! women act in relation to reproductive technologies on the basis of a 
normative conception of what it means to be a woman. Again, this gendered 
identity norm is one which conflates women with a capacity for reproduction. 
What are the significance of these gendered identity norms in terms of Butler's 
the?is? First, Butler acknowledges the existence of gendered identity norms 
consistent with those identity norms I have extracted from the radical feminist 
critique o_f reproductive technology. In particular, she acknowledges that gendered 
identity norms for women conflate women with a capacity for reproduction. This 
is evident in Butler's claim that the category of sex is constrained by "a tacit 
institution of compulsory reproduction" (Butler cited in Osborne & Segal 1994, p 
34). Remember that for Butler, the category of sex is the foundational and causal 
category which underlies gendered identity norms. When Butler argues that "sex" 
is constrained by 'a taclt institution of compulsory reproduction' she is 
simultaneously suggesting that gendered identity norms for \YOm~ri are 
themselves constrained by 'a tacit institution of compulsory reproduction'. Butler 
relays the way in which 'compulsory reproduction' effects women in the 
following practical terms. 
If ..... you can't get pregnant for biological reasons, or 
maybe you don't want to for social reasons, ...... you 
are struggling with a norm that" is regulating your sex. 
It takes a pretty rigorous (and politically informed) 
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community around you to alleviate the possible sense 
of failure, or loss, o~ impoverishment, or inadequacy -
a collective struggle to rethink a dominant norm. 
(Butler cited in Osborne & Segal 1994, p 34) 
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Butler acknowledges that culturally, the dominant identity norm for women is one 
which is inextricably bound to the issue of reproduction. Butler refers to the 
cultural phenomenon whereby women potentially feel a sense of failure in 
instances where they do not utilise a reproductive capacity. This suggests that the 
dominant norm · which regulates the concept of sex and against which women 
struggle, is one which involves the idea that a woman is inadequate or unfulfilled 
unless she utilises her reproductive capacity. 
The parallel b_etween Butler's observations regarding culturally dominant identity 
norms and those identity norms which, indicated in the radical feminist critique , 
surround the practice of reproductive technologies seems evident. I argued that 
according to the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology, the 
culturally dominant identity norm which surrounds reproductive technologies is 
one which conflates women with a reproductive capacity. This specific identity 
norm is produced in conjunction with .what radical feminists call the social 
imperative to procreate. Radical feminists maintain that this social imperative 
exerts a coercive force on women compelling them to use reproductive 
. technologies. Similarly, Butler maintains that women are struggling against 
dominant social norms which are produced within culture by what she calls 
'compulsory reproduction'. Evidently, the gendered identity norms which I have 
extracted from the radical feminist critique of reproductive technology are , Butler 
''\ 
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would argue, examples of.culturally instituted norms which regulate the category 
of sex and against which some women struggle. 
It is also important to see the way in which gendered identity norms that surround 
. . 
· reproductive technology amount to what B utle_r calls ' coherent gender identities ' . 
In chapter one I outlined the way in which according to Butler ,- _culturally 
compulsory heterosexuality leads to the production and maintenance of a binary 
gender system. This binary gender system generates coherent gender identities, 
that is , identities which reflect a continuous relation between sex, gender and 
desire , in accordance with a binary frame for sex. In the context of reproductive 
technology , I have indicated that women are dealing with a gendered identity 
norm which conflates women with a capacity for reproduction. It can be 
demonstrated that this gendered identity norm reflects a continuous relation 
between sex, gender and desire ·and therefore represents what Butler would call a 
'coherent gender identity ' . In accordance with a binary gender system , the norm 
involves the assumption that a female (sex) has the capacity for _reproduction and 
that a women (gender) inevitably wishes to utilises this reproductive· capacity. 
Moreover, the norm assists in reg·ulating heterosexual desire in that the utilisation 
of a woman's reproductive capacity requires heterosexual activity. Thus, the 
gendered identity norm that I have extracted from radical feminist critiques of 
reproductive technology is, in Butler's terms, an example of a coherent gender 
identity. As part of a regulatory functioning of the heterosexuality of desire it 
reflects a specific and continuous relation between sex, gender and desire . 
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Gendered Identity Norms and Butler's Agency. 
I am attempting to reconcile the need to retain a principle of personal autonomy 
within the context of reproductive technologies with the fact that this principle 
perpetuates a concept of prediscursive subjectivity. I have argued that this 
reconciliation is necessary because the principle of personal autonomy is a wanted 
political fiction that may service the protection of bodies. Yet, as I have shown , 
this principle contains a concept of prediscursive embodiment tbat lead to the 
foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency. In order to reconcile this apparent 
contradiction, it is necessary to show the w~y in which a Butlerian conception of 
agency allows for the possibility of change for women within the context of 
reproductive technology. I have just demonstrated that gendered identity norms 
exist within the context of reproductive technologies. In particular, I showed that 
the social imperative to procreate evokes a conception of women's identity that 
conflates women with a. reproductive capacity. In terms of Butler's thesis, such 
discursive configurations of "woman" should allow for the possibility of agency 
or change for women. Again recalling Butler's thesis, substantive gender identity 
depends upon the constant repetition of those rules and practices that condition 
the subject. For Butler, agency is located within the possibility of a variation of 
that repetition. In other words, while discursive configurations of gender produce 
the subject, the fact that signification is a process of repetition ensures that the 
subject is never fully determined by those discursive configurations. The 
enactment of gender norms will inevitably produce instances of subversive 
repetitions o~ those norms. According to this thesis, the manifestation of gendered 
identity norms within discourses that surround reproductive technologies should 
allow for the simultaneous enactment and parodying of those norms. Supporting 
this claim, it is possible to identify instances where the enactment of the norms 
surrounding reproductive technology produce instances of parodic repetition. 
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Apart from identifying· those gendered· identity norms which surround 
reproductive technologies, I have also shown that they are, what Butler terms as , 
'coherent gender identities'. The reader may recall that for Butler, the generation 
of coherent gender norms involves the simultaneous production of a realm of 
abject gender configurations. Abject gender identities are those that illustrate a 
discontinuous relation between sex , gender and desire. So ; abject gender 
identities are those in which "gender does not follow from sex , or the practice of 
desire does not follow from either sex or gender." (Butler 1990, pl 7) Instances of 
subversive repetition of gendered norms are instances in which abject gender 
identities are produced. We have s·een that the social imperative to procreate 
evokes a conceptioi:i of identity for women that conflates women with a 
reproductive capacity. Challenging this norm however, there are many women , 
who despite being childless , are content being childless. In the terms of Butler ' s 
thesis, ' a woman who is content being childless ', is an example of an abject 
gender id~ntity. This woman ' s identity does not uphold the norm by reflecting a 
continuous relation between her reproductive capacity (sex) and her desire to be 
fulfilled as a woman, by motherhood (gender). Rather , her identity expresses a 
disruption of the relationship between these two aspects of a culturally normative 
or coherent gender ~dentity. In other words , it represents a discontinuous relation 
between sex and gender. 'A. woman who is content being childless ' is someone 
for whom their reproductive capacity (sex) bares no relation to their fulfilment as 
a woman, by motherhood (gender). 
I have also suggested that discourses surrounding reproductive technology 
construct a normative conception of infertile women as desperate to have a child. 
Again, we can see the way in which this identity, in Butlerian terms , constitutes a 
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coherent gender identity. A woman (gender) is assumed to be unfulfilled if she . 
does not utilise a reproductive capacity. This capacity for reproduction is a 
function of (and here conflated with) biological sex. According · to this identity 
norm therefore, a woman's fulfilment is inextricably linked to her biological sex, 
or reproductive capacity. We can also. see however, that this coherent gender 
norm simultaneously produces instances of subversive repetition, or 'abject 
gender configurations'. Contesting the norm that 'infertile women are desperate to 
have a child', there are many infertile women who, despit~ using reproductive 
technologies, still do not have a child, but remain ambivalent about this. This 
indicates t~at a woman's fulfilment is not inextricably linked to her biological 
capacity to produces a child. A woman's incapacity for reproduction does not 
have a direct relationship to her fulfilment as a woman. Evidently, there are 
examples of abject or subversive identities that emerge from the gendered identity 
norms which surround reproductive technology. Butler's reconfiguration of 
agency indicates the way in which gendered identity norms simultaneously 
· provide the possibility of multiple subversive gender enactments. While the 
n·ormative conception of gender identity within the context of reproductive 
technology conflates women with a capacity for reproduction, this configuration 
also produces instances of parodic repetition such as women who do not desire to 
utilise their reproductive capacity or who remain fulfilled, despite not being in a 
position to do so. 
Examples of parodic repetition are bv no means limited to those I have outlin_ed 
above. Remember that the matrix of cultural intelligibility produces coherent 
gender identities, that is, identities which reflect a continuous relation between 
sex, gender, and desire in accordance with a binary frame for sex. I have been 
t 
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emphasising that this matrix produces a coherent gender identity which suggests 
that all women should be mothers, and that all mothers are heterosexual females. 
Of course , I have also emphasised that the matrix of intelligibility produces a 
realm of abject identities, that is identities which contradict or exceed the terms of 
intelligibility. Yet another example of an abject or subversive identity which 
emerges from within the context of reproductive technology is evident when we 
consider that ·reproductive technologies may be open to use by lesbians.32 While 
the gendered identity norm that surrounds reproductive technology assumes a 
continuous relation between sex , gender and desire , the ' lesbian mother' 
represents a discontinuous relation between gender and desire. In other words , 
'the lesbian mother' contradicts those terms of intelligibility that dictate that all 
mothers are heterosexual females. 
Similarly , the assumption produced by the matrix of intelligibility that all mothers 
are heterosexual females is disrupted by the emergence of such abject identities as 
'the single mother ' . We must remember that the matrix of intelligibility carries 
the assumption of a compulsory (and naturalised) heterosexuality. This · 
heterosexualisation of desire underlies the ~mergence of many culturally 
normative practices. I am thinking here of the cultural institution of marriage as 
involving a heterosexual man and women, and from this the institution of a 
normative conception of the ideal family unit in which the married heterosexual 
couple produce children. This issue is linked to Butler's observation that 
nonnative conceptions of women also figure specific "discursive routes" from 
which alternate gendered norms are constru~ted. In other words, conceptions of 
what it means to be a woman will be accompanied by a "trajectory of adjectives", 
that create a specifically characterised gendered identity. (Butler 1990, p 143) 
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Significantly, she again argues that these discursive rout~s provide the possibility 
of change: 
The injunction to be a given gender produces 
necessary failures, a variety of incoherent 
configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and 
defy the injunction by which they are generated. 
Further, the very injunction to be a given gender takes 
place through discursive routes; to be a good mo_ther, 
to be a heterosexually desirable object, to be a fit 
worker, in sum, to signify a multiplicity of guarantees 
in response to a variety of different demands all at 
once. The coexistence or convergence of ·such 
discursive injunctions produces the possibility of a 
complex reconfiguration and redeployment. (B utl~r 
1990, p 145) 
My.point here is that Butler's concept of agency ~ that the enactment of gendered 
identity norms inevitably also defy the discursive configurations from which they 
. are generated - can be extended to include the discursive routes through which 
gendered identity travels. These specifically characterised gendered identity 
norms also produce instances of parodic repetition. This is to say that discurs.ively 
qualified gendered identities are no more likely to be fully embodied than 
gendered identities whir:h are not qualified by 'a trajectory of adjectives.' The · 
heterosexualisation of desire, I have suggested, produces an array of culturally 
normative identities and practices, amongst which are such practices as marriage 
~ . 
between a heterosexual man and women. We might say therefore, .that the 
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injunctio~ to be a given gender takes place through a discursive route which 
refigures a WOIJ?an's identity in relation to the culturally normative practice of 
marriage.33 In other words, the cultural normative conception of motherhood also 
includes the assumption that one is married to a heterosexual male. Now we can 
see the way in which the emergence of 'the single mother' within the context of 
reproductive technologies, · exceeds and contradicts the terms· of cultural 
intelligibility - as~uming that the single mother .does not seek a co-parent. 'The 
single mother' does not represent a discontinuous relation between sex, gender 
and desire (assuming the woman is a heterosexual). However, it disrupts those 
normative identities and practices that are produced by the matrix of intelligibility 
and its assumption of compulsory heterosexuality .34 
I have explored several 'abject gender identities' that emerge from the 'coherent 
gendered identities' that surround reproductive technology. In particular, I have 
outlined four · examples of subversive repetition of identity norms for women. 
Women who are content being childless, infertile women who remain ambivalent 
about being childless, lesbian mothers and single mothers, are examples of abject 
configurations of identity which exceed or contradict the terms of cultural 
intelligibility. This is not to suggest that the emergence of such abject ,identities as 
'the 'single mother' are confined to the context of reproductive technologies. 
Rather, it is to demonstrate that while the context of reproductive technologies is 
informed by a series of coherent or normative cultural practices and identities, this 
does not foreclose the possibility of the subversion of such norms. Moreover, this · 
exploration indicates the way in which Butler's thesis allows us to recognise that 
gendered identity norms are not only the conditions through which the subject is 
' 
constituted, but also the scene of agency and change for women. This is because 
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such identity norms simultaneously provide the possibility of subversive gender 
enactment, that is, enactments which defy the terms of cultural intelligibility. 
I have indicated that Butler's reconfiguration of the concept of agency allows us 
to recognise the way in which gendered identity norms, relevant to the issue of 
reproductive technology, provide women with the possibility of change. · How 
does this help us to reconcile the contradiction between the apparent need for 
radical feminists to retain a principle of personal autonomy and the fact that this 
principle perpetuates a concept of prediscursive embodiment? The possibility of 
reconciling this contradiction is linked to another question .that has since em.erged 
within this discussion. If Butler maintains that subversive gender enactment is an 
inevitable feature of gendered identity norms, why is it necessary to be concerned 
with the fact that a principle of autonomy perpetuates a concept of pre-discursive 
embodiment? The reader may recall that gendered identity norms are the product 
of the matrix of cultural intelligibility. I have also outlined the way in which the 
concept of prediscursive embodiment functions to naturalise and fix this matrix. 
However, we have just seen that for Butler, this matrix allows for the possibility 
for change for women. Why then should we be at all concerned with the fact 
radical feminists utilise a principle of personal autonomy and perpetuate the 
concept of prediscursive embodiment? After all, this concept regulates the very 
matrix that, we have seen, provides agency for women. 
The foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency does not pertain to the matrix of 
intelligibility per se. Indeed, the reader may recall that the possibility of 
subversive enactments of gendered identity norms depends upon the continuing 
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presence of · those identity terms which allow for the emergence of parodic · 
enactment: 
If the rules governing signification not only restrict, 
but enable the assertion of alternate domains of 
.. cultural -intelligibility, ie., new possibilities for gender 
that contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms, 
then it is only within the practice of repetitive 
\ 
signifying that a subversion of identity becomes 
possible. (Butler 1990, p 145) 
What this signals is that while gendered identity norms appear to restrict the 
emergence of alternate gender configurations, they in fact provide a discursive 
framework from which alternate configurations of gender can emerge .35 Indeed, I 
have just illustrated the way in which gendered identity norms relevant to 
reproductive technology simultaneously produce a realm of abject gender 
configurations. However, Butler is not concerned with the matrix of intelligibility 
per se. Her concern is with the assumption which underlies and fixes the matrix of 
intelligibility, namely, the concept of prediscursive embodiment. .The concept of 
prediscursive embodiment, we have seen, fixes the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity, that is, the concept of a pre-social agent who is vested with agency. 
Assumed to be fixed, a voluntarist concept of agency thus emerges at the expense 
. of alternate concepts of agen~y. This is not to say that women's agency is 
foreclosed by the concept of prediscursive embodiment that underlies and fixes 
the .matrix of intelligibility. Indeed, according to Butler's concept of agency, the 
matrix is the very means through which infinite ~ultural identities for women can · 
emerge. Rather, she is concerned with the concept of prediscursive embodiment 
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which underlies and fixes the matrix of intelligibility and which simultane.ously 
fore.closes adequate concepts of agency. 
The reason for this concern is exemplified by the effects of the perpetuation of the 
concept of prediscursive embodiment within the radical feminist critique of 
reproductive technology. The point for Butler is that the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment naturalises or fixes the concept of a prediscursive subject who is 
. vested with agency. The principle of personal autonomy, central to the radical 
feminist critique , does not only perpetuate· the assumption of prediscursive 
, 
embodiment. Through this perpetuation, it simultaneously regulates and fixes the 
concept of voluntarist agency. Other concepts of agency are thereby foreclosed, 
and the concept of (prediscursive) voluntarist agency emerges as a requisite 
feature of women 's agency. 
If we agree that politics and power exist already at the 
level at which the subject and its agency are articulated 
and made possible, then agency can be presumed only 
at the cost of refusing 'inquiry into its construction .... .In 
a sense, the epistemological model that offers us a pre-
given subject or agent is one that refuses to 
acknowledge that agency is always and only a political 
prerogative. As such, 'it seems crucial to question the 
conditions of its possibility, not to take it for gninted 
as an apriori guarantee. (Butler 1995a, p47) 
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Similarly, the concept of prediscursive agency is implicitly affirmed, within the 
... 
radical feminist critique, as the only means through which subjects are capable of 
agency. This is an issue I raised in chapter one of this thesis. In conjunction with 
Diprose's . critique of the ethics of reproductive practices I indicated that the . 
· radical feminist critique of reproductive technology appropriates a. conventional 
approach to ethics and thereby ultimately restricts women's actions. In particular, 
I indicated that the perpetuation of the concept of prediscutsive embodiment, 
which regulates and fixes the concept of voluntarist agency, results in radical 
feminists advocating women's withdrawal from patriarchal practices such as . 
reproductive technologies. This is to say that a fixed concept of voluntarist agency 
implies that withdrawal is the only means through which women can challenge 
patriarchal practices such as reproductive technologies. 
Moreover, it is important to realise that underlying this suggestion is the 
assumption that a voluntarist concept of agency is the only means through which 
women can challenge patriarchy. In other words, when ·radical feminists maintain 
that women should withdraw from patriarchal practices such as reproductive 
technologies, they are speaking from a position which assumes that a voluntarist 
concept of agency is the only means through which women can contest patriarchal 
practices such as reproductive technologies. Thus, radical feminist's perpetuation 
of the concept. of prediscursive embodiment is problematic because it regulates 
and fixes a conventional concept of agency, one consequence of which may be 
women's withdrawal from social nractices such as the use of reproductive 
technologies. This is not to suggest that women's agency would be reduced by 
such withdrawal. Remember that for Butler, agency is made possible by the . . 
presence of the matrix of cultural intelligibility which is common to patriarchy 
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per se. Rather, it appears that radical feminists are mistaken in thinking that they 
can secure agency for women by suggesting women's withdrawal from such 
practices as reproductive technology. In fact, by advocating such withdrawal 
radical feminists are legitimating a volunta,rist conception of agency at the 
expense of alternate concepts of agency for women; they inadvertently and 
mistakenly deny that there are other valuable concepts of agency which constitute 
a means through which women can challenge patriarchy. 
I am not advocating that women be directly encouraged to participate in those 
practices, such as reproductive technologies, that condition the subject and which 
subsequently allow for the emergence of subversive gender identities. Rather, the 
point is that the radical . feminist thesis that women should withdraw from such 
practices falsely assumes that such withdrawal is the only way in which patriarchy 
can be challenged in this context. In terms of Butler's reconception of agency it 
becomes apparent that women's involvement in patriarchal practices, such as 
reproductive technologies, does not exclude or run counter to the possibility of a 
subversion of patriarchal norms. We can see now why Butler would find the 
perpetuation of the concept of prediscursive embodiment within the radical 
feminist critique of reproductive technology as problematic. This concept fixes a 
concept of prediscursive agency, the application of which encourages women to 
withdraw from reproductive technologies on the false premise that this is the only 
means to agency and the subversion of patriarchy. My point here is that if radical 
feminists are to accurately represent or address the issue of agency for women, it 
is necessary to move beyond the assumption of a fixed conception of agency. 
Again, this is because the assumption of a fixed conception of agency seems to 
result in feminists advocating women's withdrawal from social practices such as 
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the use of reproductive technologies. In Butlerian terms, this amounts to · asking 
women to withdraw from patriarchal practices that are no less the location for 
agency and subversive acts than any other. 
It is still unclear l)owever, whether radical feminists should abandon the principle 
of personal autonomy on the basis that it perpetuates· the concept of prediscursive 
subjectivity. I still adhere to the idea that · it is necessary to maintain a voluntarist 
conception of agency on the basis that it is a useful political fiction that services 
the protection of bodies. Apparently then, I have not yet resolved the conflict 
between the fact that we should not abandon conventional concepts of agency 
within the context of reproductive technology with the observation that this 
conventional approach perpetuates a concept of prediscursive embodiment. This 
conflict can be resolved by affirming the fictitious or discursive nature of the 
concept of prediscursive subjectivity. In relation to the implications of Butler's 
concept of agency for feminism, I suggested that part of the task of feminism is to 
undermine the concept of prediscursive subje_ctivity and in particular, the concept 
of prediscursive embodiment which regulates and · fixes the · assumption of 
prediscursive subjectivity. This is to ensure that the matrix of cultural 
intelligibility, stabilised and naturalised by the concept of . prediscursive 
embodiment, is de-naturalised and rendered unstable. In order to do this, it ·is 
necessary that feminists draw attention to the discursive origins of the matrix of 
intelligibility, and in particular, the discursive origins of the concept of 
prediscursive embodime11.t. 
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This can be achieve~ by affirming instances of gender enactment that defy or 
exceed the terms of cultural intelligibility. Of course, I have just given examples 
of some instances of subversive enactments of gender within the context of 
reproductive technology, such as "the lesbian mother", "the single mother" and 
so on. These instances of parodic repetition are a revelation regarding the 
discursive origins of the concept of prediscursive embodiment. In particular, these 
subversive gender enactments function to destabilise · the assumption of the 
intractability if a binary frame for sex. As I have outlined, identities such as 'the 
lesbian mother' represent a discontinuous relation between sex, gender and desire. 
They therefore indicate the fictitious . nature of the matrix of intelligibility. Given 
that the concept of prediscursive embodiment underlies, regulates and fixes this 
matrix, a revelation regarding its fictitious nature. simultaneously destabilises the 
assumption of prediscursive embodiment. 
Previously I suggested that if radical feminists are to accurately represent or 
address the issue of agency for women it is necessary for them to move beyond 
.the assumption of a fixed conception of agency. The destabilisation of the concept 
. of prediscursive embodiment is of course, linked to the possibility of moving 
beyond a fixed concept of agency. I have shown in this thesis that when feminists 
maintain the assumption of prediscursive embodiment · they subsequently 
foreclose adequate concepts of agency. By affirming instances of subversive 
repetitions bf gender that inevitably emerge from within the terms of 
intelligibility, feminists are dissolving the assumption of prediscursive 
embodiment. The dissolution . of this concept and the sub.sequent institution of a 
constitutive model of embodiment, brings with it the possibility of ,a concept of 
agency beyond that of prediscursive agency. In the context of reproductive 
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technology for instance, this would ensure that feminists, while being able to 
utilise the principle of personal autonomy, would not assume that this was the 
only means to women's agency. As I have argued, the assumption of 
prediscursive agency perpetuates the false .assumption that subversion is not 
possible from within patriarchal contexts such as those which involve the use of 
reproductive technologies. As Butler informs us, the possibility of subverting . 
gendered identity norms is a possibility within any patriarchal context. In short, 
the gesture of affirming instances of subversive gender· enactment, is a necessary 
preliminary to destabilising the assumption of prediscursive embodiment. 
Subsequently, this indicates that agency exists within the terms of patriarchy and 
eliminates the false assumption that women's agency is somehow secured by 
encouraging women to withdraw from such practices as reproductive 
technologies. 
I have attempted to resolve an apparent contradiction that emerges from applying 
Butler's reconfiguration of agency to radical feminist critiques of reproductive 
technology. First, let me reiterate the apparent contradiction. I argued that Butler's 
agency should not be a substitution for a voluntarist concept of agency. This is 
because a voluntarist concept of agency functions as a useful theoretical and 
political fiction that services the protection of bodies. However, we have seen the 
way in which a concept of prediscursive embodiment foreclose adequate concepts 
of agency for women. The principle of personal autonomy perpetuates the concept 
of prediscursive embodiment which naturalises and fixes a voluntarist concept of 
agency. Thus, there is a conflict between the fact it is necessary to retain a 
conventional voluntarist concept of agency and the fact this concept of agency 
functions to constrain adequate concepts of women's agency. More broadly, there 
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1s a tension between the radical feminist use of the principle of · personal 
autonomy, and the fact this principle perpetuates a concept of prediscursive 
embodiment. 
However, I have suggested that this conflict can be resolved by adopting a 
Butlerian concept.ion of agency and in particular, by substituting a concept of 
embodied or corporeal subjectivity for a concept of prediscursive subjectivity. As 
we have seen, B.utler's concept of agency is dependent upon the . matrix of . 
intelligibility. This is because, the possibility of subversive gender enactment is 
dependent. upon the contin~ing presence of the gendered identity norms which ~he · 
matrix produces. I have also suggested that · the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment that underlies this matrix functions to foreclose adequate concepts of 
agency. The assumption of prediscursive embodiment simultaneously fixes the · 
assumption of a pre-social agent who is vested with agency. The assumption of a 
fixed conception of agency excludes the recognition of alternate concepts of 
agency. For example, we have seen how within radical feminist critiques of 
reproductive . technology there is a perpetuation of the concept of prediscursiv·e 
subjectivity. We have also seen how the radical feminist's reliance upon this 
conventional approach to the issue of women's agency leads radical feminists to 
advocate wo.men's withdrawal from patriarchal practices such as reproductive 
technology. In terms· of Butler~s agency, this exclusion is b'ased, on the false 
presumption · that agency is secured by getting · women to withdraw from rather 
than participate in such practices. According to Butler's reconceptualisation of the 
concept of agency, the possibility for subversive acts are an inevitable feature of 
gender enactment - irrespective of context. This reconceptualisation of agency is 
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premised on the idea that the concept of prediscursive embodiment 1s a 
discursively regulated fiction. 
So, the foreclosing of adequate concepts of agency is related to the perpetuation 
of a concept of prediscursive embodiment that regulates and fixes a specific 
configuration of agency. I have argued however, that the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment is destabilised by the revelation of the discursive origins of gendered 
subjectivity. In this thesis I endeavoµ_red to affirm those instances of subversive 
gender enactment that according to Butler, inevitably emerge from acting within 
the terms of the matrix of cultural intelligibility. In particular, I showed that the 
discourses that surround reproductive technologies provide not only examples of 
coherent gender identities , but simultaneously, the opportunity for subversive 
gender enactment. By assuming the prediscursive nature of embodiment and 
thereby the fixed nature of conventional agency, radical feminists are falsely 
assuming that the possibility of contesting patriarchy comes through women's 
withdrawal from such practices as reproductive technologies. I have shown that 
Butler's dissolution of the assumption of prediscursive embodiment and her 
subsequent· reconfiguration of the concept of agency reveal that women 's 
participation in such practices allows for the subversion of dominant patriarchal 
identity norms, particularly those related to motherhood. This is not to suggest 
that women should be explicitly encouraged to utilise reproductive techn.ologies. 
Rather, the point is that radical feminists advocate women's withdrawal from such 
practices on the basis of a false assumption that women's agency is somehow 
secured by avoiding reproductive technologies. This false assumption emerges 
from the failure to recognise the fictitious nature of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment. Moreover, this is not to suggest that in order to overcome the 
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problems associated with a perpetuation of the concept of prediscursive 
embodiment feminists should abandon the use of a conventional, voluntarist 
concept of agency. Rather, voluntarist agency can function as a useful fiction that 
setvices the protection of bodies. This only however, provided the assumption of 
. prediscursive . embGdiment is trans·cended, thus dissolving its univocal position _ 
within radical feminist discourses pertaining to reproductive techn_ologies. 
Apparently then, Butler's dissolution of the sex/gender distinction shows us that it 
is possible to expand the range of concepts of agency for . women. I have 
illustrated thi_s point by uniting Butler's configuration of agency with a 
conventional approach to this issue within the context of reproductive 
technologies. This conventional approach was seen to inadvertently foreclose 
concepts of agency on the basis that a voluntarist concept of agency, and in 
particular, a concept of prediscursive embodiment, held a univocal position within 
radical feminist critiques of reproductive technology. I have argued that a 
conventional approach to agency needs to be s~pplemented with several vital 
recognitions. First, that the possibility of contesting patriarchal norms is no less 
evident when women participate in those practices and context_s that, by the terms 
of an exclusively conventional approach to agency, women are compelled to 
reject. Second, that the recognition of this mode of agency stems from the 
dissolution of the sex/gender distinction and the subsequent' institution of a theory 
of constitutive embodied subjectivity . 
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CONCLUSION -
I began this thesis by providing the reader with an example of a recent political 
response to the issue of reproductive technology: 
Women's Bodies Are Not Biological Laboratories. 
Demand Reproductive Freedom. 
(Sticker for N .U .S Women's Department. 1996. Macquarie University.) 
Its implicit meanings I suggested, correspond to specific and important theoretical 
objectives within conventional .feminist philosophy. In particular, they correspond 
to the radical feminist endeavour to subvert patriarchal control of women's 
bodies. I also. suggested however, that in relation to contemporary fem in ism's 
reje.ction of the sex-gender distinction, this slogan comes to represent alternate 
negative meanings for women. In this thesis I have attempted to elucidate Butler's 
dissoluti9n of the sex-gender distinction. Specifically, I examined the effect of 
Butler's rejection of the sex-gender distinction on conceptions of women's agency 
within the context of feminists critiques of reproductive technology. With regard 
to this examination, let's review the question of how this seemingly positive 
message can come to represent something negative for women. 
In this thesis I have tried to show. that the radical feminist critique of reproductive 
technology inadvertently conflicts with · the ambitions of feminism. Concerned 
with the issue of reproductive freedom, radical feminists adhere to an exclusive 
conception of agency. In particular, by assuming that the only means whereby 
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women can find a sp·ace for autonomy is by rejecting reproductive technologies, 
radical feminists perpetuate the assumption that women's agency is dependent 
upon a voluntarist concept of agency. Correspondingly, the slogan which features 
above inherently figures reproductive technologies as necessarily working against 
the interests of women. Moreover, though not explicit, this slogan invites a 
rejection of reproductive technologies on the basis that they represent a reduction 
in women's reproductive freedom. 
In terms of Butler's thesis, this slogan is implicitly negative for women because it 
inadvertently propounds a reduction in configurations of women's agency. This is 
because this slogan implicitly upholds a prediscursive conception of agency as the 
only means to agency for women. The upholding of a prediscursive conception of 
agency as singular and fixed leads to the false assumption that the only means of 
contesting patriarchal culture is through a rejection of reproductive technologies. 
However, the recognition of the possibility of agency within the terms of 
signification indicates that women's participation in such practices as 
reproductive technology are in fact compatible with the possibility of agency for 
women. As Butler argues, participation in those discourses and practices that are 
the very scene of agency are a means for subverting patriarchal gender norms. 
This is not to suggest that women's agency is for.eclosed by withdrawing from 
such social practices, rather radical feminists are incorrect in their assumption that 
the only means for contesting patriarchy is through a rejection of such 
technologies. 
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The reasoning which underlies the radical feminist position seems to be a 
questionable means ·of encouraging women to be active participants in life. 
Diprose makes the comment that it is hard to see why the objections to surrogacy 
and reproductive . technology, as expressions of patriarchal control and domination 
over women's bodies, should not be extended to include procreation in general .. 
(Diprose 1994b, pp 112-113) This is to say that all activities related to 
reproduction occur within a patriarchal context. If radical fe·minists seek a space 
for autonomy in relation to the context of reproductive technologies, why not in 
all contexts tainted by · patriarchy? Should women reject all manifestations of 
patriarchal culture? What sort of life would this amount to for women? I am 
trying to suggest that the reasoning which underlies the radical feminist critique 
of reproductive technologies suggests that women's only means of protection or 
escape from patriarchy is by refusing to be active social participants. This point 
becomes critical when one considers that it is a seemingly impossible task for 
women to find a space outside of patri.archy. When radical feminists maintain the 
need to reject specific manifestations of patriarchal culture, they naively assume 
that a rejection of patriarchal culture is in fact possible. Thus, radical feminist's 
reliance upon an exclusive conception of agency is not simply problematic 
because it leads to the ·unnecessary conclusion that women need to reject 
reproductive technologies in order to contest patriarchy. More generally, it can be 
regarded as an incoherent means of attemptjng to contest the ideals of patriarchy 
in so far as escape from patriarchy is a cultural impossibility. 
But what if feminisCs could theorise a means of contesting patriarchy that did not 
amount to a withdrawal into inaction? What if the very means of contesting 
patriarchy were to be found by participating in those practices often deemed 
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oppressive by feminism? In this thesis I have tried to show that for Judith Butler, 
the negative implications which stem from the appropriation of an exclusive 
conception of agency can be transcended by instituting a concept of constitutive 
embodied subjectivity. A concept of constitutive embodied subjectivity evokes a 
conception of agency that promotes women's participation in patriarchal practices 
. such as reproductive technology , · as well as the possibility of subverting 
patriarchal gender norms. (This is not to s~ggest that feminists should abolish a 
conventional concept of agency , which I have argued, can still function to protect _· 
women 's individual autonomy and sovereignty. Significantly however , Butler ' s 
agency provides a means for feminism to theorise about women's agency beyond 
the naive and I believe , disturbing assumption that women's freedom is to be 
found through (the impossible task of ) a rejection of cultural patriarchal 
practices. 
At one point in _this thesis , I questioned whether contemporary feminism 's shift 
towards a constitutive theory of embodied subjectivity was justified. In particular, 
I asked to what extent this concept of subjectivity succeeds where the sex-gender 
distinction does not? In this thesis I have indicated that a concept of constitutive 
embodied subjectivity provides feminism with a conception of agency that can be 
regarded as potentially positive for women. In particular we have seen the 
emergence of a concept of agency as an issue of signification and resignification 
works , allows feminism to transcend the limitations associated with theorising in 
relation to an exclusive conception of agency. This seems to_ suggest that the 
abolition of the sex-gender distinction and the subsequent shift towards a 
constitutive theory of embodied subjectivity marks a positive, and I believe 
necessary theoretical development within feminist philosophy. 
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I have attempted to illustrate the significance of this theoretical development to 
the issue of agency in the context of feminist debates on reproductive technology. 
Of course, it is possible to speculate about the potential significance of employing 
a theory of constitutive . embodied subjectivity in relation · to other issues within ·. 
feminist philosophy. I am thinking in here about issues such as pornography 
which, like the issue of reproductive technology, many feminists have 
traditionally regarded as an expres;ion of patriarchal control over women.
36 
Indeed, central to her most recent text . Excitable Speech: A Politics of the . 
Perforrnative, Butler appeals to her reconfiguration of the concept of agency to 
address directly the issue of pornography. Butler maintains that feminists who 
argue against pornography figure pornography as a constitutive speech act which 
"~einvokes and re inscribes a structural relation of domination". (Butler 1997, 
p18)
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In this thesis we have seen emerge from a theory of constitutive embodied 
subjectivity, Butler's reconfiguration of the concept of agency. 'Agency' 
redefined as an issue about signification and, most importantly resignification, 
indicates for Butler the possibility of an alternate response to the issue of 
pornography for feminists. Speech acts, defined by Butler as a bodily act, are a 
means of contesting or subverting the constitutive force of pornography. Like the 
act of parodying gender, a repetition· of speech acts brings forth moments which · 
contest the terms from which they are generated. As Butler's asks in her rhetorical 
style: 
Is there a repetition that might disjoin the speech act from 
its supporting conventions s~ch that its . repetition 
confounds rather than consolidates? (Butler 1997, p 20) 
,,, 
I 
I 
11, 
l1 
Iii 
j., 
137 
In the present context however, my main concern has been with the implications 
of a theory of constitutive embodied subjectlvity upon conceptions of women's 
agency, within the context of feminist critiques of reproductive technology. I have 
tried to demonstrate that a concept of constitutive embodied subjectivity is a 
theoretical tool with which feminists can not only create new perspectives on 
conventional feminist theory, but subsequently gain new incites into how to 
recognise and overcome the discursive mechanisms which subordinate women. 
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NOTES-
INTRODUCTION -
1 See Lloyd , G. (1984) 
2 See Jordanova , L. (1989) 
138 . 
3 Wollstonecraft rejects the idea of an innate disposition in women and encourages the 
development of women's reason through education. See Wollstonecraft , M. (1975). A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman. This position does not entail a rejection of women's traditional social 
role. As Diprose a~gues, " Wo~lstonecraft is arguing for a revolution in the way in which the 
female social role is executed rather than a revolution or change of that role per se ." (Gatens 
1991, p22). 
4 While generally, the sex/gender distinction denotes an arbitrary connection between femininity 
and the female body , its significance varies in accordance with the type of feminism for which it 
has been appropriated, in particular the way in which various.forms of feminism figure the b_ody. 
As Grosz outlines, for egalitarian feminists, the body figures as an obstacle to emancipation, while 
social constructionists view the body as an object "whose representation and functioning is 
political , socially marking male and female as distinct." (Grosz 1994, p16) This discussion 
however, refers more generally to the observation that in either instance, a dualist conception of 
subjectivity is perpetuated. 
5 
This concept of constructionism should not be confused with that domain within feminism that 
is called ' social constructionism ' . Social constructionists are those feminist theorists who adhere 
to the idea of a socially constructed subjectivity. Constructionism in this context refers to the idea 
that both subjectivity and embodiment are an effect of discursive configurations. 
139 
6 In the area of political philosophy see Gatens, M. (1996) In the area of bioethics see Diprose , R. 
(1996) (1995) (1994b), Rothhfield , P. (1995), Komesaroff, P. (ed.) (1995). In the area of 
biomedicine see Diprose , R. (1994c) , Diprose , R. & Vasseleu , C. (1991b), Vasseleu , C. (1991), 
Walby , C. (1996). In the area of anthropology see Biddle, J. (1993). In the area of cognitive 
psychology see Wilson , E. (1996). 
7 See in particular Gatens , M. (1996) where she appeals to the work of Spinoza to -contest 
dualism. Like Gatens , Lloyd also utilises the work of Spinoza to develop new ways of 
conceptu~lising sexual difference in relation to reason. See Lloyd, G. (1994) (1993) (1989). 
8 See also Diprose , R. (1996) 
9 This position is largely influenced by the work of Gena Corea, Janice Raymond , Robyn 
Rowland and Renate Duelli Klein. See Corea, G (1985) (1987) (1988), Raymond , J. (1994) 
(1989), Rowland , R. (1992) (1987) (1985) (1984), Duelli Klein , R. (1994) (1992) (1989a) 
(1989b) (1987) (1984) , Du.elli Klein , R & Rowland, R. (1988). The critique of reproductive 
technologies associated with these theorists is elaborated in Scutt , J . ed·. (1988). A more detailed 
examination of the radical feminist position features in part one of this thesis. 
10 
This position is epitomised by the work of Wajcam, J. (1991) , Stanworth , M. (1990) (1987), 
Sawicki , J. (1991). 
11 
For a broad range of contemporary perspectives on reproductive technologies see Bequaert 
Holmes , H. (1992), Hepburn, L. (1992). 
PART ONE-
12 
Susan Bordo makes the point that while Foucauldian ideas seem to dominate in Butler 's texts, 
Butler is more Derridean than Foucaulqian. Bordo contrasts Butler from Foucault on the basis 
that, unlike Butler, Foucault maintains the relevance of "institutional .and everyday practices by 
means of which our experience of the .body is organised". (Bordo 1992, pl 70) See also Bordo, S . 
(1993). 
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13 An example of abject identity which features in Butler's text is that of the hermaphrodite. 
(Butler. 1990, p23) The hermaphrodite contradicts the terms of intelligibility in so far as the 
binary frame for sex upon which cultural intelligibility is built does not accommodate such 
phenomenon. The tendency within culture to define the hermaphrodite as 'biologically abnormal ' 
demonstrates Butler's point that, as an identity which contradicts the terms of intelligibility , 
hermaphrodites occupy a marginalised or abject status within culture. The experience of living 
within a marginalised position within culture is well documented in Foucault, M. (1980) (ed.) 
Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Journals of a Nineteenth-Century 
Hermaphrodite. 
14 
For Sey la Benhabib, this amounts to a "Death of the Subject" thesis which is "incompatible 
with feminism." (Benhabib 1995a, p 20) Benhabib maintains that the abolition of_ the concept of a 
unified subject conflicts with the possibility of female emancipation. In particular, the ' Death of 
the Subject ' problematises politically expedient concepts of agency, autonomy and selfhood. By 
dissolving the assumption of unified subjectivity Butler dissolves the concept of a pre-social 
agency - a "doer behind the deed". "If this view of the self is adopted" Benhabib asks, "is there 
any possibility of changing those 'expressions' which constitute us?" (Benhabib 1995a, p 21) 
15 
Many thanks to Rosalyn Diprose for providing me with a copy of this unpublished manuscript. 
16 
While the specific paradigm from which Diprose extracts this conceptio~ of subjectivity is 
taken from a report on surrogacy, she does indicate that its basic principles "provide an apt guide 
to what is typically taken to be the nature of individuals, and of the relations between individuals, 
in biomedical et~ics." (Di prose 1994b, p 2) 
17 
Diprose also adds that "in the event that an individual is ignorant of her best interests it is 
assumed that the ethicist can Jefine these for her." (Diprose 1994b, p 3) 
18 
See Pateman, C. (1988), Gilligan, C. (1982). 
19 
Finnrage were formally called Finnret: Feminist International Network on the New 
Reproductive Technologies. Cited in Donchin, A. (1989). 
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20 It has been argued that Corea 's text contextualises reproductive technology within the history 
of reproduction by appealing to the theoretical framework outlined by Obrien (1981): "Obrien 's 
analysis of reproduction is centrally premised on the distinction between women's continuous 
reproductive experience and men's continuous one. For Corea, this provides a key insight into the 
efforts by men to increasingly control women's reproductive capacity." (Franklin & McNeil 1988, 
P 550) 
21 
For a broad range of contemporary perspectives on reproductive technologies see Holmes, 
H.B. (ed) (1994). 
22 
See Klein, R. (1994) (1989), Raymond , J. (1994), Ince , C. & Corea, G. (1987). 
23 
See also Bartholet, E. (1992), Williams, L. S. (1992), Koch , L (1992), Klein R. (ed.) (1989) , 
Rowland , R. (1987), Grundberg, S. & Dowrick, ~- (1980). 
24 
See also Bartholet, E. (1992), Williams, L.S. (1992), Koch , L (1992), Franklin , S. (1990), 
Klein, R. (1989b), Crow, C. (1985), Corea, G (1988). 
25 
For the purpose of discussion I have concentrated on the radical feminist objection that 
reproductive technologies compromise women's autonomy. In focusing on this issue I do not 
mean to undervalue those criticisms directed against reproductive technologies which relate to 
issues such as eugenics and racism. For an examination of these i·ssues see Klein , R. (1994), 
Raymond, J. (1994), Akhter , F. (1992), Nair, S. (1992) . . 
PARTTWO-
26 
This is not to say that Benhabib rejects a post-structuralist. account of subjectivity per se. As 
Nicholson describes, Benhabib is primarily concerned with the dangers associated with "strong 
formulations " of postmodern critiques of subjectivity. (Nicholson 1995, p3) For Benhabib these 
' strong formulations' eliminate the concept of subjectivity all together. As I have noted, she 
regards this abolition of the idea of subjectivity as incompatible with the idea of autonomy, 
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agency and accountability, and thereby a negation of the possibility of emancipation and historical 
change. 
27 S~e Klein , R. (1994) , (1989), Raymond, J. (1994), O'Keefe , M. (1992), Steinberg , D.L. (1990), 
Solomon , A. (1989) , Klein & Rowland (1988). 
28 I have employed a general concept of autonomy which does account for the difference between 
specific notions of autonomy. It might be argued that the radical feminist~· critique of reproductive 
technologies implicitly refers ·to several different notions of autonomy. For instance , when radical 
feminists reject reproductive technologies on the basis that the are physically dangerous they are 
appealing to a concept of a personal autonomy. Yet, when they reject reproductive technologies 
on the basis that a woman 's consent is not informed, are referring to the concept of legal 
autonomy in so far as the issue ot'informed consent is a legal issue. As Meyers has outlined, there 
are many different notions of autonomy and the differences between such concepts are not always 
clear. Consequently, I will use the concept of autonomy in a general sense which subsumes any 
specific notion of thi~ concept. For a discussion of specifically defined concepts of autonomy and 
the relationship between such concepts, see Meyers, D. (1989), Christman , J. (1 ~89). 
29 ·Drucilla Cornell makes a similar point when she responds to Butler's critique of foundationalist 
theories of subjectivity. Cornell ,maintains that while, as Butler argues; foundationalist theories of 
subjectivity have functioned as instruments of cultural imperialism , such theories have also had . 
emancipatory effects. Her broader point is that the univocal position of a post-structuralist account 
of subjectivity within Butler's work ignores not only the emancipatory possibilities of alternate 
theories of subjectivity, but also that alternate theories of subjectivity are "too, bits of cultural 
discourse whose meanings are subject to "resignification"." (Cornell 1995 , p69) I perceive this 
position to be consistent with a familiar objection to post-structuralist account of identity , namely, 
that it is often presented as a "privileged critical framework". See Bardo, S. (1990), Fraser, N. & 
Nicholson, L.J. (1990). 
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30 Some theorists have contested the idea that the maintenance of personal autonomy is simply 
about a persons right to make decisions for themselves free from interference. Meyers argues for 
instance that people may willingly avail themselves of their libert_y. Hence, they make a personal 
decision for themselves - "yet lack personal autonomy." (Meyers , D. 1989 , p 18). 
31 Again , this echoes Drucilla Cornell's point that foundationalist theories of subjectivity can 
have emancipatory effects and for this reason should not be rejected by feminism. See Cornell , D. 
(1995). 
32 While 'the lesbian mother' can be regarded as ari example of an abject or subversive identity it 
is vital ·to recognise that entry into programs involving the use of reproductive technologies are 
restricted to married heterosexual women, at least in Australia. (Michaels, M. 1996 , p 66) 
Moreover, Hepburn makes the point that such restriction extends to include low-income women 
who cannot afford such procedures. ( Hepburn, 1992, p115). See also Crowe, C. (1990). Thus , 
' the lesbian mother ', and as I will later argue , 'the single mother ', might be described as potential 
instances of parodic repetition in instances where reproductive practices are regulated to exclude 
the participation of some women. However, there are instances of sperm donor arrangements, in 
which 'the gay parent' identity has emerged. Such instances re-scribe traditional identity norms 
relating to parenthood and the ideology of the family. See Benkov , L. (1994). 
33 For a discussion on the way in which reproductive technologies contribute to a redefinition of 
motherhood and dominant family ideology see Michaels, M.W. (1996) and Haines , E. (1992) 
respectively. 
34 Rothman argues that it is this very subversion of motherhood that undermines not only 
women 's identity in so far as it is linked to maternal values, but also social well-being. (Rothman, 
B.K. 1989). 
35 It can also be argued that this point signals a rebuttal to Benhabib's objection that Butler 's 
conception of the subject seems to disallow agency. What Benhabib fails to acknowledge is that 
according to Butler 'change' is an inevitable feature of gender enactment or ' performativity'. As 
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we have seen, Benhabib asks whether there is any possibility "of changing those 'expressions' 
that constitute us?" (Benhabib 1995a, p 21) Butler responds by reminding Benhabib that "In the 
course of Gender Trouble, I suggest that change and alteration is part of the very process of 
perform-ativity. "(Butler 1995b, p 135). 
CONCLUSION -
36 
See Dworkin , A. (1994). 
37 
This argument actually refers to Matsuda 's thesis regarding th e nature of speech acts, in 
particular her view that speech acts enact rather than reflect relations of social domination. Butler 
argues the relevance of this account of speech in so far as the argument against pornography is 
based on the same assumption. (Butler, J. 1997, p18-19). 
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